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1 The Policy Relevance 
of Linked Employer-
Employee Data
Alex Bryson1 and John Forth2
The role of linked employer-employee data (LEED) in advancing
understanding of labour markets is well-established in parts of Northern
Europe. Recognising the potential of such data, the United States has
devoted considerable resources to constructing LEED from existing
administrative sources. In the European Union, there is a similar drive. In
the United Kingdom, despite an excellent nationally-representative LEED
survey3 which has helped us understand the contours of industrial
relations, and the recent emergence of some administrative LEED sources,
the analysis of such data remains in its relative infancy. Furthermore,
throughout the world, we believe that insufficient attention has been paid
to the ways in which LEED data can make a contribution to policy analysis.
This is the challenge to labour economists and other researchers as they
seek to persuade national and supranational governments to commit
sizeable resources to the production and analysis of these data.
It was in response to this challenge that the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) and the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) ran a one-day
workshop in London on the 16th September 2005, bringing together some
of the principal LEED analysts from Europe and the United States. Their
papers, brought together in this volume, deal with a variety of substantive
issues. But all focus on how LEED have been used to bear down on
questions of policy-relevance, and all identify the unique contribution that
LEED have made to our understanding of labour markets and firms. They
also touch on some of the technical and administrative problems
encountered in generating such data, and the difficulties in ensuring that
it is available at a time and in a form that can be readily digested by
analysts and policy-makers in government and beyond.
The remainder of this introduction discusses the main ‘types’ of LEED,
identifies their potential advantages over other data, illustrates how
policy-relevant issues such as productivity can be tackled with LEED, and
introduces the papers in this volume.
1
1 Policy Studies Institute and Wertheim Fellow, Harvard Law School and NBER.
2 National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
3 The Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) 2004. See http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/emar/wers5.htm
1.1 Types of LEED
There are two main ‘flavours’ or ‘types’ of LEED: longitudinal and cross-
sectional. Longitudinal LEED are usually based on administrative data,
while the richest cross-sectional LEED are based on surveys of workplaces
and their employees, often conducted face-to-face. We elaborate on their
respective advantages and disadvantages in turn.
The role of longitudinal LEED: These data track workers and their firms or
workplaces over time. They are particularly suited to linking firm and
workplace fortunes (labour productivity, employment growth, survival) to
worker flows (entry and exit) and worker progression (tenure and wages)
within the firm. One can identify human resource (HR) practices at firm
and workplace level using information on entry wages, wage dispersion,
wage progression, and rates of entry and exit from the employer, and link
these to performance measures over time. Using the time-component of
the data one can make causal inferences about the impact of alternative
HR regimes, and switches in those regimes, on firm and workplace-level
productivity and performance.4 The construction of similar ‘HR proxies’
across national data sets would permit comparisons of the impacts of
similar practices and procedures across countries, as well as within them.
Longitudinal LEED also permit consideration of the extent to which
productivity change observed in cross-section is driven by behavioural
change within continuing employers, compositional change in employers
due to entry and exit, or a combination.
The role of cross-sectional LEED: Cross-sectional survey-based data contain
smaller numbers of observations than administratively-based LEED but
are richer in covariates. These are usually collected using dedicated survey
instruments, often in face-to-face interviews, with HR managers and
employees. Nationally representative data of this type are available for the
UK (1998 and 2004), Australia (1995), Canada (1999, 2001) and Norway
(1989) while in France employer-based surveys (REPONSE 1998 and 2004)
have been linked to administrative data on employees. The value of these
survey-based LEED lies in the detailed information they contain regarding
both policies and practices of workplaces across national economies,
coupled with information on employees. In some cases they also contain
information on employee attitudes. The available data items permit
comparisons of avowed policies, on the one hand, and practices on the
other, sometimes distinguishing between the simple incidence of a
practice or procedure, and the extent to which it is ‘embedded’ within an
organisation (in terms of coverage and its integration with other policies).
The data on employee attitudes to jobs and to the employer also permit us
to establish whether the causal mechanisms posited by Human Resource
Management (HRM) and other academics do, in fact, obtain and, if so, where
and under what conditions.
2
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4 One of the best and most recent examples of this sort of work is ‘The Effect of HRM Practices and R&D
Investment on Worker Productivity’ by Frederik Anderson et al. (2005), SOLE Conference Paper.
Surveys can be combined with administrative data, as has occurred in
countries like Norway, Denmark, Germany and France. This can permit
analyses of longer-term impacts of practices and policies on workers and
the firm that can be traced in the administrative data, as well as offering
opportunities to investigate the antecedents of practice introduction. The
combination of survey and administrative information can also be a
means of cross-validating the HRM proxy measures generated through
wage and other administrative measures and can be used to compare
results using subjective and objective measures of productivity and
performance, as has been done recently with the 2004 British Workplace
Employment Relations Survey (Kersley et al., 2006).
1.2 Unique advantages to LEED
There are four ways in which LEED can offer unique insights into
processes within establishments and in the labour market at large:
1. If there is something ‘specific’ to worker-firm matching which generates
both costs and returns to both parties, a proper understanding of labour
market dynamics requires observation of that match.
2. Analyses are enriched by data from both the employer and employee
side such that otherwise unobserved features of the employment
relationship can be accounted for in analyses, overcoming some of the
biases inherent in data relying solely on employers or employees.
3. Multiple observations of employees within multiple workplaces permit
analyses of the relative contributions to the distribution of pay and other
labour market features that are attributable to within- and across-
workplace dispersion.
4. Where LEED are longitudinal, one can tackle worker and employer
selection processes and the antecedents and consequences of practice/
worker adoption, thus permitting a more rigorous assessment of causal
processes than might otherwise be the case.
We illustrate some of these points below in the context of research on
labour productivity, but most of the points apply to other substantive
issues. LEED offer insights into the determinants of labour productivity
that are not possible using traditional techniques.
1.3 Illustrations of how LEED can tackle productivity and other
policy-relevant issues
There are a number of policy-relevant issues to be addressed with LEED
data. Some examples are outlined in a little more detail below, focusing on
the substantive issue of labour productivity.
Antecedents of practice introduction: relatively little is known about the
antecedents to practice adoption and longevity. This is interesting in its
3
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own right, not least because some of the practices that studies have
identified as potentially productivity-enhancing have not been widely
adopted by firms. It may be that adopters are those who benefit most from
such policies, either because there are heterogeneous returns to practices
or because differences in the cost of adoption generate different net
returns. A better understanding of the conditions under which particular
policies are adopted, or abandoned, will help us better understand this
issue, including the potential endogeneity of particular practices. LEED can
make a particular contribution where they contain information on worker
flows into and out of plants at moments of technological adoption, and
when they measure employee reactions to technological innovation.
Heterogeneous impacts: the returns to particular practices may be
heterogeneous, in which case one would expect differences in estimated
effects of treatment-on-the-treated and treatment-on-the-non-treated.
Current theories and studies suggest this heterogeneity would manifest
itself along dimensions such as firm size and the nature of product market
competition. With longitudinal LEED one might be able to identify which
firms benefit from which policies, and under what conditions. Analyses of
this sort could address whether there are ‘best practices’ that, if adopted,
can work for ‘all’, or whether firms must seek a ‘fit’ between their policies
and the external environment they find themselves in. Where data are
available on the employees at the firm the analyst is better able to
establish what practices should ‘fit’ given the composition and
orientations of the workforce. Answering these questions is a prerequisite
to engaging with policy questions regarding practice transfers across
firms and countries.
Within and across firm variance in productivity: Little is known about the
contributions of within and across-firm variance in productivity to variance
at economy-level. One might establish how ‘bunched’ firms are in terms
of their productivity levels and growth, and compare across countries.
There will be particular interest in the tails of the productivity distribution,
that is, high and low performers, and why it is that the UK seems to have
a particularly long low-productivity tail. This raises a fundamental
question: if firms can survive with low productivity, what are they
managing to maximise in order to survive? Equally important is the
degree to which workers’ productivity differs within and across the
workplaces in a firm. Where data sets contain firm-level identifiers one can
explore the degree to which within-firm variance in productivity and
growth are related to policies and practices.
Roles of compositional and within-firm change in productivity dynamics:
Whereas something is known about time-series trends in productivity
across countries, little is known as to whether they are driven by
compositional change in firms or by behavioural change in continuing
workplaces. Links between productivity and labour turnover – including
job shedding and job creation – are also best tackled with longitudinal LEED.
4
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1.4 Practical difficulties in using LEED
If the compilation and analysis of LEED data were straightforward, it would
probably have become widespread in Britain already. In practice, there are
a number of practical problems that need to be overcome before one can
undertake this sort of research. First, the data need to be collected. This
can be expensive, requiring government departments and others to
devote considerable resources to the issue. Longitudinal data require
investments to track units over time and to minimise attrition, while rich
survey-based cross-sectional data are expensive to collect. In some cases,
changes in rules and regulations are required to join up existing data sets.
Second, the data need to be made available to researchers for analysis.
This is often very difficult, especially where the data were collected from
employers or employees as part of statutory obligations. In such
circumstances, the conditions under which data can be passed to third
parties is very limited, and may require researchers to be employees of
government agencies, or conduct analyses in secure environments on
government premises. Confidentiality issues can arise even where data
are anonymised. Even where it is practically possible to link different data
sets with unique identifiers, there are a range of reasons why this may not
be possible, including refusals by one or other arm of government to share
its data with others, even if legally entitled to do so.
Third, data must be in a format allowing researchers to manipulate and
analyse them. This can prove very challenging, especially when data
collection is primarily motivated for non-research reasons. Even when
analysts are permitted to manipulate data, they may follow different
protocols from one another, making it difficult to compare results across
analysts: this is a particular problem when comparing data over time or
across countries. All of this can take time, so that a particular problem can
be the timeliness of any analyses conducted. For LEED to have an impact
on policy formation and execution, it needs to be available for analysis
soon after collection.
1.5 The papers presented
Eight papers were presented at the September 2005 DTI-PSI workshop5.
This publication contains shortened versions of seven of them. These are
briefly summarised below.
Ed Lazear and Kathryn Shaw’s seminal paper uses LEED from eight
countries to explore firm wage structures and promotion, hiring and
mobility patterns. The main finding is that countries are remarkably
similar in their wage structures and wage changes. Most wage variation is
within firm. Although there is a good bit of variation between firms in 
every country, firms have a large range of the wage distribution within.
With respect to wage growth, although firms differ with respect to the
5
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5 They can be downloaded at: http://www.psi.org.uk/events/event.asp?event_id=91
average raises they give in a particular year, the standard deviation of
raises within firm is between 10 per cent and 20 per cent, even when 
average raises are close to zero. This is most consistent with the view that
firms respond to outside pressure (either market or governmental) to raise
workers’ wages commensurate with some occupational or skill standard.
Mobility levels differ across countries but, on the whole, high wage firms
have lower mobility than low wage firms and entry and exit rates are
positively correlated, with entry rates being somewhat larger than exit
rates in most country years.
David Margolis, using data for France, shows that takeovers have
important consequences for employment that are only visible in LEED.
Characterising acquired and acquiring firms in terms of their
compensation policies and human resource management practices, he
shows that firms behave essentially as predicted by economic theory
concerning mergers and acquisitions. Some takeovers seem to be driven
by ex-ante perceptible differences in firm characteristics, most notably
compensation policy, that could be perceived as sources of inefficiency to
be improved upon after the takeover occurs. Acquired firms tend to be
significantly more indebted but with significantly higher returns on assets
than the firms that acquire them, consistent with the idea that mature
firms “buy in” opportunities for growth while young firms obtain their
necessary financing by being integrated into a larger entity. Analysis of
post-transaction continued employment shows that workforce
reorganisations performed by the new entity target similar types of
workers in the acquired and acquiring firms, suggesting that acquiring
firms may use the takeover event as a justification for undertaking a
broader restructuring, integrating the acquired firm’s employees into the
new entity and keeping only the most appropriate workers from both
firms. Workers who leave the firm after takeover tend to have low job
tenure, white-collar skills and unobserved characteristics that give them
low market value. For the most part, these are the workers who find it
easiest to get new jobs following a mass layoff, which means that
employment services may not need to be directed as intensely to
employees laid off after a takeover since these workers are likely to be able
to find new jobs relatively easily even in the absence of additional assistance.
Harald Dale-Olsen’s paper for Norway indicates that fringe benefits can
be important in managing firms’ human resources since workers’ quit
behaviour is very sensitive to the offering of fringe benefits.
Establishments also achieve higher productivity by offering more fringe
benefits, although it is not clear whether this is caused by workers
providing more effort or if it is caused by saving recruitment costs, and
they also have higher survival rates than other establishments. This is as
expected, since a strategy that yields improved productivity for the
establishment should imply a higher survival rate.
From a policy point of view this article thus advocates the use of fringe
benefits as part of the compensation policies offered to workers by employers.
6
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Nabanita Datta Gupta and Tor Eriksson’s paper uses Danish LEED to
investigate the effect of new workplace practices on the gender wage gap.
The theory as to whether or not these new work practices can be the great 
equaliser when it comes to the persistent pay gap that exists between men
and women is ambiguous. Empirical evidence presented in the paper
indicates that wage gains from the introduction of new workplace 
practices (such as self-managed teams, project organisation and job
rotation schemes) seem to accrue mainly to salaried males, and in fact,
wage losses accrue to females so that the gender gap in pay widens at the
level of the firm. In most instances male wages increase and female wages
are reduced in firms that offer these practices. When both groups get
increases, then males obtain a relatively larger increase. The positive
effects on male wages are not a result of worker sorting. Nor do they seem
to be due to women having fewer possibilities to exploit potential gains
from the practices because of family responsibilities.
The paper by John Addison, Lutz Bellmann, Thorsten Schank, and Paulino
Teixeira explores demand for different types of labour using German panel
LEED, uncovering evidence that is not in accord with most studies to date.
Within manufacturing, unskilled workers appear to be substitutes for more
skilled workers whereas, in services, there is little evidence that unskilled
and skilled workers are affected by each other’s wage. Increased trade
does not appear to have adverse consequences for any skill group.
Perhaps most at odds with previous research is that they find no support
for skill-biased technical change: neither upgrading to state-of-the-art
equipment nor investing in information technology has negative
consequences for any skill categories. The authors suggest that if, as is
often argued, rigid wages lie at the heart of the German employment
problem, the evidence suggests some value in subsidising unskilled work.
Using British WERS98 LEED, Mark Bryan shows that workplace-level
hours ‘policies’ or norms are strong drivers of the hours that employees
end up working. Overall, they account for nearly a third of the variation in
hours explained by the analysis, and they have an especially large effect
in the private services sector. Hours’ variation within workplaces accounts
for over a third of the explained variance, with skill and occupation as well
as family characteristics all affecting hours within workplaces. Just over a
quarter of the variation in hours is explained by a sorting process of
workers to firms. Workers in occupations that entail long hours also tend
to be in workplaces where, on average, everyone works longer hours.
Finally, in their paper Alexander Hijzen, Peter Wright and Richard Upward
ask: what happens to workers’ earnings when their employer goes out of
business? They provide the first analysis that explicitly estimates the
earnings losses due to enterprise closure in the UK using data from the
New Earnings Survey Panel. They show earnings losses are primarily
associated with periods of non-employment rather than with falls in
wages for those who are re-employed. This is in sharp contrast to findings
7
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from the US, but consistent with the only other UK study on worker
displacement. Second, earnings losses do not appear to be particularly
long-lived. After controlling for observable characteristics displaced
workers earnings are not lower than non-displaced workers five years
after displacement.
8
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92 Wage Structure, Raises
and Mobility
Edward P. Lazear and Kathryn L. Shaw6
2.1 Introduction
This paper uses linked employer-employee data from a number of
different countries in an attempt to generalise about firm wage structures
and promotion, hiring and mobility patterns. This is principally done by
examining wage heterogeneity within and across firms, and also across
countries. The relationships with national income distributions, worker
mobility and productivity are also examined. Through this analysis, the
paper aims to address a number of specific questions:
1. What is the structure of wages within firms and how does that structure
compare to the structure of wages for the country as a whole?
Specifically, is the distribution of wages within firms less diffuse than
that for the country as a whole and how much variation is there in the
average wage between firms?
2. Is there much within-firm variation in wage growth rates? Does “a
rising tide lift all ships?” When a firm experiences a good year and
average wages rise considerably, do all workers share in the prosperity?
3. To what extent is there heterogeneity in wage raises between firms?
4. How does the extent of heterogeneity in wage levels and raises affect
worker mobility and productivity?
Until very recently, it would have been impossible to answer these
questions because they require data to be available on all of the workers
in a firm, for a large number of firms. But now, the required data are
available from a number of different countries. These data sets, from
many European countries and from the US, contain information on all
workers in those countries (or at least on a large subset of those workers).
As a result, it is possible to examine the worker in the context of his or her
entire firm.
This is not the first time such questions have been asked. However,
existing studies (Lazear, 1992; Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom, 1994a, b)
have made use of data on single firms. The advantage of these studies is
that they examine the entire firm, thereby analysing promotion paths,
determinants and consequences, as well as wage determination and
structure. The disadvantage is that because the studies each cover single
6 Stanford Graduate School of Business.
firms, it is difficult to generalise the results. This problem is accentuated
because not all of the results are consistent across the various studies.
Panel datasets that use the individual as the unit of analysis and sample
randomly from a large population are also inadequate, as they typically
have very few observations from the same firm. As a consequence, neither
a firm’s wage structure nor its hiring and promotion patterns can be
gleaned from traditional data. In contrast, the data presented in this paper
cover all workers in a large number of firms.
2.2 Wage structures, mobility and productivity
The implications of wage structures for income inequality, worker mobility
and productivity can be illustrated by means of examples.
Consider first the possibility that every firm is a microcosm of the overall
economy. All firms share the same distribution of income within the firm
as does the entire economy. In this case, the firm in which a worker finds
himself may be of little consequence, because all incomes and presumably
opportunities are represented. Alternatively (and equally implausibly), all
firms have but one wage. All workers within the firm earn the same
amount and the way by which a non-degenerate income distribution is
generated is that firms differ in the single wage that they pay. If the latter
characterises the labour market, then the only way for a worker to change
his earning situation is to change firms. Were mobility limited, the
consequence of initial firm assignment for income inequality could be
much more significant.
Different hiring and pay policies may also lead to different levels of
productivity. For example, it may be that firms with too compressed a
wage policy may experience lower productivity, because in the presence
of strict job-based wage setting, a worker wanting a higher wage must
move to another firm. Firms with compressed wage policies may therefore
see competitors stealing away their best workers, which might lower
productivity for the firm and perhaps even for the country as a whole.
Theory implies different patterns in wage heterogeneity within and across
firms. The theory of human capital states in its most basic form that
workers are paid on the basis of their general skills. Were human capital
the only determinant of wages, it would not matter at all in which firm a
worker finds himself. The competitive labour market would require that all
firms pay the worker exactly the same amount, irrespective of the firm in
which he works. Otherwise, other firms could easily steal him away by
paying a slightly higher wage and capturing the profits. This is most easily
described as a spot market view of the labour market, where competition
forces workers to be paid on the basis of the productivity, which is in turn
reflected perfectly in measurable skills. Nevertheless, a complication to
human capital theory was introduced even in Becker’s (1962) early paper
on human capital, where he defines ‘firm-specific’ human capital. This is
10
Making Linked Employer-Employee Data Relevant to Policy
11
Wage Structure, Raises and Mobility
skill that affects productivity in the worker’s current firm, but not in other
firms in the economy. It is important to distinguish between general and
firm-specific human capital. The latter creates an immediate reason why
wages might differ from firm to firm, even for the same worker. For
example, a worker who had a great deal of firm-specific human capital and
who encountered an unanticipated job loss, say because his plant closed,
would suffer a wage reduction in moving to another firm because the skills
used at the first firm would not all be transferable to the new firm.
A purely institutional theory of wage determination has the same
implication as the basic theory of human capital, namely, that a worker’s
wage is independent of the firm in which he is employed. Suppose that
wages were set by a central authority and the authority set the wage based
on the worker’s occupational title, years of schooling or years of
experience, perhaps for reasons of equity. Each of these may be
independent of the worker’s level of productivity within the firm. There are,
however, other theories that imply heterogeneity across firms. Tournament
models7, for example, which are most applicable to white collar workers,
suggest that wage structures within firms serve incentive purposes and
that it is the structure, rather than the current wage that determines the
strength of the incentive. In tournament theories, workers at higher levels
of the firm’s hierarchy receive pay that has impacts on those below them.
Lower level workers want to become higher level workers and their desire
to climb the internal job ladder depends on the raise that workers receive
when they are promoted (non-monetary as well as monetary). Since the
optimal size of the raise depends on internal conditions like the riskiness of
the activity and the shape of the firm’s hierarchy, tournament theory
suggests that workers will be treated differently in different firms, even
though they have the same basic characteristics. Bargaining theories,
where the outside alternatives affect the actual wage level as well as the
worker’s value to the firm, also create a separation between the wage that
a particular firm pays and the ‘market’, which is less well defined, once
contracting and bargaining are taken into account.
The types of data that are available in the new data sets allow researchers
to get a good start at examining these various issues.
2.3 The data
The data come from all of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland,
Norway, Sweden) and from Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy. The
sampling frames are different across countries, but with the exception of
Italy, each country provides a substantial number of observations coming
from a given firm across a large number of firms. In some countries, e.g.
Denmark and Norway, every worker in the entire country is represented.
There are two data sets for Sweden. One (Oyer 2006) covers only a subset
of the country but provides rich data on jobs. The other data set (Edin, 
7 Lazear and Rosen (1981)
Holmlund, and Skans, 2006) is more comprehensive, but does not have
the same detail on some variables that are of interest.
Key to using the data is that there is substantial information on a cross
section of workers within each firm across many firms to draw inferences
about wage structure, worker mobility, and promotion and hiring patterns.
Only Italy falls short on this score, but the Italian authors provide
information on synthetic firms by taking data from similar industries and
locations and blending them into cells, which they treat as firms. The
French data are a 1/25 sample, but this allows computation of wage
distributions at least for the larger firms.
2.4 Wage levels
If all firms were alike, then their wage distributions would be identical to
the distribution for the country as a whole as shown in Figure 2.1a. At the
other extreme, firms might treat their workers very similarly, and the
variation in wages throughout the country could be accounted for by
differences in the mean value of wages between firms, as shown in Figure 2.1b.
12
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Figure 2.1a: Within firm variation; no between firm variation
PDF for country, PDF for median and extreme firms all identical
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Figure 2.1b: Within-firm similar; between firms different
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Figure 2.1c: Norway 1997
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Most countries, with the significant exception of France, have similar
patterns. The coefficient of variation in individual wages within most
countries is around 0.3 (Figure 2.2). Also, whilst the mean wages of firms
are almost as high as the population mean wage, the variance of wages
within firms is about 60 to 80 per cent of the variance of wages for the
population. (Figure 2.3 compares standard deviations). The fact that the
within firm wage variance is smaller than the variance for the overall
distribution suggests firms make up parts of the overall distribution as
shown in Figure 2.1b. But there is also considerable variation within firms.
The typical pattern is illustrated by Figure 2.1c, for Norway. Norway’s
situation is a compromise between Figure 2.1a and Figure 2.1b, but
leaning more to Figure 2.1a than to Figure 2.1b. The overall distribution for
the country as a whole is much more dispersed than that for the typical
firm. The actual distribution for the typical firm that is below the 10th
percentile is considerably tighter than that for the country as a whole. The
same is true for the typical firm around the median and for the typical firm
with mean wages in the top 10 per cent of firms.8 Although there is some
overlap, the wage distributions of high wage and low wage firms are by
and large disjoint. Still, firms have considerable dispersion within. The
typical firm is not the almost spiked distribution as shown in Figure 2.1b.
8 The typical firm was constructed by averaging the mean and standard deviation of log wages for firms in
the 0-10th percentile, the 45-55th percentile and the 90th and above percentile. The distributions were
constructed assuming that wages are distributed log normally.
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Figure 2.1d: France 1996
0.00E+00
1.40E+00
1.20E+00
1.00E+00
8.00E-01
6.00E-01
4.00E-01
2.00E-01
2 6.465.2 5.64.84.443.63.22.4 2.8
Below 10
Near 50
Above 90
All
log wages
15
Wage Structure, Raises and Mobility
Figure 2.2: Country coefficient of variation (individual data)
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Figure 2.3: Ratio of average within firm standard deviation
to country standard deviation
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Indeed, the amount of within-firm variation is striking. There are a number
of interpretations of the fact that firms exhibit much, if not all, of the
variation in wages that is seen at the country level. One likely possibility is
that the skill mix that is necessary to operate a company does not vary all
that much by company. All firms must have high level managers,
production workers of some sort, and a basic clerical staff. Another
interpretation is that firms use the same kinds of incentive structures to
motivate their workers. Still another is that wages are set according to
seniority and the demographic distribution of workers, although different
among firms, displays the same underlying pattern.
Figures 2.1c for Norway and 2.1d for France also indicate that the
dispersion varies with the overall level of wages, with high wage firms
having more dispersion than low wage firms. So not only is the mean
wage different among firms, but the amount of within firm variation is
different as well. Figure 2.3 shows that countries are remarkably similar
with respect to within-firm wage variance relative to country wage
variance. Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of the variance of wages within
firms. Figure 2.5 provides further evidence that the correlation between
log wage and spread is positive for five of the six data sets in which it is
reported (covering five countries). There are at least three ways of
interpreting this correlation. It may be that high within-firm variance
pushes up mean wages, if firms that allow disparate wage treatment also
reap the benefit through incentive and selection effects of higher
productivity. Firms that compress wages may drive out their best workers
and stifle incentives to produce. Alternatively, it may be that high wage
firms necessarily also have high spreads, because there is more
heterogeneity in high wage firms than in low wage ones. Law firms must
16
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Figure 2.4: The distribution of the coefficient of variation of 
wages within firms 90/10 percentiles
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have receptionists, but telephone call centres need not have lawyers. A
third possible explanation is purely statistical. Suppose that the underlying
distribution of wages reflects worker heterogeneity and competitive wage
setting. Suppose further that there is significant positive skew in worker
ability. Finally, suppose that firms are partitions of the overall income
distribution. A positive correlation between the average and standard
deviation of wages would result. For example, suppose that there were
only two firms and that the bottom 50 per cent of wage earners worked for
one whereas the top 50 per cent worked for the other. The high wage firm
would have higher variance. Since it is well known that income
distributions are approximately log normal and therefore have positive
skew, the statistical argument remains a possibility.
The fact that there is considerable wage variation within-firm means that,
at least potentially, workers are not locked into a particular wage slot as a
function of their first job assignment. To test this hypothesis, one needs to
examine the degree of residual wage variation after controlling for person
effects. If all of the variation in wages within firm were accounted for by
person effects, then there would be constancy over time in a worker’s
position, given his initial position. Workers care that their position can
improve in the firm as a result of experience and promotion. If there is no
within-firm residual variation, then the only way for a worker to improve
his relative position is to move. So if residual variance is low, then worker
mobility is expected to be high.
Figure 2.5: Correlation: log wage standard deviation 
and log wage
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The pattern of mobility can help determine whether within-firm wage
variation reflects underlying worker characteristics or wage policy. For
example, consider a firm that has a small standard deviation of the log of
wages. This could reflect a policy of pay compression or it could reflect a
homogeneous work force. If it is pay compression that hurts the top
relative to the bottom, then the top workers should be more likely to leave
the firm than the bottom workers. If we find a pattern where firms with
tight wage distributions also have disproportionate exit of the highest paid
workers, then the inference that we would draw is that the pay
compression is policy. Conversely, if low wage workers have their pay
increased relative to the market in such firms, then they should be less
likely to leave. There would be no reason for top workers to leave
disproportionately or for bottom workers to stay disproportionately if all
were paid their competitive wage.
For the few countries where we have the data to test these propositions it
seems that, if anything, for most countries the more compressed wage
firms have less mobility among top workers than firms with less
compressed wages (Figure 2.6). If these findings hold up elsewhere, they
would suggest that the pattern observed reflects worker heterogeneity
more than it does wage policy. In other words, they would suggest that
firms which are more compressed have a more homogeneous work force
and that, within that group, there is less difference between the top
workers and the median workers. As a result, top workers are less likely to
18
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Figure 2.6: Difference between exit rates of top workers 
compressed minus non-compressed
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be underpaid in that environment. What might explain this? Three
candidate explanations are:
1 Firm size – Wage compression and mobility (at all parts of the wage
distribution) might be correlated with firm size.
2 Selection when entering the firm. If a firm has a compressed top, the
best people may shy away from those firms. Then those who are there
may have already been sorted. This would explain a zero correlation,
but it is unlikely to explain a negative correlation.
3 Unions or other institutional factors. Unions tend both to compress and
raise wages. If all workers earn rents in compressed wage firms, then
there would be low labour mobility for all workers in these firms.
Figure 2.7 presents some data with respect to possible explanation
number (1). The ratio of mobility in the larger firms (>100 workers) is
compared to overall mobility. The ratio is almost always below one,
meaning that larger firms have lower mobility levels. If larger firms also
have more compressed wage structures because of their bureaucratic
nature, then the relatively low mobility of top workers in compressed
wage firms might simply be picking up firm size.
Obtaining information on mobility of different wage workers in
compressed versus non-compressed wage firms would address (1) and
(3). Examining the observable characteristics of workers in compressed
and non-compressed wage firms would speak to (2). Holding constant
Figure 2.7: Exit rates of big firms/exit rates of average firms
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unionisation and other institutional factors would shed light on (3). Such
evidence is not available for this paper.
The general conclusion from this section is that there is considerable
within-firm variance in wages in all countries. Although firms differ
considerably within a country, both in terms of average wage and in terms
of wage spread, there is a significant amount of variation within each firm.
Some of this reflects differences in workers within each firm, but some
may reflect wage policy. At this point it is difficult to distinguish, but the
wage compression evidence points more to heterogeneity than to policy,
at least in Norway, Denmark Finland and Sweden.
2.5 Wage growth
The common person’s view of business cycles and economic growth is
that when things are good for some, they are good for all. There is a
parallel with firms and their employment and wage conditions. One
extreme view is that firms move in tandem. When the economy is good,
wages grow for the economy as a whole and every firm experiences the
same increase in wage growth. At an even more micro level, every worker
within every firm experiences the same percentage increase in wage
growth. During bad times, the reverse occurs with all firms and all of their
workers experiencing the same decline in wages. Obviously, this cannot
be true, but is it a reasonable approximation of the truth?
Figure 2.8 provides some evidence on this. While hardly surprising, the
standard deviation of the change in log wages is much larger than the
average level of wage growth for most countries. When wages are rising
at a fast rate, there are plenty of workers who are left behind and when
average wages are falling, many workers are still experiencing substantial
wage increases. Even when wages were not growing that rapidly on
average, some workers experienced very high wage increases. The
economy hardly moves in a synchronised fashion. The same is true for
virtually all years and all other countries. This is an interesting fact, and
one that could have been learned from standard panel data sources. The
advantage of the new data is they enable us to look at the firm.
20
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The same is true within firms. The within-firm standard deviation in wage
increases is always larger than the mean wage change and in many
countries, very much larger. For example, in Denmark, in 2000, average
wage growth for the firm was 3.4 per cent. The within-firm standard
deviation of growth rates was 8 per cent.
One way to get directly at these questions is to determine how much of
wage variation is accounted for by firm and year effects. A regression
could be run for each country year of the form
ln Wagei j = a0 + a1 (Firm Dummies)
where ln Wagei j is the change in log wages of worker i in firm j. The
estimation would reveal how much of the variation is accounted for by
firm effects. Then years could be stacked to see whether high raise firms
remain high raise firms for substantial periods. That is, are the firm effects
robust only within the year or are they fixed over substantial periods of
time so that high wage increase firms, say, in 1985 are also high wage
increase firms in 1990? At least at some time interval, the firm effects
should vanish or some firms would have wage structures that are far out
of line with the average for their industry or occupation.
It is also interesting to examine whether a wage policy where firms give all
workers the same raise results in more turnover. One possibility is that
homogeneous wage increases breed discontent, particularly among the
high ability workers who are not rewarded appropriately in their own eyes.
Figure 2.8: Mean change in log wage; 
std dev (change in log wage)
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Is there a negative correlation between turnover rate and within firm
standard deviation in wage growth (within firm coefficient of variation in wage
growth)? This is discussed below in the section entitled “Worker Mobility.”
Why does this matter? If workers’ fate is determined primarily by the fate
of their individual firm, then wealth can be affected by factors that are
largely beyond a worker’s control. If instead, most of the wage growth is
idiosyncratic and specific to the worker, then individuals may have the
ability to take actions that affect their wealth levels. In addition, if wage
growth is mostly determined by the firm, but this tends to even out over
time, say because wage growth is negatively serially correlated (high
growth firms in one period are low growth firms in the next period), there
would be little persistence to worry about and inter-firm mobility would
not be required to remove long term discrepancies in wages. But if the
firm effects are persistent, then movement by some workers is necessary
to keep on track with others in the same occupation. All of these questions
can be investigated using the linked data.
2.6 Wage growth and tenure
The standard finding in the literature on human capital is that wage
growth is more rapid during the early years of career than during the latter
years. This can come about through a variety of mechanisms. One is that
young workers move more than old workers – something we show below.
The other is that within firms, there is a policy to give larger wage
increases to young workers than to older ones.
Figure 2.9 provides evidence on average wage increases for low and high
tenure individuals within the firm, averaged across firms in the economy.
The difference is almost always positive, and in some country-years, it is
large. Of course, this is wage growth for those who stay in the firm. Much
of the difference in wage growth at the individual level that occurs over the
life cycle may work through mobility. What is clear, though, is that firms
have a policy of allowing the wages of at least some young workers to
grow more rapidly than the wages of the best treated senior workers. The
notion of skewness in wage growth as a policy is a new finding that
warrants further investigation and conceptualisation.
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2.7 Worker mobility
Exit rates vary substantially across firms and countries. The typical firm’s
exit rate varies from lows of around 15 per cent in Norway, Sweden,
Finland and early observations for Germany, to highs of 35 per cent in
France. As expected, entry rates and exit rates are highly correlated. In
countries where exit rates are high, entry rates are high. This must be true
in equilibrium where approximately the same number of workers is
employed over time. There are some notable exceptions, however. During
the early 1990s Germany had exit rates that far exceeded entry rates. This
reflects the re-unification and fundamental changes in the labour market that
occurred during that period.
2.8 Mobility and wage levels
There is a negative correlation between both exit and entry rates and wage
levels – see Figure 2.10. High wage firms are also low turnover firms. This
could reflect one of two phenomena. First, high wage firms may pay above
the market rate. Workers queue for jobs in those firms. When they finally
land a job in a high wage firm, they keep it because their alternatives are
rarely better. An alternative explanation is that high wage firms have more
skilled workers and the turnover rates for the less skilled are higher than
those for the more highly skilled.
Figure 2.9: Difference in wage growth by tenure group
low tenure growth rate – high tenure growth rate
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2.9 Mobility and firm size
Gibrat’s Law contends that growth rates are independent of firm size.
Figure 2.11 speaks to this by looking at the net entry rate (entry – exit rates)
and then taking the difference between all firms and big firms. There is no
consistent pattern. This neither supports nor rejects Gibrat’s law. In some
country years, there is a pattern of growth being lower in large firms. In
other country years the reverse is true. But the difference is rarely zero,
which would be the prediction of Gibrat’s Law. Apparently other factors
are important in determining the size distribution of growth rates and the
statement that growth is independent of firm size seems to be inaccurate.
A more accurate statement is that growth rates vary with firm size across
time and location. The causal nature remains unknown at least for this study.
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Figure 2.10: Correlation of entry and exit rates with wage
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The determinants of firm turnover rates (industry, occupation, wage, skill,
average tenure, etc.) could be investigated. Although we present no
evidence on those factors here, it is possible to perform an analysis of this
sort using the country-wide datasets discussed in this paper.
2.10 Mobility and wage growth
If the typical labour market allows for some rent sharing between capital
and labor, worker wages should rise when firm profits rise. Firms that are
profitable are also likely to be doing more net hiring than firms that are
unprofitable. As a result, good times might be accompanied by super-
normal wage growth and also by super-normal employment growth. The
cross-country data provide evidence on the correlation and we believe that
this is the first evidence of this sort that cuts across many firms.
The correlation between wage change and entry rates tends to be positive
in a given country-year. But firms that are raising wages do not
consistently (across country-years) have lower exit rates (Figure 2.12). In
the most open countries, like Denmark, the finding is strong. High wage
growth and low exit rates move together. But in Sweden, the results are
weak and in the opposite direction. This might reflect the ‘Dot.com Boom’
phenomenon. Programmers and other skilled technical workers moved
from firm to firm frequently, as demand shifted to reflect the fortunes of
one company or another. Firms with rapidly growing wages hired many
workers, but also lost them to other firms with rapidly growing wages
because of the nature of industrial structure. Turnover rates were lower,
Figure 2.11: Net entry all minus big
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and wages were increasing less rapidly, in more traditional parts of the
economy where the situation was closer to stable. So exit rates and high
wage growth might go together if they characterise firms that are in
industries undergoing rapid change. Again, this is a question that requires
additional evidence, obtainable in these data sets, but not presented here.
2.11 Summary
Linked employer-employee data from a number of different countries are
used to provide evidence on firm wage structures and promotion, hiring
and mobility patterns. The main finding is that countries are remarkably
similar in their wage structures and wage changes. Most wage variation is
within firm. Although there is a good bit of variation between firms in
every country, firms have a large range of the wage distribution within.
Furthermore, with respect to wage growth, there are consistent patterns.
Although firms differ with respect to the average raises they give in a
particular year, firms do not tie all workers to the same raise. The standard
deviation of raises within firm is between 10 per cent and 20 per cent, even
when average raises are close to zero. This is most consistent with the
view that firms respond to outside pressure (either market or
governmental) to raise workers’ wages commensurate with some
occupational or skill standard.
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Figure 2.12: Correlation exit rate and within firm wage change 
(within country)
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Mobility levels differ across countries, but even here, mobility patterns
seem relatively consistent. High wage firms have lower mobility than low
wage firms and entry and exit rates are positively correlated, with entry
rates being somewhat larger than exit rates in most country years.
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3 Compensation Policy,
Human Resource
Management Practices
and Takeovers 
David N. Margolis9
ABSTRACT
Our analysis allows us to draw several policy conclusions. First, there may
a justification for subsidising loans to high growth potential, highly
indebted firms since profitable yet indebted firms seem to look to other
firms for financing of their growth opportunities. Second, although
predator and target firms are similar to each other, they differ from non-
takeover firms in observable ways, and thus employment services may be
able to prepare for future layoffs by focusing on these firms. Finally, the
types of workers laid off after a takeover seem to be the ones with the best
chances of finding new jobs, so there may not be a need for additional
resources to help the placement of these workers after a takeover.
3.1 Introduction
In order to grow, firms (and economies) need capital to invest and projects
in which to invest it. The capital that firms need can be drawn from many
different sources, including bank financing, stock issues, direct issuance of
corporate debt, receipt of equity or cash injections from other firms.
Different sources of financing come with different constraints for the firm,
but in every case the entity that provides the financing hopes for a return
on its investment derived from the operations of the firm.
The projects are also of different sorts, depending on the sector(s) of the
economy in which the firm operates. The project can either involve
expanding existing capacities or acquiring new ones. Both sorts of goals
can be achieved by “organic” growth, with the firm creating opportunities 
9 This paper originated in a joint project started with Andrew Hildreth (U.C. Berkeley), to whom the author is
thankful for several discussions. The author would also like to thank Denis Fougère, Robert Gary-Bobo,
Francis Kramarz, Jérôme Philippe, Antoine Terracol, Jan van Ours and the participants in seminars at
CREST, Tilburg University, the University of Aberdeen, the Joint UCD-Queen’s Belfast Economic Seminar
and the TEAM internal workshop for useful comments. All remaining errors are mine.
Contact information: David N. MARGOLIS, TEAM, Maison des sciences économiques, Université Paris 1
Panthéon – Sorbonne, 106-112 boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France.
E-mail: David.Margolis@univ-paris1.fr, Tel: +33 (0)1 44 07 82 62, Fax: +33 (0)1 44 07 82 47.
by itself, via joint ventures with other firms or by acquisition of another
firm that possesses the capacities, market share, products, distribution
networks or whatever the firm needs in order to grow.
Companies have been exploiting this last possibility for many years.
Figure 3.1 shows that even in the late 1960s (when the earliest consistent
data are available), several thousand mergers and acquisitions were
undertaken each year in the United States, and these transactions,
although varying over time and increasing substantially in value, have
remained economically important.
Since an acquiring firm must pay the market price for its target (plus the
additional costs associated with undertaking the transaction), its choice of
target becomes critical. If the acquiring firm cannot improve the
profitability of the newly created entity by more than the costs associated
with creating it, then the transaction will not take place. Clearly, one of the
means by which profits can be increased is to reduce costs, namely
through firing workers seen as overpaid, poorly adapted or simply
superfluous to the needs of the new entity. Thus the compensation
structure and human resource management policies of the target firm
become an object of interest for predators, and post-transaction layoffs
can reflect the acquiring firm’s efforts to improve the profitability of the
newly created entity.
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Figure 3.1: U.S. & U.S. Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions
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Such considerations explain why mergers and acquisitions are often
portrayed in the media in terms of their perceived negative consequences
for labour as opposed to their positive consequences for growth. Press
releases that accompany mergers often stress the potential for
“rationalising” or “downsising”, talking of possible “synergies” resulting
from consolidating existing structures. All of these policies imply
workforce reductions, and although they are sometimes implemented
through early retirements or non-replacement of workers who quit, they
also correspond in many cases to mass layoffs.
This paper addresses the merger and acquisition process from the pre-
transaction period (when the predator firm chooses its target) to the post-
transaction period (when restructuring actually takes place). The primary
focus is on compensation and employment, although consideration is also
given to other elements of the process. In particular, using a unique linked
employer-employee data set from France, we begin by exploring the
differences between predator and target firms along several dimensions,
including compensation and employment. This allows us to characterise
which sorts of firms are more likely to be targeted for takeovers and which
ones are more likely to undertake them. We then look at the post-
transaction reorganisation period and try to establish whether workers
from the acquired firm are more or less at risk of a layoff, which sorts of
workers are more likely to be laid off and which sorts of firms are more
likely to undertake large adjustments in their work forces post-takeover.
From a policy perspective, all of these issues are important. When
considering ways to foster economic growth, it may be useful to see what
sorts of firms are the ones that undertake the acquisitions, as these are the
ones that are aggressively seeking growth opportunities and may be
worthy of additional attention. Conversely, if one can identify the sorts of
firms that are most likely to be acquired, one can prepare for the risk of
layoffs in the areas where such firms are located. In particular, by analysing
which workers stay and which workers go after a takeover, employment
services can better structure their preparation for assisting these workers
when they become laid off. Employment services can also direct resources
to geographic areas where particularly vulnerable firms are established in
anticipation of the post-takeover layoffs and make plans for helping the
types of workers who are most likely to appear in search of assistance.
3.2 How Economists Perceive Mergers and Acquisitions
The vast majority of the attention among economists concerning mergers
and acquisitions has focused on the reasons why one firm might acquire
another. Several main explanations have arisen:
Controlling the actions of incumbent management:10 When the
management team of a firm takes poor decisions that result in the firm’s
stock being priced below its potential, an outside firm can acquire the
underperforming firm, change the management team, reverse the poor
decisions and reap the gains from the improved efficiency. If these gains
are sufficient to offset the costs, the transaction will take place. The
literature11 has pointed to compensation policy and human resource
management practices as two areas in which an existing management
team, perhaps in the hopes of buying peaceful labour relations or of trying
to create a paternalistic environment, often makes “poor” decisions that
can render a firm a takeover target.
Costly capital and the lack of investment opportunities: As a firm matures,
the return on its remaining opportunities for organic growth decreases (it
exploits the best opportunities first and works its way down the list).
However, it may build up a capital structure and a debt history that renders
its cost of acquiring additional capital relatively low. Conversely, a newly
created firm which may have had to borrow extensively to finance its
starting up may be unable to find additional sources of capital to exploit
its (relatively high return) investment opportunities. In such a situation, the
mature firm may acquire the potentially fast-growing firm, whose stock
price will not incorporate the returns on investments it is unable to finance
on its own, in order to have access to these higher-return opportunities for
investment while taking advantage of its relatively advantageous credit
terms for financing the additional investments.
Attaining a critical mass:12 A firm may have access to a production
technology which is particularly efficient at high volumes of output, but it
is unable to generate enough demand on its own. As a result, it may
attempt to acquire additional distribution outlets or access to additional
markets in order to exploit the cost advantages of large scale production
inherent in its technology.
Increasing market share:13 When a firm has a substantial degree of market
power, even without going as far as a monopoly, it can often exercise a
certain degree of control over market prices and output levels and thereby
improve profitability. In order to attain sufficient market share, firms may
attempt to buy competitors. Of course, such strategies are frowned upon
by competition authorities and are thus rarely presented to the media
under this angle.
Enforcement of a threat under tacit collusion:14 In the absence of an explicit
motive to gain market share, firms may partake in pricing and production
practices that represent collusive behavior. However, since these implicit 
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10 Some examples of this appraoch include Manne (1965), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1984,
1986, 1988).
11 See, for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), Brown and Medoff (1988) and Gokhale, Groshen and
Neumark (1995).
12 See, for example, Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983).
13 See, for example, Eckbo (1983) and Borenstein (1990).
14 See, for example, Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002).
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arrangements are subject to undercutting by a member of the cartel, other
members may use the threat of takeover to enforce the arrangements and
may occasionally need to act on this threat in order to maintain their
credibility.
Insuring against market-specific risks:15 If a firm is in a sector that is subject
to important demand or input price fluctuations, it may seek to insure its
share price against these fluctuations by diversifying into other, more
stable, sectors or sectors with counterbalancing risks. This
conglomeration approach, popular in the 1980s, has gradually been
abandoned by firms focusing on their “core competences” while letting
investors insure themselves privately by mixing shares within their own
investment portfolios.
3.3 How Do Linked Employer-Employee Data Help?
Since the objective of this paper is to study the employment and
compensation dimensions of the takeover process, one obviously needs
information on employment and compensation in firms involved in
takeovers. This information can come from a variety of sources on either
the employer or the employee side, or from linked employer-employee data.
Data coming from employer-side sources include the aggregate statistics
published by various statistical agencies and investment banks, corporate
tax returns, corporate accounts published by firms listed on stock markets
or employer surveys. Each of these sources has its disadvantages. The
aggregate data are clearly inadequate since it is impossible to know if a
sector that undergoes significant restructuring through takeovers and also
loses significant numbers of workers is losing the workers because of the
takeovers or responding to some external negative demand shock by
laying off workers and simultaneously consolidating. Furthermore, there is
no way of knowing whether or not the firms that are laying off workers are
also the firms involved in the takeover activity.
Tax returns and corporate account data are more promising, in that one
can identify particular firms and measure total employment and total
compensation costs. However, there is significant work associated with
identifying which firms are involved in takeover activity; this information
is made available by consulting firms, investment banks and occasionally
statistical institutes, but it is not easy to merge accurately with the
accounts information. Furthermore, although one can now identify which
firms are involved in the takeover activity, one cannot tell which workers
are let go, nor whether a firm with, for example, a high compensation cost
per worker is really overpaying its workers or whether it has a genuinely
more productive workforce that it needs to compensate appropriately.
15 See, for example, Matsusaka (1993).
Employer-side surveys come even closer to the ideal, since one can ask
detailed questions about the structure of the workforce and compensation
by type of worker. But once again, the problem lies in interpreting the
figures: if a firm’s employment remains stable after a takeover yet its wage
bill falls, have its workers taken a pay cut or were the more expensive ones
fired and replaced with less expensive workers doing the same jobs? An
additional issue lies in how representative the data is; the only employer-
side survey-based studies in the literature are restricted to narrow sectors
in specific geographic areas, and it is hard to generalise about what might
happen on a nationwide scale on the basis of such analyses.
Employee-side data analyses are much rarer, in that the majority of
employee-side data do not ask whether a person’s employer has been
involved in takeover activity. Some of the literature on mass layoffs tries
to consider whether the layoffs occurred as a result of a plant’s closing or
while a plant remained open, but to this date they have not explicitly
considered takeovers as a reason for the layoff. This is due to the absence
of data on the question: neither the United States’ Displaced Workers
Supplement to the Current Population Survey nor Canada’s COEP data, the
two main sources used in the literature on mass layoffs, ask if the firm
underwent a takeover. Furthermore, even if such information were
available, workers typically do not possess detailed knowledge of their
employer’s financial accounts (and are never asked about it in surveys),
meaning that one could not control for alternative explanations of
takeovers when analysing takeovers with this sort of data.
Linked employer-employee data, such as those exploited in this paper, can
solve all of these problems. Since the data include information on the firm
side, such as data on corporate accounts and identification of which firms
are involved in takeover activity (and their role in the takeover), one can
control for various explanations of takeovers other than just compensation
and employment issues and one can cleanly identify the acquiring,
acquired and control (non-takeover) firms. Since the data also include
information from the worker side, one can also cleanly identify whether
the in-place workforce is “overpaid”, inappropriately structured (e.g. too
many high skilled-workers for the production technology) or too
numerous relative to other comparable firms. Since the data are also
longitudinal, meaning that individual firms and workers can be followed
over time, one can also see which workers stay and which workers go after
a takeover.
In fact, the linked employer-employee data that are used in this paper are
drawn from several sources. The first source is a longitudinal data set of
firm accounts (FUTE) established by INSEE, France’s National Institute for
Statistics and Economic Studies, that draws on corporate account data
filed for tax purposes and from supplementary surveys. This data, of
which we use the 1993-1999 information, covers all sectors of the
economy and firms of all sizes, and allows one to control for explanations
of takeovers that are related to a firm’s financial situation, revenues or
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sector of activity. A second source is the little-exploited data in the
Modification of Structure (MDST) database, also compiled by INSEE. This
data, available from 1993-1999, covers all asset transfers over a minimum
size (8 million French Francs) between firms and classifies them by type.
Among the types of asset transfers covered are mergers (several firms
transfer all of their assets to a newly created entity) and acquisitions (the
acquired firm transfers all of its assets to the acquiring firm). Both of these
data sets use the standard identification code for French firms (the SIREN)
which allows the data to be combined easily and reliably.
On the individual side, this paper exploits two other data sets, the Annual
Declarations of Social Data (DADS) and the Permanent Demographic
Sample (EDP). The DADS is a longitudinal data set available from 1976-
1999 which provides information on every job held in the private, state-
owned, local government and non-profit sectors by every worker in
France. The longitudinal version of this data covers roughly 1/25 of the
French population (people born in October of even-numbered years) and
contains both an individual’s national identification number (NNI) and the
SIREN code of the employer, in addition to information on earnings,
occupation, hours worked during the year and a rather limited set of
individual characteristics (age, sex, place of birth and place of work). The
EDP data, which are drawn from census records, birth, death and marriage
certificates and other administrative sources for individuals born in the
first 4 days of October, allow us to add additional individual-specific
characteristics such as education to the DADS data, due to their use of the
individual’s NNI as an identifier.
The DADS data are the key linked employer-employee data source, and
due to the presence of both the NNI and the SIREN in these data, all four
data sets can be brought together in one combined database for analysis.
This allows us to resolve all of the problems associated with having only
employer-side or only employee-side data, and as Table 3.1 below shows,
one can thus characterise firms by their status (acquired, acquiring or
control) according to firm- or worker-side characteristics. However, since
dating an individual’s employment status relative to the takeover date is
complicated when considering firms that have engaged in multiple
takeovers, the analysis undertaken here only considers French firms that
were either involved in no takeovers at all during the 1993-1999 period
(Non-MDST Firms) or involved in only one takeover during this period
(Acquired and Acquiring Firms).
Table 3.1 shows that there are differences between target and predator
firms along all of the dimensions considered: compensation policy, human
resource management policy and firm accounts. In particular, on average,
firms that are acquired pay above the rates paid by acquiring and control
firms, although they do not increase pay with seniority as much as
acquiring firms. The target firms also tend to employ slightly less educated
and younger workers, who do not remain employed for as long as in the
other sorts of firms. The target firms are also smaller, more indebted, have
higher returns on assets and are more productive than predator firms on
average. The simple fact that different sorts of firms can be classified
along all three sorts of dimensions is a testament to the usefulness of
linked employer-employee data.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Firms by Takeover Status
 Variable Multiple Takeover Taken Over Taking Over No Takeover
Compensation Policy
 Firm-Specific Fixed Effect -0.4987 -0.2558 -0.3724 -0.3686
 Firm-Specific Seniority Returns 
 (per Year of Job Seniority) 3.86% 3.07% 3.43% 2.99%
Human Resource Management Policy
 Male 62.98% 64.64% 63.30% 63.08%
 Potential Experience 
 (Current Age – 
 School-Leaving Age) 36.76 29.14 39.72 34.84
 Years of Job Seniority 6.13 4.78 7.49 5.88
 Skilled Blue Collar 16.25% 21.70% 19.68% 21.97%
 Unskilled Blue Collar 17.20% 26.84% 20.74% 25.57%
 No Education 27.84% 29.27% 28.08% 29.13%
 Baccalauréat 
 (High School Diploma) 6.64% 6.44% 6.50% 6.43%
 Advanced Tertiary Education 3.34% 2.81% 3.03% 2.86%
Firm Accounts
 Total Employment 6314.57 835.92 18869.65 8201.16
 Fixed Assets Net of 
 Depreciation and 
 Amortisation (MFFr 1990) 9.4257E+06 1.2086E+06 9.2926E+07 1.4519E+07
 Pct. Increase in Value of 
 Fixed Assets (t-1 to t) 2423.56 134.93 705.04 209.01
 Total Debt/Total Assets 67.33% 73.58% 69.23% 72.22%
 Return on Assets 2.78% 3.87% 3.11% 3.56%
 Value Added per Worker 
 (MFFr 1990) 1426.01 352.13 282.31 311.58
 Number of Observations 357392 287043 543601 3142435
Sources: MDST, FUTE, DADS and EDP data and Authorís Calculatio ns.
Notes: The excluded educational categories are only primary education, pre-high school level vocation 
or technical education, pre-high school level general education, high school level technical or 
professional education and 2 year post-high school education. The excluded occupation is white collar.
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3.4 Identifying the Significant Differences Between Acquired
and Acquiring Firms
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 3.1 only provide a general picture
of the sorts of firms that are involved in takeovers, and as such they are not
sufficient to distinguish the characteristics that really differentiate between
predator firms and their targets, since some variables may tend to vary
together. For example, if a firm is to remain competitive on the labour market
it may have to match average compensation in other firms. If it pays a lower
initial wage, it may have to pay higher returns to job seniority to attract
workers. This situation is consistent with the average figures in Table 3.1 when
comparing predator firms to target firms, but a question remains unresolved:
is it really the same firms that pay less on average that pay more for
seniority, or do these firms pay less overall (base pay and seniority
returns) while other firms pay more both on average and for job seniority,
with the relative differences in the two subgroups offsetting each other?
Using econometric techniques for analysing qualitative data (logit models), one
can control for such correlation between variables and distinguish which
variables really increase the likelihood that a given firm will be the target of a
takeover or become an acquirer of other firms. For details, the reader is referred
to Margolis (2005), but the main results are presented here and in Table 3.2.
First, in terms of compensation policy, there is basically nothing that
distinguishes target firms from predators, although they both pay better
for seniority (while target firms pay worse starting wages) than firms in the
control group. One consequence of the target firms’ lower return to seniority
relative to control firms is that target firms also have workforces with lower
job seniority than control firms, while no significant differences in average
seniority are apparent between target and predator firms. Since the literature
on mass layoffs suggests that high-seniority workers have a harder time
finding jobs post-layoff, this is somewhat encouraging news if the majority
of workforce reductions post takeover occur in the acquired firm.
On the human resource management side, almost nothing significantly
distinguishes target firms from predators. However, both sorts of firms
employ relatively fewer senior workers and more men than control firms.
Again, this is encouraging news since the mass layoffs literature has also
noted that less senior and male workers tend to find new jobs faster than
more senior or blue collar workers.16
With respect to the information available in the firm’s accounts, the
econometric results suggest that the investment opportunities explanation
for takeover is particularly relevant in France. Acquired firms, in addition
to being significantly smaller than their purchasers, have (insignificantly)
higher debt-to-asset ratios while maintaining higher rates of return on
their assets. Thus it may indeed be the case that firms with healthier
balance sheets but more limited investment opportunities use takeovers
as a means of gaining access to new avenues of growth.
16 See Fallick (1996) for a (somewhat dated) survey of the North American literature. Kuhn (2002) provides an
international perspective on displaced workers and Margolis (2002) provides an in-depth look at the
determinants of new job finding for displaced workers in France.
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Table 3.2: Logit Regressions: Characterisation of Firms 
Relative to Takeover Activity (Coefficients with Standard Errors in Parentheses)
 Probability Modeled P(Acquired) P(Acquired) P(Acquiring)
 Comparison Group Acquiring Firms Control Firms Control Firms
Human Resource Management
 Male -0.0460 0.1591*** 0.1917***
  (0.0858) (0.0365) (0.0521)
 Age -0.0221 0.0094 0.0064
   (0.0159) (0.0089) (0.0090)
 Job Seniority -0.0055 -0.0198*** -0.0224***
   (0.0048) (0.0022) (0.0030)
 Skilled Blue Collar -0.1784** -0.1999*** -0.0661
   (0.0803) (0.0352) (0.0493)
 Unskilled Blue Collar -0.0256 -0.0547 -0.0556
   (0.0776) (0.0336) (0.0482)
 Return to Fixed Unobservable 1.57E-06 1.900E-05 1.230E-06
 Individual-Specific Characterisitcs (5.300E-05) (2.100E-05) (2.500E-05)
 Returns to Education 7.00E-06 -3.000E-05 8.593E-06
   (1.170E-04) (4.800E-05) (7.000E-05)
 Returns to Observable (Time-Varying) -5.700E-04 -3.600E-04 1.280E-04
 Individual-Specific Characterisitcs (6.620E-04) (2.500E-04) (4.010E-04)
Compensation Policy
 Firm-Specific Fixed Effect -0.1015 -0.0709** -0.0030
   (0.0682) (0.0277) (0.0399)
 Firm-Specific Seniority Returns -0.2344 0.2887** 0.6306***
   (0.2370) (0.1165) (0.1672)
 Residual from Earnings Decomposition -0.1331** -0.0818*** 0.0218
   (0.0669) (0.0269) (0.0392)
Firm Accounts
 Log (Total Employment) 0.4589 0.0804 -0.0125
  (0.4410) (0.2079) (0.2893)
 Log (Value of Fixed Assets Net of  -0.7321* 0.1637 0.4069
 Depreciation and Amortisation) (0.4411) (0.2077) (0.2892)
 Percent Increase in the Value of Fixed Assets -3.580E-07 6.621E-08 2.247E-07
 Net of Depreciation and Amortisation (1.780E-06) (1.045E-06) (3.101E-07)
 Log (Total Debt/Total Assets) 0.0181 0.0249  0.0282
  (0.0437) (0.0209) (0.0257)
 Log (Return on Assets) 0.0517*** 0.0453*** 0.0064
   (0.0151) (0.0072)  (0.0094)
 Log (Value Added per Worker) -0.0588 0.0830*** 0.1408***
   (0.0495) (0.0237) (0.0301)
 Log Likelihood -3897.1845 -15352.8675 -8191.83
 Number of Dependent Variable = 1 Firm 4536 4536 2210
 Number of Firms 6746 74807 72481
Sources: MDST, FUTE, DADS and EDP data and Author’s Calculations.
Notes: All models also include controls for 9 observation years, 10 sectors, Paris region, 8 educational 
categories, age2, age3 and age4, Log (capital-labour ratio), Log (sales/worker) and the interation of 
seniority with returns to seniority. 
*** indicates a coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
One observation per firm, representing averages over the sample period, is used for the analysis.
3.5 Who Stays and Who Leaves After a Takeover?
Once one has characterised which firms are more or less likely to be
involved in takeover activity, one can turn one’s attention to which workers
in those firms are more or less likely to stay on with the new entity after
the transaction. The longitudinal linked employer-employee data used
here allow one to consider workers who were employed by acquired and
acquiring firms in the year before the takeover and follow them in the
years after the takeover to see which workers stay and which leave, either
through layoffs or by quitting (the data do not provide information on the
reason for the separation).
The first step is to look at overall workforce retention in acquired and
acquiring firms. Figure 3.2 shows the probability of continued
employment in acquired and acquiring firms. While it seems clear that
more layoffs occur in the target firm in the short term than in the predator
firm (the difference is significant for the first 2 years), such differences in
separation behaviour tend to disappear in the medium term.
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Figure 3.2: Probability of Continued Employment 
by Takeover Status
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When looking in detail at which workers stay with their firms (see table
3.3), however, it becomes clear that the layoffs are not evenly distributed
across the existing work force. This simple observation is actually quite
informative given that almost no workforce characteristics distinguished
acquiring firms from their targets. It implies that a predator firm does not
base its takeover decision on the composition of its target’s workforce, as
might be expected if the takeover is hostile and the acquiring firm has no
access to the target firm’s personnel records. Thus human resource
management policies do not form the basis of the takeover decision,
whereas compensation policies may enter into account. On the other
hand, once the transaction is completed, the acquiring firm obtains access
to the acquired firm’s personnel records and can selectively organise its
layoffs to maximise the cost savings while minimising production losses
due to having fewer workers.
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Table 3.3: Logit Regressions: Probability of 
Continued Employment (Coefficients with Standard Errors in Parentheses)
    Acquired Firms   Acquiring Firms
  1 year 2 years 5 years 1 year 2 years 5 years
 Variable after after after after after after
Human Resource Management
 Male 0.6230** 0.8024* 1.3165 0.4441 0.3413 2.7088***
   (0.3135) (0.4421) (1.0012) (0.3186) (0.3917) (1.0475)
 Age 0.3728* 0.6409** 1.3074** 0.4639** 0.1450 0.7694
   (0.1973) (0.2943) (0.6578) (0.2017) (0.2634) (0.6555)
 Job Seniority 0.0209*** 0.0156*** 0.0043  0.0093*** 0.0250*** 0.0445***
   (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0057) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0058)
 Skilled Blue Collar 0.0890** 0.2114*** 0.2917*** -0.0436 0.0335 0.2335**
   (0.0377) (0.0453) (0.0937) (0.0346) (0.0435) (0.0946)
 Unskilled Blue Collar 0.0292 0.0734 0.0970 -0.1301*** -0.0688 -0.1905*
   (0.0407) (0.0502) (0.1069) (0.0387) (0.0482) (0.1115)
 Return to Fixed Unobservable 0.1631*** 0.3404*** 0.3854*** 0.1947*** 0.1719*** 0.2128**
 Individual-Specific (0.0299) (0.0408) (0.0969) (0.0310) (0.0386) (0.0960)
 Characteristics
 Returns to Education 0.1634*** 0.3402*** 0.3851*** 0.1948*** 0.1721*** 0.2130**
   (0.0299) (0.0408) (0.0969) (0.0310) (0.0386) (0.0960)
 Returns to Observable 
 (Time-Varying) -1.0999 -3.5280** -5.4494 -1.3130 -0.8246 -8.2198**
 Individual-Specific  (1.0975) (1.5513) (3.4497) (1.1180) (1.3845) (3.5221)
 Characteristics
Compensation Policy
 Firm-Specific Fixed Effect 0.2252*** 0.2776*** 0.8409*** 0.2626*** 0.1019 0.9212***
   (0.0330) (0.0446) (0.1116) (0.0457) (0.0664) (0.1652)
 Firm-Specific Seniority Returns 0.1753 0.3932*** 0.6705*** -1.9967*** -2.2268*** 0.9989
   (0.1073) (0.1366) (0.2075) (0.2799) (0.3805) (0.9479)
 Residual from Earnings 
 Decomposition 0.0343 0.1156*** 0.0580 0.0198 0.0636* 0.0358
   (0.0226) (0.0325) (0.0848) (0.0250) (0.0349) (0.0856)
Looking first at the employees of the acquired firm, those who were
employed by firms that paid particularly below market wages or rewarded
seniority particularly poorly are least likely to stay with the new entity post
takeover. This is consistent with the idea that the new owners are likely to
impose a corporate culture where employees are expected to exert effort
(and will be compensated for it), and that those employees who were used
to a corporate culture in which people were not paid much but little was
expected of them in terms of effort (the literature often considers returns
to job seniority as providing a mechanism for inciting individuals to exert
effort on the job) are more likely to quit when their firm is absorbed.
In terms of worker characteristics, senior workers are most likely to stay
with the new entity post-takeover, as are men, older workers, skilled blue
collar workers and workers whose market value, both in terms of
education and other unobservable characteristics, is relatively high. The
results concerning the market value of workers may reflect the fact that it
is costly to find such high-value workers, and the predator firm takes
advantage of the fact that the target firm has already paid these costs. The
results concerning job seniority are likely to reflect collective bargaining
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Table 3.3 (continued): Logit Regressions: Probability of 
Continued Employment (Coefficients with Standard Errors in Parentheses)
   Acquired Firms   Acquiring Firms
  1 year 2 years 5 years 1 year 2 years 5 years
 Variable after after after after after after
 Firm Accounts
 Log (Total Employment) 0.0094 0.0258*** 0.0909*** 0.0542*** 0.0508*** 0.0088
   (0.0064) (0.0081) (0.0177) (0.0065) (0.0075) (0.0209)
 Log (Value of Fixed Assets Net of  -0.1070*** -0.2732*** -0.3048*** -0.2583*** -0.0971*** -0.2618***
 Depreciation and Amortisation (0.0112) (0.0140) (0.0300) (0.0100) (0.0126) (0.0340)
 Percent Increase in the Value 
 of Fixed Assets -5.400E-04** 1.730E-03*** -0.0022*** -8.100E-04** 4.200E-05 -0.0265***
 Net of Depreciation  (2.450E-04) (2.570E-04) (0.0004) (3.560E-04) (1.180E-04) (0.0094)
 and Amortisation
 Log (Total Debt/Total Assets) 0.2613*** 0.2736*** 0.0217  0.2196*** 0.3438*** -0.7780***
   (0.0408) (0.0496) (0.1097)  (0.0444) (0.0503) (0.1399)
 Log (Return on Assets) 0.0313*** 0.0952*** 0.0780** 0.0630*** -0.0737*** 0.0528
   (0.0115) (0.0143) (0.0309)  (0.0101) (0.0115) (0.0373)
 Log (Value Added per Worker) 0.3777*** -0.1227** -0.9281*** 0.3617*** 0.5152*** -0.1804
   (0.0488) (0.0599) (0.1495) (0.0536) (0.0673) (0.1992)
 Log Likelihood -5851.0055 -3919.493 -893.785 -6703.903 -4397.9905 -914.871
 Number of Individuals 
 Still Employed 2982 1906 385 6256 4209 888
 Number of Eligible Individuals 17114 14363 8702 17706 13287 7488 
Sources: MDST, FUTE, DADS and EDP data and Author’s Calculations.
Notes: See notes to Table 3.2. Each individual employed in the relevant firm in the year preceding the 
takeover year is potentially eligible, although the number of logit models in which an individual 
participates depends on the takeover date relative to the end of sample date (1999).
agreement conditions and legislation concerning layoffs that protect
longer-tenure workers over recent hires. It is worth noting, however, that
low-seniority workers and white collar workers (the difference with
unskilled blue collar workers is insignificant) are the most likely to
separate from their employers post-takeover and that these workers are,
at least in some dimensions, the workers that the literature on mass
layoffs suggests find new employment more easily.
When looking at firm accounts, it appears that an employee of a large firm
(measured by assets) has a significantly higher chance of leaving the new
entity than an employee of a smaller firm. On the other hand, employees
of firms that were more indebted yet more profitable prior to the
transaction are more likely to stay on with the newly created entity post-
takeover. Perhaps surprisingly, the effect of average employee
productivity changes over time, with the workers of more productive
acquired firms initially staying with a higher probability than those of less
productive acquired firms and the relation reversing two years after the
takeover.17 When considering acquiring firms, a similar inversion takes
place, although it is statistically insignificant and takes place at a much
longer distance from the actual takeover event.
The results concerning continued employment in firms that acquire other
firms are very similar to the results for employee retention in acquired
firms, in terms of which workers are more likely to stay or leave, although
unskilled blue collar workers in acquired firms do tend to separate with a
significantly higher probability than skilled blue collar workers or white
collar workers in these firms. This observation provides partial validation
for the idea that the acquiring firm’s management team has an “ideal”
workforce structure in mind and uses the occasion of the takeover to
proceed with “necessary” reorganisations both in house and with its
newly acquired staff. Since firms involved in takeovers are similar to each
other ex-ante in terms of the structure of their workforces (and different
from firms that do not undergo a merger or acquisition), it is perhaps
unsurprising that the same sorts of workers from both acquired and
acquiring firms stay with the newly created entity post transaction.
However, since these sorts of firms can be distinguished from non-
takeover firms according to the characteristics of their workforces, such
similar post-transaction behavior should ease the task of employment
agencies somewhat as they can prepare to accommodate similar types of
workers in a similar manner in areas where “typical” firms are found
without having to worry about which side of the transaction the firm will
be on.
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17 The fact that the coefficient changes sign over the duration of the employment spell implies that simple
duration econometric models would be misspecified when analysing this model. This is the primary reason
why we chose to analyse the continued employment duration through a series of logit models.
3.6 Conclusion: Takeovers Have Important Consequences 
for Employment that Are Only Visible in Linked 
Employer-Employee Data
The analysis undertaken in this paper represents a step forward with
respect to existing knowledge about takeovers along several dimensions.
Acquired and acquiring firms were characterised in terms of their
compensation policies and human resource management practices, as
opposed to simply balance sheet data. Detailed analyses of which workers
are most at risk of separating from their employer post takeover were also
carried out, and the distribution of layoffs between acquired and acquiring
firms was investigated. None of these additional steps could have been
undertaken without the detailed linked employer-employee data that
served as the basis for the analysis.
French firms have been shown to behave essentially as predicted by
economic theory concerning mergers and acquisitions. Some takeovers
seem to be driven by ex-ante perceptible differences in firm
characteristics, most notably compensation policy, that could be perceived
as sources of inefficiency to be improved upon after the takeover occurs.
Analysis of post-transaction employment shows that workforce
reorganisations performed by the new entity target similar types of
workers in the acquired and acquiring firms, suggesting that acquiring
firms may use the takeover event as a justification for undertaking a
broader restructuring, integrating the acquired firm’s employees into the
new entity and keeping only the most appropriate workers from both firms.
French firms also seem to follow the investment opportunities model of
takeovers, in that acquired firms tend to be more indebted but with
significantly higher returns on assets than the firms that acquire them.
Such takeovers may indeed correspond to mature firms “buying in”
opportunities for growth while young firms obtain their necessary
financing by being integrated into a larger entity.
The workers who leave the post-transaction entity can be characterised by
their observable characteristics as well as their “market value” (a measure
of unobservable characteristics). They tend to be younger, female and
white-collar workers with low job tenure and characteristics (both
education-related and unmeasured in the data) that give them low market
value. For the most part, these characteristics describe the workers who
also find it easiest to get new jobs following a mass layoff, which means
that employment services may not need to be directed as intensely to
employees laid off after a takeover since these workers are likely to be able
to find new jobs relatively easily even in the absence of additional assistance.
As a final note, it is worth highlighting the manner in which the results
shown here can be used to inform policy. First, it seems that some smaller
firms disappear due to their inability to access affordable capital, even
though they have promising investment opportunities. This suggests that
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capital markets should be investigated for failures and that there may be
an additional justification for subsidising fast-growing firms: not only do
they seem unable to access capital markets adequately, but they are more
likely to be acquired by other firms and such acquisitions tend to lead to
(proportionally) large reductions in employment.
Second, acquired firms do indeed lay off workers more than acquiring
firms but only in the short term, while the workers who end up laid off may
not be as much in need of reemployment assistance as might previously
have been thought. Both acquired and acquiring firms differ from non-
takeover firms in observable ways, and similar sorts of workers are laid off
from both types of firms after a takeover, so employment agencies may be
able to do some planning for layoffs before they occur by focusing on
firms that are more likely to be involved in takeover activity. But the
planning may not need much in terms of additional resources (with the
exception of women, those workers whose educational or otherwise
unobservable characteristics make them less desirable to the labour
market and unskilled blue-collar workers from the predator firms) since
the workers most likely to be laid off are also those who can find new jobs
the quickest after a layoff.
In sum, mergers and acquisitions are intimately related to the
compensation policies and human resource management practices of the
firms involved. One can use linked employer-employee data to target
policy initiatives along several dimensions related to takeover activity, and
an analysis of the employment implications of takeovers may lead to
different policy recommendations than might have be preconceived in the
absence of such detailed microeconometric evidence.
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4 Using Linked Employer-
Employee Data to Analyse
Fringe Benefits Policies:
Norwegian Experiences
Harald Dale-Olsen18
ABSTRACT
Over 50 per cent of firms in Norway offer fringe benefits as part of their
compensation package for workers, but their incentives for doing so are
not well understood. Using linked employer-employee data provided by
Statistics Norway and surveys of managers, this paper investigates the
relationship between fringe benefits, worker retention and firm
performance. The findings indicate that fringe benefits can play an
important role in human resource management, as workers’ quit
behaviour is very sensitive to their existence. Establishments also achieve
higher productivity by offering more fringe benefits, although it is not
clear whether this is due to workers making greater efforts, or to lower
recruitment costs. Finally, firms with more generous benefits have higher
survival rates than other establishments.
4.1 Introduction
Policy analysts and academics often equate labour costs with wages,
when, in fact, non-wage labour costs account for between 15 and 40 per
cent of total labour costs in major OECD countries.19 Non-wage elements 
are becoming increasingly important. From the 1960s to the 1990s in the
United States, fringe benefits increased from 4.9 per cent of total
compensation to over 10 per cent.20 This begs the question: what do 
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to 1983. To my knowledge, comprehensive comparative surveys with more recent figures have yet to be
published.
20 Woodbury (1983) reports total compensation comprises 4.9 per cent benefits in 1966 using BLS-data.
Benefits comprise employer payments to pension, health and life insurance, and other agreed-upon items.
While indexing the 1966-figure as 100, Hashimoto (2000) reports that the index in 1995 has increased to
174.1 and 212.45 for legally required and voluntary benefits, respectively. In economic research, several
contributions have studied the relationship between fringe benefits and worker behaviour. In 2002, Journal
of Labor Economics ran a special issue on compensation strategies, where fringe benefits were the focus of
two articles.
employers hope to gain from these benefits? Perhaps fringe benefits are a
tax-efficient form of remuneration, or permit the targeting of incentives to
valued workers without distorting pay structure? Maybe fringe benefits are
excluded from the bargaining process in countries where wages are set by
centralised bargaining, thus providing employers with ways to recruit new
workers and to retain old workers?
In this article we report findings from recent studies of firms’ fringe
benefits policies using Norwegian data. Norway differs from most west-
European countries in certain respects. Norway is not part of European
Union, it has a sizeable petroleum sector and it provides its citizens access
to a generous welfare state. At the same time, Norway is among the most
highly centralised wage bargaining countries in the world (Wallerstein,
1999). Employer and worker unions bargain centrally over wages. But this
does not mean that all wages are set centrally: not all sectors participate
in the bargaining process, and in many sectors local and/or individual-
level bargaining supplement the central bargaining process.
Do workers and employers bargain over fringe benefits? The answer is
clearly yes, but not always for all kinds of fringe benefits. Important fringe
benefits such as pension schemes, health insurance and holidays are
clearly subjects for bargaining. Fringe benefits of lesser value are less
often a bargaining objective for unions, at least when bargaining centrally,
but even low valued benefits may be objects for local and individual
bargaining.
What constitutes a fringe benefit? This clearly varies between countries. In
the literature, one usually considers pension schemes, health and life
insurance as fringe benefits. But in the USA for example, sickness and
maternity leave and paid holidays are also considered fringe benefits,
while these benefits are statutory rights in the majority of OECD countries
(OECD, 2002). In Norway public pensions, sickness and maternity leave
and basic holidays are determined by governmental legislation and
agreements between employer and worker unions on a central level. They
are usually not considered as fringe benefits. Private pension schemes
may however be considered as fringe benefits. For tax purposes, many
fringe benefits must be reported to the tax authorities. Among these are
stock options, free cars and free housing (see Section 4.3 for a more
comprehensive list). Lower valued fringe benefits and those of a more
spurious character (for example free coffee and fruit) are usually not 
reportable. Fringe benefits that are considered reportable and taxable
change over the years. Employers introduce new kinds of fringe benefits
that are not reportable and taxable, which then are made reportable and
taxable by the tax authorities. Finally, one should be aware that even those
fringe benefits that should be reported are not always reported. There is
reason to believe that this is particularly true for small amounts, less well-
established employment relationships and for less well-regulated
industries.
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In many ways, we have seen increased emphasis on fringe benefits in
Norway during the last decade. In Norwegian newspapers and media we
have seen an increased number of articles focussing on the positive
aspects of fringe benefits. Along other dimensions the change is not that
obvious. Consider Table 4.1, which reports statistics on the value of fringe
benefits as they are reported to the tax authorities during the period 1995
to 2002. Column 3 shows that the percentage of establishments offering
fringe benefits has increased, although due to business cycle effects the
trend is not linear. But, as columns 4 and 5 show, throughout the period
the value of fringe benefits as they are reported to the tax authorities only
accounted for a small percentage of total compensation.
If the value of fringe benefits is so small on average, why do fringe
benefits merit attention? First, even small values can have large impacts
on certain outcomes. Second, although the average values are small, for
specific groups the fringe benefits payments may be larger and may show
a stronger trend. Consider for instance Figure 4.1. This figure depicts the
value of fringe benefits reported to the tax authorities as a share of the
total compensation for five groups of educational qualifications: oil-well
drillers and miners, welders, lawyers, economists with a university degree,
and economists with an MBA. While for most of the groups we observe
only small changes during the period 1995-2002, the development for the
MBAs is striking. During the period of observation, the fringe benefits’
share has become close to five times as large as at the outset. Is this
change just a reflection of how the MBAs’ employers have altered the
fringe benefits policy, regardless of their employees’ educational
qualifications? In 1995, the MBAs’ establishments provided on average
fringe benefits valued at 2.6 per cent of total compensation (not shown on
the graph). In 2002 this had only increased to 3.8 per cent, so MBAs
experience a stronger movement towards a compensation comprising
more of fringe benefits and less of wages than the average worker.
Furthermore, this development is not caused by these MBAs being
employed within telecom and IT (narrow industries with preferences for
fringes such as stock options). Telecom and IT have experienced a strong
growth in the provision of fringe benefits, but so have wholesale trade and
production of food and beverages. When asked, employers in the two
former industries stress that employees prefer fringe benefits to wages,
but also that they are important for recruitment purposes. Fringe benefits
are important for recruitment purposes in the two latter industries as well,
but the producers of food and beverages rarely reply that employees
prefer them to wages. So while the growth in fringe benefits for MBAs is
partly caused by the developments in Telecom and IT, we are still left to
explain why MBAs in other industries experience this growth.
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Table 4.1: The use of fringe benefits 1995-2002
 Year Number of Percentage of Fringes as share of
  establishments  establishments total compensation (%)
   offering fringes
    All establishments Fringe offering
 1995 141169 (29564) 29.4 (55.6) 1.4 (0.9) 4.6 (1.6)
 1996 144223 (30338) 43.9 (81.5) 1.7 (1.2) 3.5 (1.5)
 1997 148380 (32571) 46.9 (83.6) 1.6 (1.2) 3.3 (1.4)
 1998 150598 (34591) 48.4 (84.3) 1.6 (1.1) 3.2 (1.4)
 1999 150965 (35518) 39.0 (67.3) 1.6 (1.0) 3.8 (1.5)
 2000 150064 (36194) 38.5 (65.4) 1.6 (1.0) 3.9 (1.5)
 2001 149092 (36551) 39.3 (65.1) 1.5 (0.9) 3.8 (1.4)
 2002 148125 (36968) 57.9 (89.6) 1.9 (1.4) 3.2 (1.5)
Note: Population: All Norwegian establishments and workers during the period 1995-2002. 
The figures in parentheses are based on establishments with more than 10 employees. 
Total compensation comprises wages and the value of fringe benefits as they are reported 
to the tax authorities.
Figure 4.1: Fringe benefits expressed as share of total 
compensation (%-points) during 1995-2002 for five 
educational qualifications
0
1
2
3
4
5
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Lawyers
Economists, MBA
National average
Economists, 
university
Welders
Oil well drillers 
and miners
In the next sections, we summarise recent research on fringe benefits
which implies that the use of fringe benefits is beneficial for both workers
and firms. These studies mainly use Norwegian linked employer-
employee data (LEED) supplemented by survey questionnaire data. Two
questions are particularly important in this research: 1) Can fringe benefits
be important as devices to control worker turnover; 2) How do fringe
benefits policies affect establishment performance?
Performance is not a well-defined target. The literature focuses on total
factor productivity and establishment survival probability as measures
reflecting performance. These measures are quite different, and one
should not necessarily expect fringe benefits to have the same impact on
these. All else equal, more productive establishments should survive
longer. But theory also implies that establishment survival will only be
ensured as long as the sum of the discounted future revenue stream
generated by continued operation is at least as large as the revenue
generated from the sale of all equipment and hardware today. If, for
example, employers discount differently, this variation may be correlated
with their provision of fringe benefits in such a way that fringe benefits
increase productivity, but appear to reduce establishment survival. In the
data section, we discuss some of the merits of LEEDs, but also point out
some potential drawbacks.
4.2 Some theoretical thoughts – why offer fringe benefits?
Fringe benefits can be understood from two different perspectives – as
equivalent to money wages or as non-pecuniary goods. If fringe benefits
are equivalent to money wages, why are they offered? The wage is the
price for labour, which provides consumption opportunities for the worker.
If fringe benefits are offered instead, this may imply that the prices for
fringe benefits are lower than money wages or that they provide the
worker with better consumption opportunities. There are several reasons
why fringe benefits can be cheaper than wages. For workers and firms, tax
legislation often treats fringe benefits more favourably. A wage of one
pound seldom yields consumption opportunities of one pound for the
worker and labour costs of one pound for the employer. Employers may
save pay-roll tax, and workers may save earnings tax. In addition, due to
market power firms may achieve fringe benefits at favourable prices
compared to what is available for workers. Furthermore, in some cases the
fringe benefits are produced by the firm itself, and the mark-up saved by
avoiding expensive third-party sellers may provide the employers with a
significant leverage in providing employees with attractive fringe benefits.
Fringe benefits may also be understood as non-pecuniary goods. Fringe
benefits are seldom accepted as a medium of exchange. They are not
readily used as payment for goods and services. Thus the real value of
fringe benefits for both the provider and the recipient can be difficult to
surmise. Fringe benefits may, however, give the workers strong
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satisfaction. They may have strong preferences and fondness for a
particular holiday cottage. An offer of free child care may take care of
workers’ organisational problems at home. The point is that fringe
benefits are singled out from the basic wage, thus worker evaluation is
influenced by endowment and framing effects (Thaler, 1980, Tversky and
Kahneman, 1986; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990) and biases of
judgement (Rabin, 1998).
Regardless of these two perspectives, fringe benefits allow employers to
design or structure the remuneration package offered to workers so that it
differentiates between workers (Elliot, 1991), and so they have an element
of “wage discrimination” attached. Fringe benefits allow employers to
target particularly attractive workers or groups of workers, and offer them
benefits which they desire. From this perspective, we see that fringe
benefits may be particularly attractive for employers in centralised wage
bargaining economies. Certain fringe benefits can also be understood as a
form of deferred compensation, which may achieve efficiency gains by
increased worker commitment, but also “lock” workers to firms. Fringe
benefits may act as a motivational device through the gift-exchange
mechanism of Akerlof (1982) and other efficiency wage mechanisms, and
they may act as important incentive devices.21 Finally, it was noted as early
as the 1980s that unionism and collective bargaining cause total
compensation to comprise relatively more fringe benefits and less money
wages (Freeman, 1981; Woodbury, 1983).22 Thus a typical fringe benefits
policy would be to offer the management stocks and stock options, while
the workforce in general is offered a pension scheme.
In Dale-Olsen (2005a, 2005b), fringe benefits are primarily treated as non-
pecuniary goods, i.e., fringe benefits are not treated as equivalent to
money wages. This allows us to interpret fringe benefits in a framework
which explicitly acknowledges that firms pay different job bundles (wages
and different non-pecuniary goods), workers – as unemployed or as
employed – search for jobs, but search frictions cause delays to the match
between workers and firms.23 In this framework, firms find that workers
quit due exogenous reasons. However, workers also search continuously
for better jobs, and they quit when they receive a better job offer. Firms
offer job bundles comprising of wages and non-wage amenities (e.g.,
fringe benefits) to attract workers and to retain employees. Large firms
offer job bundles providing more utility to workers than small firms, since
this strategy reduces worker turnover rate, and makes it easier to attract
replacement hires. This is a necessity just to keep a large workforce. The
optimality of this strategy follows from the theoretical model’s matching
assumptions, that workers and firms are homogenous and the notion that 
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21 Stocks/stock options are counted as fringes in Norway, making the link to the CEO incentive literature clear.
22 Union policies are strongly influenced by the median voter, and the median voter is often an older, tenured
worker. He or she will often prefer fringes as health insurance and pension plans to money wages.
23 This framework is the equilibrium search (or dynamic monopsony) framework with hedonic wages as
presented by Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998).
the economy is in equilibrium (for example, firms do not shrink or expand
their workforce). Thus it does not imply that achieving a low quit rate is an
optimum strategy in all cases.
Finally, one should note that there are several reasons why the fringe
benefits policies of firms should depend on size. Large firms have more
market power than small firms. Large firms are more likely to produce
items or goods that may be considered fringe benefits to workers. Large
firms are more likely than small firms to have designed and established
wage and recruitment policies – large firms “lose” workers all the time, while
workers quit small firms more unevenly.24 Clearly large firms, more often
than small firms, offer their employees access to internal labour markets.
Thus, while it is well known that there exists a firm-size wage premium,
such a premium should also exist when it comes to fringe benefits.
4.3 Data
Linked employer-employee data (LEED) provide the perfect background
for analysing workforce policies regarding, for example, payment issues-
but also more externally designed social reforms. LEED datasets give a
researcher the opportunity to follow workers over time, to see how they
react to work environment changes. Longitudinal LEED datasets, such as
those used in this paper, often provide researchers with information on
whole populations. A small LEED dataset could comprise all the
employees of a firm. Large ones are often based on public administrative
registers, thus comprising the whole populations of workers and
establishments in a country. Since the access cost to these registers is less
related to the number of subjects (or records), the researcher may find it
more cost effective to access the complete population than to focus on a
sample. Several research issues can for all practical purposes only be ad-
dressed using large comprehensive LEED datasets. A typical issue could
be the identification of high wage and low wage firms and the study of
how they are matched to high wage and low wage workers.
However, LEED datasets are not without drawbacks. Since they are
originally constructed for administrative purposes, the information they
include is often more limited. The researcher is limited to the information
that already exists. The unit of the population is already pre-defined, and
especially for LEED datasets based on administrative registers, the
legislation for the register governs changes to this population. Thus
questionnaires can be much more targeted and designed to shed light on
special issues, but at the price of having to be based on samples only.
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24 Consider, for example, two groups of establishments in 2000. In group A, each establishment employs 3
workers, of which at least two workers quit. In group B, each establishment employs 500 workers, of which
at least two workers quit. Average duration between each quit in group A is close to 84 days, with a
variance of 3392. Average duration between each quit in group B is 9 days, with a variance of 58. Even the
variance relative to the mean is much smaller for group B than for group A, implying more uneven quits
from group A than from group B.
For social scientists the well-regulated social democracies of the Nordic
countries provide relatively easy access to LEED datasets.25 The LEED
datasets are mostly managed by the public authorities. The countries have
implemented different systems or regimes for how researchers are to
access these databases. The systems are designed to take into
consideration individuals’ privacy issues and the possibility of misuse and
exploitation. Thus one regime is that the micro data never leave the central
statistical agency, and all analyses have to be conducted on the premises
of this agency. This does not imply that the researcher physically has to be
on the same premises, since she may remotely submit programs. Another
regime is to accept that data leave the public authorities after approval
from statistical agencies and governmental bodies. In this case all
identifying numbers are usually encrypted. Often the data are to be kept in
a secure environment (not accessible over the internet).
Statistics Norway provides researchers with access to very large
comprehensive Norwegian LEED datasets. The research referred to in this
article uses information mainly from a LEED dataset based on public
administrative registers, and comprises all employers and their employees
in Norway 1995–2003 employed on May 15th each year. A crucial and
important aspect making the construction of Norwegian LEEDs possible
(or at least easier) is that in Norway separate identifying numbers exist for
each citizen, each establishment and each enterprise. The PIN-code of the
workers makes it possible to track workers through time, even while
employed by different employers and during periods of unemployment.
Similarly, the identifying number of the establishments makes it possible
to follow an establishment from creation to closure. In our LEED dataset
the identifying numbers are encrypted, but otherwise all aspects of the
number series are kept.
How do the Norwegian administrative registers treat closures? The
classical closure of an establishment – a plant is completely disbanded,
dismantled and then disappears – is seen as the disappearance of the
establishment from the registers. In many cases, some sort of continued
operation occurs, but the establishment’s identifying number changes and
thus implies an establishment closure in the records. From 1995 the main
principle for designating a new identifying number and new date of birth
to an establishment in such cases is that at least two of three
characteristics have to change: 1) new owner; 2) new main product
(change of industry); and 3) new location (change of municipality). If the
workforce remains identical, all three characteristics have to change for it
to be considered a death of an “old” establishment and a “birth” of a new
one. This means that establishment closures due to purely administrative
reasons should not occur. Important characteristics of the establishment
have to change for the establishment to get a new identity.
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25 By relatively ease, I mean that in these countries large comprehensive LEEDs actually do exist, and
researchers get access to them.
It is a matter of concern that a change of ownership results in what
appears as a birth of a new establishment. As pointed out above,
enterprises (owners of establishments) and establishments have separate
identifying number series. Purely legal ownership changes result in a new
identifying number for the enterprise, but otherwise no changes for the
establishment. Note also that these criteria are identical for single-
establishment and multiple-establishment enterprises. Reallocation of
resources between establishments within the same enterprise may result
in what appears as more frequent establishment closures among multiple-
establishment enterprises, but one may equally well observe the opposite,
since multiple-establishment enterprises have available more resources
and financial reserves (these enterprises are usually larger than single-
establishment enterprises).
This linked employer-employee data set provides information on workers
(gender, education), jobs (for example earnings, daily wage, hourly wages
in 2002-2003, the value of fringe benefits as they are reported to the tax
authorities, weekly working hours, seniority) and establishment-
characteristics such as industry (5-digit NACE), sector and municipality.
The data are very comprehensive, thus it is possible to derive information
on the establishments’ local labour market (at the municipality level) and
at a detailed industry level (3-digit NACE).
Among fringe benefits reported to the tax authorities are, for example,
loans provided by employers at low interest rates, and free or subsidised
telephones/mobile phones, cars, newspapers, work clothing, public
holidays, gifts, food (lunch/dinner), free child care (including
kindergartens), free accident insurance, retirement insurance, stocks
available at below market price, free housing, free memberships in private
medical services, paid parking spaces, and benefits from borrowing
computer equipment from employers.
This LEED dataset faces a typical drawback – it does not comprise all the
desired information. Although our data are very comprehensive, it would
have been of benefit to have information on the value reported to the tax
authorities of specific fringe benefits (for example company car, free
housing, stocks or loans lower than market price/interest rate). And even
more important, not all fringe benefits are reported to the tax authorities.
The information is also much more limited when it comes to information
on establishments (not aggregated from worker characteristics). For a
sample of the establishments we have access to information on value
added, capital (insurance values), pay-roll tax and investments, but only
for establishments that are part of the manufacturing statistics (and a few
mining, construction and trade establishments).
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In the research reviewed in this article, information from two LEED
datasets are linked to the information from two questionnaires – FLEXI97
and ABU2003 – conducted in 1997 and January-March 2003, respectively.
Each questionnaire was answered by the daily leader or personnel
manager of more than 2300 Norwegian establishments and covered topics
such as new work practices and organisation issues, wage determination,
health and pension issues. These establishments were sampled from
establishments with more than 10 employees, but the sample was
constructed so that large establishments were over-sampled (stratified).
For example, all establishments with more than 300 establishments were
included in the samples. Both survey samples were drawn by Statistics
Norway using stratified sampling from Statistics Norway’s registers of
establishments and enterprises. Statistics Norway has access to most
identifying numbers in Norway (e.g., citizen, worker, establishment,
enterprise). The identifying establishment and enterprise numbers are
then replaced by the encrypted ones, so these surveys are easily linked to
our LEED datasets.
While FLEXI97 and ABU2003 comprise questionnaire information on new
work practices, ABU2003 focuses especially on fringe benefits issues.
What kinds of fringe benefits are offered? What are the employers’
motivations for offering fringe benefits? By answering these questions, the
questionnaire provides the information the LEED datasets lack. This article
focuses principally on ABU2003, but returns to Flexi97 in the final section.
4.4 What characterises establishments offering 
fringe benefits?
In this section, a rough picture is provided of the non-public administration
sector establishments that offer fringe benefits in Norway 2002. In the
ABU2003 questionnaire the employers are asked about the provision of
eight specific fringe benefits: pension schemes, allowed leave due to self-
reported sickness in excess of collective agreements (from here on called
extended sickness absence), private physicians, gym membership, child
care, cleaning assistance, holiday homes (cottage/flat), and vacation
longer than collective agreements (from here on called extended
vacation). It is possible for an employer to provide more than one fringe
benefit.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 describe wages, fringe benefits (from the questionnaire
and LEED), and show the distribution of the provision of fringe benefits in
Norway 2002. On average close to 80 per cent of Norwegian employers
offer at least one fringe benefit. Pension schemes and gym membership
are the most common. Child care and cleaning assistance are seldom
offered. Table 4.3 also reveals that the distribution of the number 
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of fringe benefits offered is skewed. Most employers offer one or two
benefits, while a small minority (10 per cent) offers more than three. The
distribution of the value of fringe benefits is equally skewed. Most
employers offer benefits of a low reported value, but maximum reported
establishment average value is over 1500 NoK ( ).26
Table 4.4 looks closer at the clustering or groups of fringe benefits offered.
It shows that pension schemes are the central fringe benefit. As employers
increase the number of fringe benefits provided, they also combine
extended sickness absence, gym membership and holiday home. Only
employers providing six or seven fringe benefits offer child care or
cleaning assistance.
Table 4.5 reveals that there exist distinct industry differences, regardless
whether one considers the fringe benefits reported to the tax authorities or
the fringe benefits reported in the questionnaire.
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26 During the period 1995-2003 1 $ has varied between 6 and 10 NoK, while the variation between the
Norwegian Krone and Euro has been much smaller. Thus in the following sections, we only show the
conversion to Euro.
Table 4.2: Provision of fringe benefits. 2002
From the questionnaire data, manufacturing, services and transport are
high fringe benefit industries, while trade and primary are low fringe bene-
fit industries. From the tax authority data, we see that primary industries
are among the higher ranked. This reflects differences in fringe benefits
reported to the tax authorities and those reported in the questionnaire.
56
Making Linked Employer-Employee Data Relevant to Policy
Table 4.3: Distribution of fringe benefits 2002
  Reported daily fringe value  Number of fringe benefits
  Interval of the distribution  Interval of the distribution over
  over reported fringe benefits  the number of benefits provided
 Min 0   Min 0
 1% 0   1% 0
 5% 0   5% 0
 10% 0   10% 0
 25%  1.1   25% 1
 50%  5.5   50% 1
 75%  17.1   75% 3
 90%  39.7   90% 4
 95%  68.3   95% 4
 99%  160.2   99% 5
 Max 1672.6   Max 7
Note: See Table 3.2
For example, low reported values of fringe benefits in the hotel and
restaurant industries are not surprising, since these are less well-regulated
industries and well-established employment relationships are less
common. Insurance, vehicles, housing and food are relevant fringes in the
primary sector, but are only reported to the tax authorities. The manu-
facturing, service and primary industries are high-wage; hotels and trade
are low-wage. Thus it appears that industries paying high wages also offer
more fringe benefits than low-wage industries.
The next table – Table 4.6 – addresses this issue in more detail: Do
establishments paying high wages also offer more fringe benefits? From a
compensating wage differential perspective, we would expect high wage
firms to pay low fringe benefits, and vice versa. Introducing on-the-job
search and search friction may yield a positive correlation between wages
and benefits.
To shed light on this issue, in Dale-Olsen (2005b) the establishments are
ranked by their position in the wage distribution, and grouped into six
groups depending on rank. The first group comprises establishments
positioned at the bottom of the wage distribution, from the 0th percentile
to the 10th percentile. The last group comprises establishments positioned
at the top of the wage distribution, from 91st percentile to the 100th
percentile. For each of these groups, Dale-Olsen (2005b) studies average
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Table 4.4: Clustering of fringe benefits 2002
 The number of fringe  Frequency Fringe benefits within group percent
 benefits offered category
 1 1 Pension scheme (PS) 54.4
  2 Extended sickness absence (ESA)/gym (G). 
   These are tied. 13.4
 2 1 PS, ESA 28.0
  2 PS, G 21.3
 3 1 PS, G, holiday home (HH) 18.0
  2 PS, ESA, HH 15.2
 4 1 PS, ESA, HH, G 29.3
  2 PS, HH, G, extended vacation (EV) 19.2
 5 1 PS, ESA, HH, G, EV 31.8
  2 PS, ESA, HH, G, private physician (PP) 26.1
 6 1 PS, ESA, HH, G, EV, PP 35.7
  2 PS, ESA, HH, G, EV, child care (CC) 21.4
 7 1 PS, ESA, HH, G, EV, PP, CC 60.0
  2 PS, ESA, HH, G, EV, CC, cleaning assistance 20.0
Note: Questionnaire information is linked to register information for 2002. 1387 observations. They 
are weighted to be representative for the population of establishments employing at least 11 
employees. Frequency category 1 is the most frequent fringe benefit or combination of fringe benefits 
within the groups defined by the number of fringes offered. Frequency category 2 is the second most 
frequent fringe benefit or combination of fringe benefits within the groups defined by the number of 
fringes offered.
size, average wage, and average percentage fringe benefit value of the
total compensation. Table 4.6 reports these figures for three separate
populations: for all establishments 1995-2002, for all establishments
employing at least 10 workers, and establishments in the ABU2003-sample
(a sample from establishments with more than 10 workers).
In all three populations there is a very similar picture, as revealed in Table
4.6. The higher in the wage distribution the establishment is positioned,
the larger is the establishment and the larger the part of total
compensation comprised of fringe benefits. The slight deviation for all
establishments’ workforce size (when comparing columns five and six in
row one) is caused by the high average wage level of some very small
establishments, but then again these averages rest on a few observations
only. At the top of the wage distribution, the value of the fringe benefits is
4-5 per cent of the total compensation
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Table 4.5: Wages, fringe benefits and industry 2002
The observed wage distribution is a reflection of the establishments’ wage
policies and their workforces’ qualifications. Establishments at the top
may pay high wage premiums (above average market wages) compared
to other establishments, for example to achieve a larger workforce size
(even given equally productive workers). However, establishments may
also be located at the top because they have a highly qualified workforce.
Dale-Olsen (2005b) derives separate distributions for the wage premiums
and workforce qualifications from the wage distribution, and then studies
these separately. The study concludes that fringe benefits are more exten-
sively used among establishments that are higher up in the wage
premium distribution and among workforces of higher quality. Child care
though, is offered primarily to less skilled workforces. This reflects these
establishments’ workforce gender composition, being dominated by
female occupations. Cleaning assistance is primarily offered by
establishments at the very top of the wage premium distribution.
Finally, Table 4.5 revealed that wages vary between industries. How do the
above findings change if one considers the relationship between fringe
benefits and the wage distribution conditional upon industry? It turns out
that the high wage establishments still offer more benefits and they are
still large, but one also finds that very low wage establishments offer more
benefits and these are also large. Thus in this case we observe a convex
relationship between fringe benefits and workforce size.
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Table 4.6: Establishment size, wages and reported fringe benefits
4.5 Employers’ motivations for offering fringe benefits
We start by providing a brief look at employers’ motivations for providing
fringe benefits. In the questionnaire the employers were asked why they
offer fringe benefits. They were given four alternative answers to choose
from: i) employees prefer fringe benefits to wages, ii) it is important to
recruit/retain workers, iii) it saves pay-roll tax, and iv) employers obtain
goods and services at lower prices than workers. The categories of
motivation are not mutually exclusive. Employers may choose more than
one reason or none (29.4 per cent answer none).
Table 4.7, reproduced from Dale-Olsen (2005b), shows that the main
reason for employers to offer fringe benefits is because they are (thought)
to be important for recruitment and retention of workers. More than fifty
per cent of the employers answer that this is the reason for offering them.
25 per cent answer that employees prefer fringe benefits to wages or that
employers achieve lower prices than workers. Very few answer that fringe
benefits are offered to save pay-roll tax (but this may be because it is not
socially acceptable to say so).
These reasons are also clustered. Employers who only provide one reason
usually motivate fringe benefits by “recruit/retain workers” (74.8 per cent).
If they provide two reasons, a majority say “recruit/retain workers” and
“since employees prefer fringes to wages” (54.6 per cent). However, several
employers answer “recruit/retain workers” and that they “achieve lower prices
than workers” (41.2 per cent). If the employers provide three reasons, then
87.9 per cent answers “recruit/retain workers”, “employees prefer fringe
benefits to wages” and “employers obtain lower prices than workers”.
Since some workers employed by larger firms are likely to quit each
period, recruitment and training of new workers are costly issues that
occur regularly, at least for larger firms, and have to be addressed in an
organised way. Thus larger firms are more likely to have personnel
departments and well-developed recruitment and wage policies, and they
are more likely to answer that fringe benefits are important for
recruitment. Larger firms are also more likely to obtain lower prices than
employees. Table 4.7 also reveals that the fringe benefits on offer vary
according to the employers’ motivation. Those saving pay-roll tax offer
private physicians, child care and cleaning assistance – the latter two
being typical informal economy occupations. Employers motivated by
‘employees prefer fringe benefits to wages’ offer private physicians and
extended vacations, but they are less likely to offer a holiday home.
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4.6 The impact of wages and fringe benefits on workers’ 
quit behaviour
In this section we study in more detail how workers’ quit behaviour is
affected by wages and fringe benefits. In Dale-Olsen (2005b), the results
from several duration regression models are presented. A duration
regression model explicitly models the time in a particular state – in this
case the employment spell. The models are estimated using the
observations on the nearly 200,000 workers employed by the non-public
administration establishments of the ABU2003-sample.
This article focuses on the results from two of the duration regression
estimations.27 Observed heterogeneity is controlled by the variables:
education (years and field dummies), experience (years), gender, union
member, municipality mean and variance log wages, industry mean and
variance log wages, industry and county dummies. Table 4.8 presents two
regression results regarding wages and fringe benefits. Regression 1
includes hourly wage and dummies for different fringe benefits.
Regression 2 includes hourly wage and the percentage of total
compensation comprised by fringe benefits. For ease of interpretation, the
estimated parameters are presented as showing the impacts on the quit
rate in per cent. The average quit rate is 20.6 per cent.
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27 The estimations are of so-called Weibull-duration regression models where unobserved heterogeneity
(variation) is controlled for by a Gamma distributed term.
Table 4.7: Why do establishments use fringe benefits?
 Motivation for using fringe benefits as part of total compensation
 Employees prefer Important for recruit/ Achieve lower Saves
 fringes to wages retain workers prices than workers pay-roll tax
Mean (%) 25.5 55.0 24.1 2.0
Pearson correlation coefficients (Fisher’s z-transformation). In per cent. 
Number of employees -2.0 8.1** 7.1** -1.5
Pension scheme 3.7** 8.1** 13.1*** 7.0**
Extended sickness absence 2.7 6.2* 2.6 8.0**
Private physician 10.0*** 6.9* 3.3 12.8***
Gym membership 1.6 8.9** 16.1*** 3.0
Child care 0.0 4.6 -3.7 8.5**
Cleaning assistance 7.0* 3.3 -1.3 15.7***
Holiday home -8.4** 9.0** 13.0*** -3.8
Extended vacation 24.1*** 12.9*** -8.8** -10.0***
Note: Weighted. Figures based on the response from 847 establishments offering at least one fringe 
benefit in excess of pension scheme. The categories of motivation are not mutually exclusive. ***, **, 
and * denote 1, 5, and 10 per cent level of significance, respectively. Source: Dale-Olsen (2005b)
Regression 1 of Table 4.8 shows that higher wages and some of the fringe
benefits (child care, holiday home, extended sickness absence leave)
strongly reduce worker turnover. Establishments offering child care
experience a 40 per cent lower quit rate than other establishments. In
addition, the results of Regression 2 imply that as the relative value of the
fringe benefits increase, the quit rate drops. More fringe benefits, given
the total level of compensation, reduces worker turnover.
The results of regressions 1 and 2 are very robust. Dale-Olsen (2005b)
reports the results from several other specifications (different controls,
different distributional assumptions, bootstrap), and these are quite
similar. For example, in one specification the total reported value of the
fringe benefits was included in addition to the variables mentioned above.
This specification controls for the fact that the fringe benefits dummies do
not indicate the amount of fringe benefits offered and that those reported
to the tax authorities and those reported in the questionnaire may not
coincide. This causes only minor changes, and the parameters associated
with the fringe benefit dummies are basically unchanged.
To give a visual impression of the importance of fringe benefits for the quit
rate, the parameter estimates are used to calculate the hazard function and
the cumulative hazard function. The hazard function is interpreted as the
probability that the worker quits next period contingent on the worker
being employed in this period. The cumulative hazard then gives a picture
of the total quit probability as the years of seniority increase.
In Figure 4.2 four cases are considered: mean wage/no fringes, mean
wage/all fringes, high wage/no fringes and high wage/all fringes. These
are extreme cases, but they reveal the differences between the policies.
The mean wage in this sample of workers is roughly 200 NoK ( ),
while high wage is defined as twice the mean wage. ‘All fringes’ implies
that all eight fringes are provided. Figure 4.2 shows that the probability is
roughly twice as large for mean wage/no fringes compared to mean
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Table 4.8: The impact of wages and fringe benefits on workers’ 
probability of quitting
wage/all fringes. More importantly, though, paying high wages/no fringes
yields a probability that is larger than paying mean wages/all fringes. Thus
with respect to worker turnover at least, offering fringe benefits may
totally compensate for lower wages.
The estimated figures in Dale-Olsen (2005b) indicate extremely strong
preferences for some of the fringe benefits. These estimates can be used
to calculate workers’ marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for fringe
benefits. Table 4.9 presents these MWP-figures. The method is basically to
use the quit behaviour as a key to provide an MWP-estimate. How much is
the probability of quitting reduced by increasing wages? How much is it
reduced by offering fringe benefits? The relative relationship then
provides an MWP-estimate. Of course, this method rests on very strong
simplifying assumptions, for example regarding utility functions.
The significant MWP-figures reported in Table 4.9 are extremely high. One
reason for this result is that the utility function does not take into
consideration the necessity of wages, but treat wages and fringe benefits
equally. Wages provide workers with consumption opportunities today.
Certain fringe benefits act as deferred compensation. They are non-
transferable and provide consumption opportunities in the future.
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Figure 4.2: Wage and fringe benefits policies and workers’ 
probabilities of quitting: four cases
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Some fringe benefits provide utility today, but are non-transferable, non-
divisible, lack readily available markets, and thus they provide fewer
consumption opportunities than wages.
Another reason may be the fact that the fringe benefits are modelled by
the use of dummies on the establishment-level, and the associated
parameter estimates may catch the importance of other non-observed
benefits. But also the MWP for an extra 1 percentage point of fringe
benefits (reported on the individual level) as part of total compensation is
strong.
These workers are on average on the margin willing to pay 11 NoK
( ) for 1 percentage point more fringes as part of total
compensation. On average, an extra 1 percentage point of fringe benefits
implies an extra 2 NoK of fringe benefits. Thus the workers are willing to
pay 11 NoK to get a value of 2 NoK in fringe benefits.
The results referred to here can be criticised for not taking into account the
fact that employers design their wage and fringe benefits policy to achieve
a desired level of worker turnover. For example, very few employers
attempt to achieve zero worker turnover. Employers have thus determined
the profit-maximising combination of wages, fringe benefits and worker
turnover. If this is the case, then the regressions above may be affected by
endogeneity bias. To address this, Dale-Olsen (2005b) also runs
establishment-level quit regressions, utilising the panel characteristics of
the data. This allows one to estimate quit regressions using the GMM-
method of Arellano and Bond (1991) incorporated in STATA. This still
identifies strong significant negative impacts from both fringe benefits and
wages on worker turnover.
4.7 Do establishments offering fringe benefits achieve 
higher productivity?
The next issue is whether or not establishments offering fringe benefits
achieve measurable productivity gains from their fringe benefits policies.
The main employer argument for offering fringe benefits was that fringes
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Table 4.9: The marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for fringe 
benefits (in Norwegian Krone)
were necessary to recruit and to retain workers. Worker turnover, and the
consequent recruitment and training are costly, so fringes may offset turn-
over. A properly designed fringe benefits policy also acts as an incentive
device, i.e., these establishments may achieve a more efficient workforce
compared to establishments not offering fringe benefits. To shed some
light on this issue, Table 4.10 presents descriptive statistics on value
addition and fringe benefits for 164 manufacturing establishments in the
ABU2003-sample. The first column provides statistics across all
establishments. The next columns provide statistics for four groups of
establishments, where group membership is determined by fringe
benefits’ share of total workforce compensation. The first group comprises
of the 10 per cent establishments with the smallest share. The next group
comprises of the next 11-50 per cent establishments, and so on.
Although the relationships are slightly weaker for the top group, Table 4.10
shows that establishments paying relatively more fringe benefits are
larger overall, employ more highly educated workers, are more capital
intensive, pay higher wages, pay more pay-roll taxes, and produce more
than other firms. While value addition increases as the share of fringes
increases, no causal impact of fringe benefits on productivity is identified.
But this topic is elaborated in Dale-Olsen (2005b) by estimating several
Cobb-Douglas production functions. Using an estimation method called
system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) to address endogeneity issues, a
positive impact of fringe benefits on value addition is identified.
Establishments paying more fringe benefits relative to total compensation
experience higher total factor productivity than establishments paying
little fringe benefits. This productivity effect is not caused by saving pay-
roll tax, since it persists even after controlling for pay-roll tax differences.
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Table 4.10: Productivity, wage and fringe benefits policies. 
Average 1995-2002
 Interval of the fringe benefits distribution
 Total 1-10% 10-50% 51-90% 90-100%
Number of employees 239.9 103.4 (98.6) 237.9 (218.4) 281.8 (247.3) 216.5 (192.2)
High educated employees 61.2 8.1 (8.7) 45.6 (70.4) 85.7 (113.3) 72.5 (76.0)
Log capital 12.0 11.2 (1.5) 12.1 (1.7) 12.2 (1.5) 11.5 (1.5)
Log value added 11.2 10.2 (1.1) 11.1 (1.3) 11.5 (1.4) 11.3 (1.4)
Daily wage 760.0 640.3 (116.2) 709.4 (151.4) 812.8 (189.9) 812.8 (189.9)
Fringe benefits (%-points) 1.4 0.02 (0.02) 0.5 (0.2) 1.7 (0.6) 5.7 (2.6)
Pay-roll tax rate (%-points) 11.2 10.6 (2.4) 10.8 (2.4) 11.5 (2.5) 12.5 (1.5)
Number of observations 1168 116 468 467 117
Note: Table elements express mean and standard deviations (in parentheses). Capital, value added 
and daily wage are reported in NoK. Population: 164 manufacturing ABU2003-establishments with 
valid observations on capital and pay-roll tax.
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4.8 The impact of new work practices, fringe benefits policies
and wages on establishment survival
In this section, we turn to the final issue – how do fringe benefits policies
affect establishment survival? In the previous sections, we have seen that
fringe benefits can be used to manage the worker turnover of an
establishment. Furthermore, manufacturing establishments offering
higher valued fringe benefits achieve productivity gains compared to
establishments offering lower valued benefits. All things equal one should
then expect that establishments offering relatively more fringe benefits
should be better able to survive in a competitive economy than those
establishments offering relatively fewer fringe benefits.
A problem with evaluating the impact of fringe benefits and wages on
establishment survival is that if one considers the population of
establishments existing at one point in time, and then studies which
establishments survive, the original population is also a product of a
‘natural selection’ process. Some establishments are very old – survivors
– while others are brand new – whereof some may become survivors as
time goes by. This problem is aggravated by the fact that in our data we
only can identify the time of entry for establishments participating in the
questionnaires (Flexi97 and ABU2003) or for establishments established
during 1996-2003.
During the period 1995-2003, we can focus on a specific cohort or cohorts
of establishments. Dale-Olsen (2005c) selected the cohorts of 1996-2000,
and then followed them until 2003. For example, the 1996-cohort
comprises 10,383 establishments with more than one employee (single-
person establishments are discarded from the data, since the role of these
compared to self-employed individuals is unclear). Table A4.1 in the
appendix provides descriptive statistics of all establishments and the entry
establishments in the Norwegian economy in 1996. The entry
establishments are usually smaller than the incumbent establishments.
The entry rate is highest in the hotel, post-telecom (where a major
reorganisation occurs) and IT industries, and smallest in manufacturing
and primary industries. The entry establishments pay lower wages than
the incumbents, but slightly more fringe benefits. These findings are quite
robust across the cohorts.
Our main focus in this section, however, is on establishment closure. Table
4.11 shows the average exit rate of the 1996-, 1997- and 2000-cohort of
establishments during the periods 1996-2003, 1997-2003 and 2000-2003,
respectively28. The table presents figures for all establishments and for
establishments with more than 10 employees separately. For all three
cohorts the quit rates drop with workforce size, so it appears that larger 
66
Making Linked Employer-Employee Data Relevant to Policy
28 The figures express the average closure rate during the period of observation, and they do not provide
information on the cumulative probability of establishment survival during this period. The closure
probability drops strongly as the establishment grows older. This is clearly seen if one focuses on the 1996-
cohort. In 2003 only 55 per cent of the cohort is still active. Of the 45 per cent closures, more than 10
percentage points can be related to closures during the first year. To save space, the table does not present
statistics on the 1998- and 1999-cohort.
size ensures survival. Establishments in multiple-establishment
organisations have on average lower exit rates than establishments in
single-establishment organisations (which may reflect multiple-
establishments’ larger sizes).
The table reveals clear differences between cohorts, populations (size) and
industries. The 2000-cohort has the highest closure rate – 8.9 per cent – as
expected (the shakeout or selection process is strongest among the young
establishments), but the closure rate for the 1996-cohort is actually quite
similar. 1997-cohort clearly has lower closure rates. Hotel-, IT- and post-
telecom-sectors rank at the top when it comes to high exit rates, but these
rankings are less clear when one focuses on establishments with more
than 10 employees.
Table 4.11 also reports “rough” correlations between the total fringe
benefit value as a share of total compensation, workforce size and
establishment closure for the different cohorts, populations and
industries. They demonstrate the strong heterogeneity that exists.
The correlations are qualitatively dependent on cohorts, populations and
industries. At the aggregate level one gets the impression that fringe
benefits correlate positively with closures (particularly for 1996), but no
strong pattern can be seen between benefits and size. It is, however, clear
that the construction-, service-, post-telecom and IT-sectors are the driving
forces behind the positive correlations between fringes and closures. If
one turns to the manufacturing establishments, having more fringe
benefits is associated with fewer closures. This is particularly interesting
since the previously referred productivity results were based on
observations of manufacturing establishments.
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Table 4.11: The closure rates of establishments (per cent), size 
and fringe benefits. 1996-, 1997- and 2000-cohorts
   1996-cohort  1997-cohort  2000-cohort
  All +10 employees All +10 employees All +10 employees
Total 8.5 4.9 6.9 5.6 8.9 6.0
Total – Only multisite 8.2 2.2 3.9 2.2 4.6 2.9
Primary 9.6 1.7 12.3 5.6 12.0 5.4
Manufacturing 8.3 5.1 8.7 7.1 8.8 3.9
Construction 7.3 4.5 9.6 8.8 9.4 6.0
Trade 7.4 3.8 8.1 3.8 8.4 3.0
Hotel 10.0 6.4 12.6 7.0 14.6 6.6
Transport 9.1 7.6 8.6 5.4 9.1 5.4
Post-telecom 20.6 3.9 11.5 9.0 11.5 8.0
Service 8.0 5.7 6.9 4.1 10.1 7.1
IT  9.5 9.3 10.6 5.4 15.8 15.2
Correlation between workforce size and the value of fringe benefits 
as share of total compensation.
Total -0.9** -1.5 0.1 3.9***  0.1 2.1
Primary 1.6 0.5 3.4 -5.1 12.9** 8.3
Manufacturing -1.7 -1.1 -0.9 -2.9 -0.4 1.1
Construction -3.3** -2.9 0.2 3.2 1.3 -6.2
Trade 0.1 1.5 5.1*** 18.1*** -1.5 4.8
Hotel -1.8 -0.9 0.2 6.1 4.0 4.0
Transport 1.0 -4.0 4.2** 7.6 -0.2 -8.0
Post-telecom -7.0*** -8.4*** -0.8 3.4 -9.5 -6.9
Service -2.7** -1.8 -2.4** 4.4** 0.1 8.7**
IT  -2.6 22.6*** -5.8* 4.0 6.5* 17.7**
Correlation between the exit of establishments and the value of fringe benefits 
as share of total compensation.
Total 1.3*** 4.4*** 0.2 1.1 0.9 3.7*
Primary -1.9 -6.9 -0.9 34.7*** -8.4* -12.6
Manufacturing -1.4 -3.3 -3.5* -7.7** -3.4 -2.1
Construction 2.8* 18.5*** 3.4** 11.3*** -0.4 -1.6
Trade -1.7* 5.5** 0.3 5.8** 1.6 13.6**
Hotel -4.3** -6.0** -3.8* -8.1*** -3.1 -5.1
Transport -2.4 -9.5* 0.8 0.1 -3.9 -7.3
Post-telecom 4.0*** 13.3*** -1.5 -3.9 14.2** -9.4
Service 1.1 9.4*** 1.1 1.0 2.3 -3.0
IT  2.1 2.6 4.6 -3.8 6.1 20.2***
Note: Population: all entry Norwegian establishments in 1996, 1997 or 2000 (cohort 1996, cohort 1997, 
cohort 2000) excluding public administration and one-man establishments. All reported figures of 
correlations are Pearson correlation coefficients (Fisher’s z-transformation) measured in per cent. ***, 
**, and * denote 1, 5, and 10 per cent level of significance, respectively. Source: Dale-Olsen (2005c).
To study the relationship between establishment survival and fringe
benefit policies in more detail, Dale-Olsen (2005c) estimates duration
regression models on observations of the 1996-2000 cohorts of
establishments. The models control for log daily wages, fringe benefits
(%), a dummy for being part of a multiple-establishment organisation
(yes=1), log number of employees, the proportion of the workforce that is
unionised, average years of education in the workforce, the number of
educational qualifications in the workforce, the proportion of workforce on
part-time contracts, average municipality wages, cohort-dummies and
industry dummies (NACE, 2-digit).29 All variables except for the dummies
are treated as time-varying covariates.
Table 4.12 reports the results – probability ratios – from four of the
regressions.30 The first two columns present the results for two different
duration models based on all observations. The next two columns report
the results from similar regressions on observations of the manufacturing
establishments only, thus enabling comparison to the findings of Section
4.7’s productivity analysis. Table 4.12 shows that the results are quite
robust to the choice of duration model – a nice feature which lends
credibility to the findings. With the exception of the impact caused by
municipality wages, we observe qualitatively similar effects for the other
significant covariates. Furthermore, we see that for most covariates – the
municipality wage level is once more an exception – the results are equally
robust to the choice of population.
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29 Regressions are based on the Weibull-model and the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model, with
time-varying covariates. To avoid making the analyses sensitive to characteristics of a specific cohort, the
regressions are conducted on pooled observations from the five cohorts. The legislation regulating entries
and closures in the administrative registers was introduced in 1995, and thus the quality of the data is
improved for the later cohorts.
30 Note that these ratios are actually hazard ratios. A hazard ratio associated with a covariate is to be
interpreted as how much higher/lower is the hazard caused by this covariate relative to the baseline hazard
(reference). In Table 4.12, consider the parameter associated with multiple-establishment organisation
(MEO): 0.761. Being member of a MEO then implies 0.761 – 1 = –0.239, i.e., 23.9 per cent lower than the
baseline hazard. See also the interpretation of the hazard function in Section 4.6.
A higher share of fringe benefits in total compensation significantly
reduces the exit probability. The impact is not strong, but one should not
expect a huge impact. Increasing the share of fringe benefits by one
percentage point implies a 0.2-0.9 per cent lower exit probability (for all
establishments). For manufacturing establishments the impact is slightly
stronger – a 0.7-2.3 per cent lower probability of closure. Thus these
regressions support the productivity results of Section 4.7.
Wages turn out to affect the probability of closure negatively, i.e., paying
higher wages delays closure. At first this may seem surprising, but one
has to remember that wages reflect productivity – more productive firms
pay higher wages. Since more productive firms survive longer (everything
else equal), a positive correlation exists between wages and survival.
Controlling for productivity, a higher wage level should imply earlier
closure, but in these regressions without controls for productivity we
actually observe what should be expected. In general, doubling the wage
implies a 7.4-32.8 per cent lower probability of closure (Cox and Weibull,
respectively).
Although not the main focus of this section, Table 4.12 reveals interesting
findings regarding the impact of workforce size, unionisation, multiple-
establishment organisations and human resources on establishment
closures. Workforce size matters for survival – being large ensures
survival. For example, in these data average manufacturing size is 13
employees. The probability of closure drops by 14.5 per cent (Cox) when
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Table 4.12: The impact of fringe benefits policies on 
establishment probability of closure. Probability ratios
     All  Manufacturing
     establishments  establishments
    Cox Weibull Cox Weibull
Log workforce size   0.802*** 0.522*** 0.855*** 0.677***
Multiple-establishment organisation  0.761*** 0.879*** 0.702*** 0.797*
Log daily wages   0.926*** 0.672*** 0.909*** 0.633***
Fringe benefits (%)   0.998*** 0.991*** 0.993*** 0.977***
Women (in per cent of workforce)  0.996 0.897*** 0.979 0.991
Average years of education  0.998 0.994 0.997 1.003
Number of educational qualifications  1.014*** 1.040** 1.010*** 1.024**
Part-time workers (in per cent of workforce) 0.931*** 0.635*** 0.868*** 0.504***
Union workers (in per cent of workforce)  1.066** 1.001 1.167** 1.493***
Average municipality wage  1.001*** 0.998*** 1.001* 0.998***
Industry and cohort dummies  YES YES YES YES
Note: Observations: All: 185586 observations, 44978 establishments, 14751 closures; Manufacturing: 
11182 observations/2991 establishments, 1019 closures. ***, **, and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level of significance, respectively. Source: Table elements based on figures presented in Dale-Olsen 
(2005c).
the size doubles. Unionisation is associated with shorter lifespan. This can
be interpreted as evidence that unions lower efficiency and ultimately
cause closure, but this is probably a too simple explanation. Unionisation
will reflect these establishments’ ex ante lower survival probability –
workers become members for protection. Being part of a multiple-
establishment organisation lowers the probability of closure, which may
indicate a positive network influence. And while the level of the
workforce’s educational qualifications has little or no importance for
closure, the number of educational qualifications in the workplace clearly
matters. A more diverse workforce implies higher closure probabilities. An
explanation is that difficulties of managing a workforce increase with
diversity – in principle not unlike Kremer’s ideas regarding the O-ring of
production (Kremer, 1993).
The final issue in this section is to provide evidence on whether fringe
benefits are primarily adopted by employers also advocating certain
management practices, and whether these management practices really
determine survival. To shed some light on this issue, Dale-Olsen (2005c)
estimate four duration regressions on the combined LEED-FLEXI97-
questionnaire data, using 488 observations from the manufacturing
sectors only.31 All establishments are active in 1997, but during the next 8
years nearly 20 per cent close. All covariates in the regressions are
measured earlier than or at the time of the questionnaire (1996 or early
1997). Three derived variables measuring total factor productivity (TFP), an
index for new work practices (NWP) and an index for competition issues
(CI) are incorporated in the analyses.32 These are clearly very rough
measures, and this combined with the fact that the regressions rest on
rather few observations, imply that some care should be taken so that one
does not draw too strong conclusions. Table 4.13 presents the results of
these regressions.
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31 It is, with few exceptions, only for these industries that we have information on capital and value added.
Unfortunately this means that the regressions rest on few observations, which clearly limits the number of
controls. The regressions – Cox and Weibull – are weighted appropriately to take into account the stratified
sampling of the data.
32 TFP is measured by the average of the residuals from the estimation of simple Cobb-Douglas production
functions separately on 1995- and 1996-data. An index of NWP is derived by simply adding 13 dummies of
for the following characteristics: i) having a non-centralised wage determination and providing incentive
wages, ii) offering worker autonomy and self-control, and having previously reorganised so employees
got more responsibility, iii) letting low-level employees conduct quality control, control the final result and
be responsible for purchases, iv) letting employees work at home, in work groups and use job rotation, 
v) employing temporary workers and short-term recruits from other firms. Maximum of the index is 12 and
mean 5.6. An index of DC is constructed by similarly adding 5 dummies for i) international market most
important, ii) competition become stronger, iii) temporary laid-off workers, iv) permanently laid-off workers,
v) recruiting problems. Maximum is 5 and mean 1.6.
The basic model, Model A, controls for log total labour cost per employee,
fringe benefits (%), log number of employees, a dummy for being part of
a multiple-establishment organisation (yes=1), number of employees,
union workers (in per cent of workforce), the workforce average years of
education, and average municipality wages. Model B then adds TFP, NWP,
NWP squared, CI, and the pay-roll tax rate.
Model A of Table 4.13 reveals qualitatively similar results compared to
Table 4.12, although the lack of observations makes it more difficult to get
strong results. Significant impacts are only found concerning workforce
size, log total labour costs per employee and workforce’s years of
education, which still correlate negatively with the probability of closure.
However, the point estimate related to fringe benefits indicates that
relatively more benefits reduce the probability of closure.
The inclusion of TFP, NWP, NWP squared, CI, and the pay-roll tax rate
presented in the columns under the heading Model B then changes the
impact of labour costs. Controlling for the level of productivity, higher
labour costs increase the probability of closure. Similarly, controlling for
the level of productivity, a higher level of pay-roll tax increases labour
costs and consequently raise the probability of closure. Being a more
productive establishment, controlling for costs, then yields a lower
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Table 4.13: The impact of new work practices and productivity
on establishment closure. Probability ratios
 Model A Model B
    Cox Weibull Cox Weibull
Log workforce size   0.644*** 0.660*** 0.533*** 0.581***
Multiple-establishment organisation  1.367 1.351 1.327 1.410
Log total labour costs per employee  0.734** 0.709** 13.187*** 12.158**
Fringe benefits (%)   0.948 0.938 0.888 0.895
Women (in per cent of workforce)  1.065 0.905 1.443 1.280
Average years of education  0.621** 0.627** 0.675* 0.688*
Union workers (in per cent of workforce)  1.435 1.434 1.352 1.217
Average municipality wage  4.766 7.411 4.497 1.856
Total factor productivity (TFP)    0.382*** 0.389***
Log capital     0.808*** 0.803***
Pay-roll tax rate     1.139** 1.140
Index for new work practices    0.302*** 0.312***
Index for new work practices squared    1.108*** 1.104***
Index for competition issues    2.071*** 2.000***
Note: 488 observations, representing 2698 establishments, 505 closures. ***, **, and * denote 1, 5, 
and 10 per cent level of significance, respectively. Source: Table elements based on figures presented 
in Dale-Olsen (2005c).
probability. When it comes to fringe benefits, however, the impact remains
insignificant although the point estimate indicates a negative impact.
On the other hand, the index of new work practices strongly correlates
with survival. The estimates of Table 4.13 indicate a convex relationship.
For very low values of the index the probabilities of closure decrease, but
establishments achieving high values on index experience increased
probabilities compared to non NWP-establishments.
Using the parameter estimates, it is possible to calculate the cumulative
exit probability. Figure 4.4 shows the cumulative exit probability for four
groups defined by fringe benefits policy (1 and 10 per cent of total
compensation, respectively) and NWP-status (index value of 2 and 10,
respectively). These four groups are defined as: (low fringe, low NWP),
(high fringe, low NWP), (low fringe, high NWP), and (high fringe, high
NWP). As seen in Figure 4.4, scoring high on the index of NWP is 
clearly detrimental to survival, while more fringe benefits yield the
opposite conclusion.
Why are NWP associated with reduced survival rates compared to
establishments adopting more traditional management? Originally one
would surmise that NWP-establishments having a flexible workforce,
paying incentive wages, and delegating responsibility to the workers
should be better suited for competitive markets. In the regressions
referred to above, differences in establishment productivity and capital 
are controlled for. A speculative explanation could therefore be that 
the owners of NWP-establishments operate with a different set of targets
(for example, a preference for returns today rather than later) than non-
NWP-establishments. For instance, if the owners of NWP-establishments
demand higher returns to their investments than other owners, then 
they may disband their establishments sooner than non-NWP-
establishment owners.
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4.9 Conclusion
This article has summarised recent research on fringe benefits policies.
This research shows that workers’ quit behaviour is very sensitive to the
offering of fringe benefits. Fringe benefits can thus be important devices
for managing firms’ workforces. Paying high wages is one strategy to
reduce the worker turnover, offering attractive fringe benefits is another.
The research also indicates that establishments achieve higher
productivity by offering more fringe benefits, although it is not clear
whether this is due to workers making more effort or if it is due to reduced
recruitment costs. Finally, we have seen how establishments offering
more fringe benefits experience higher survival rates than other
establishments. This is as expected, since a strategy that yields improved
productivity for the establishment should imply a higher survival rate.
From a policy point of view this article thus advocates the use of fringe
benefits as part of the compensation policies offered to workers by
employers. Care should be taken when designing the fringe benefits
policies. Fringe benefits, as seen in Section 4.6, are not equally
appreciated by different groups of workers. Furthermore, a few
reservations are needed. While the research reveals positive impacts of
fringe benefits on productivity, this rests on observations from
manufacturing firms only. Manufacturing has traditionally been more
conservative concerning the provision of benefits, while other industries
(IT and telecom) have practiced generous provision. This research does
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Figure 4.3: The impact of new work practices (NWP) on the
probability of establishment closure. Flexi-sample
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Note: The figure shows the cumulative exit probability (hazard) for four groups of establishments. 
See text for details. Source: Calculated using estimates presented in Dale-Olsen (2005c).
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not discuss whether fringe benefits in non-manufacturing industries have
had the desired effect. Neither is it determined whether the impact that we
observe is related to the introduction of fringe benefits as new elements in
the remuneration package. During 1996 to 2002 the provision of fringes
increased by 23 and 76 per cent in manufacturing and telecom,
respectively. Fringe benefits may very well lose their attraction if/when
they become common.
The article has shown how linked employer-employee data (LEED) make it
possible to shed light on an issue from different angles, thus making the
findings more robust. Furthermore, it has presented results using analyses
which for all practical purposes are not possible to do except on LEED
datasets. But while the benefits of using LEED in social science are great,
they do come at a price. While questionnaires can target specific
questions, the LEED surveys are often constructed for non-research
purposes. The article discusses this, and advocates the use of LEED
datasets combined with information from other questionnaires.
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5 New Workplace Practices
and the Gender Wage Gap:
Can the New Economy
be the Great Equaliser?
Nabanita Datta Gupta33 and Tor Eriksson34
ABSTRACT
We estimate the effect of introducing new workplace practices on the
gender gap in wages in the manufacturing sector. We use a unique 1999
survey on work and compensation practices of Danish private sector firms
merged to a large matched employer-employee database. Self-managed
teams, project organisation and job rotation schemes are the most widely
implemented work practices. Our estimates from a differences-in-
differences model of wages and work practices show that the wage gains
from adopting new workplace practices accrue mainly to salaried males
and typically increase the gender gap in pay at the level of the firm.
Considering practices individually, however, a few exceptions are seen:
the gender wage gap among salaried workers is significantly reduced in
firms which offer project organisation while the gap in pay among workers
paid by the hour is significantly reduced with the use of quality control
circles. All in all, however, the new economy is not the great equaliser.
5.1 Introduction
A growing area of research focuses on the reorganisation of work taking
place in the modern-day organisation, away from a task-specialised
structure towards a more task-integrated organisational structure
(Lindbeck and Snower, 2000). The new organisational structure has
introduced work practices such as job rotation and learning across tasks,
teamwork, decentralisation of responsibility and worker participation
in decision making. The adoption of new work practices has led to
a breakdown of traditional occupational barriers and the 
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establishment of flatter organisational structures. Moreover, high-
performance work practices are usually accompanied and sustained by
performance-based pay, giving rise to new payment schemes.
In terms of their adoption, such practices diffused slowly in the decade of
the 1970s and 1980s but began to be widely adopted starting from the
early 1990s, and by 1997, approximately 71 per cent of U.S. firms had
adopted some form of innovative human resource management practices
(Osterman, 1994; 2000). In Europe considerably fewer employers have
implemented these practices, see OECD (1999). However, in Scandinavia,
including Denmark, the new practices have been adopted more frequently
than in the rest of Europe.
A great deal of the previous research in this area has focussed on the effect
of new workplace practices on establishment level outcomes such as total
labour costs, and firm productivity; see Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) for a
recent survey. Relatively less is known about their effects on workers’
wages, and in particular, whether these practices affect groups of workers
differently. This is largely due to a lack of micro data on workers matched
to firm-level data on the adoption of high-performance work practices.
Even when wage outcomes are considered, previous studies have
assumed that the returns to these practices do not vary by gender, race or
other group characteristics, the typical outcome under study being total
labour compensation or average establishment level earnings; exceptions
are Bauer and Bender (2003) and Black and Lynch (2004). In this paper, we
consider the effects of new work practices separately on men’s and
women’s wages within a firm. Our aim is to investigate whether the new
economy can act as the great equaliser – that is, whether the introduction of
innovative human resource management practices can reduce the gender
gap in wages among men and women working within the same firm.
There are several channels through which new workplace practices may
lower the gender wage gap. First, the breakdown of traditional
occupational lines or barriers due to the introduction of quality control
circles or job rotation gives women an entry into the design and
production side, traditionally men’s domain, and allows for skill
accumulation in tasks that are more remunerative than traditionally female
tasks. Second, decentralisation of supervisory authority and increased
worker participation in decision-making give women greater bargaining
power and control over wages and working conditions compared to
hierarchical organisational structures in which supervisory positions are
mostly held by men.
Another mechanism could be that incentive-based pay systems that
accompany high-performance work practices allow for transparency in
pay, as wages are based on known, objective and quantifiable
performance criteria. This may make it easier for women to bargain for
matching increases or to seek legal recourse in situations where wage
discrimination may be present. Further, some of the new practices impart
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flexibility in workers’ schedules, allowing women to balance home and
work responsibilities more effectively, thereby raising their productivity at
the workplace. Finally, a recent line of experimental enquiry within
cognitive and social psychology explores whether women have an
enhanced ability to multitask or superior communicative and collaborative
skills (Williams et al., 1991; Rubenstein et al., 2001; Hannah and
Murachver, 1999; Underwood et al., 1990; 1994). Possessing a relative
advantage in such skills could make women better matched to meet the
demands of the modern workplace and thereby raise their relative value to
employers.
There exist a few channels through which the introduction of new
workplace practices could serve to increase the gender gap in pay.
Because of family responsibilities, women may find it difficult to make the
needed investments to take full advantage of the new practices. Also,
decentralisation of pay negotiation and incentive-based pay remove
centrally-determined wage floors which have effectively increased
women’s wages relative to men’s. Yet another factor that can boost men’s
wages in this context is if (mostly male) supervisors in firms which adopt
new working practices are given pay increases by management in
exchange for their cooperation in supporting and disseminating these
practices within their units (Black and Lynch, 2004), i.e. acting as
facilitators.
The overall effect on the wage gap is theoretically inconclusive and can
only be determined by empirical means. Our purpose is therefore to
quantify the effect of these practices on the within-firm gender wage gap,
controlling for all other observable firm characteristics that can affect wages.
By combining a unique 1999 survey of employers in Denmark to register
data on their employees, we match data on a total of 224,262 workers
working in 1,387 of the firms that were surveyed. The firms that were
surveyed were asked to provide information on the adoption of innovative
work practices as well as new incentive-based pay practices. This allows
us to estimate the wage impacts of new workplace practices on groups of
male and female workers and on the gender wage gap within private
sector organisations in Denmark. As new work practices have been
implemented on a larger scale and rather differently in the manufacturing
sector, we restrict our analysis to the manufacturing sector only. This gives
us a sample of 691 firms employing on average 194,838 workers per 
year and 282 employees per firm. This focus also makes our results
comparable to previous studies in the literature (Black and Lynch, 2001,
2004 for example).
In spite of the Danish gender wage gap being one of the lowest among
industrialised countries, the female-male wage ratio in Denmark has
shown signs of stagnation in the 1980s and 1990s at a more or less
constant level of 80-88 per cent, depending on whether straight wages or
total compensation are used as a measure (see for example Pedersen and
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Deding, 2002). A number of previous studies have linked women’s
relatively lower pay to their over-representation in the public sector, which
has experienced slower wage growth than the private sector in recent
decades (Rosholm and Smith, 1996; Datta Gupta et al., 2000). A few recent
studies which have had access to matched data have turned their attention
to the private sector, where the raw male-female gap in pay is
considerably larger than the national average, even when considering full-
time workers only. Further, in the private sector, even within narrowly
defined industry and occupation groupings, Datta Gupta and Rothstein
(2005) and Deding and Wong (2004) find that a significant unexplained gap
exists even after controlling for standard human capital characteristics.
Thus, the question is whether implementation of new workplace practices
and new forms of work organisation can be a way to eliminate the
persistent wage differences that seem to exist among men and women of
identical characteristics even within narrowly defined job types.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 5.2 yields a brief
review of the earlier literature. In the next two sections we discuss some
methodological issues and describe the data at our disposal. The fifth and
the sixth sections give the empirical model and the empirical estimates,
respectively. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Previous research
Only a few previous studies have had access to data on work practices at
the individual or firm level. A study on the impact of work practices on
productivity by Black and Lynch (2001) estimates production functions
using both GMM and within estimator techniques on a representative
panel data set of businesses over the period 1987-1993. They find that it is
not so much the type of work practice but rather how it is implemented
that matters for productivity. For example, productivity is higher in
unionised establishments which adopt work practices giving workers
greater decision-making authority together with pay practices such as
incentive-based pay schemes, than in non-union establishments with the
same practices.
Another study on the relationship between workplace innovations and
wages by Black and Lynch (2004) matches plant level practices with plant-
level productivity and average establishment wages, and estimates
production functions and wage functions using both cross-sectional and
longitudinal data drawn from surveys of U.S. manufacturing-sector
establishments from 1993 and 1996. This study finds that the
reorganisation of workplaces to incorporate high performance work
practices leads to an increase in average establishment wages of about 
6 per cent. But, at the same time, profit sharing and/or stock options lead
to lower regular pay for workers, particularly technical and clerical/sales
workers. Their study is based on a sample size of 766 establishments in
1996 (cross-section) and 193 establishments in the panel (1993-1996).
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Cappelli and Neumark (2001) use a national probability sample of
establishments that includes comparable measures of performance and
work practices across organisations. By virtue of the sample’s longitudinal
design, they are able to incorporate data from a period preceding the
introduction of these practices. This allows them to purge their estimates
for firm- or establishment-level heterogeneity that may arise due to high-
performing firms having a greater ability to adopt such practices (“best
practices”). Their findings point to increased employee compensation and
therefore higher labour costs per employee from adopting these practices,
but weak productivity effects. The overall effect on profitability is
inconclusive.
Caroli and van Reenen (2001) study organisational changes, which imply
a reduction of hierarchy within work organisations in two separate panels
of French and British firms. They find that these changes had a positive
impact on productivity. In addition, they find negative effects on unskilled
manual workers’ employment share and wage sum. Thus, their study
indicates that the new work practices were biased against unskilled labour.
Bauer and Bender (2003) utilise matched employer-employee data from
Germany to study effects of organisational changes and focus in particular
on the new practices’ effects on firms’ wage structures. They find that
flattened hierarchies and especially the introduction of teamwork increase
wage inequality within firms, due to the wage gains being concentrated at
the higher end of the firms’ wage distributions.
A paper by Bailey, Berg and Sandy (2001) examines the relationship
between high performance work systems (HPWS) and the earnings of
4,000 management employees in 45 establishments in the steel, apparel
and medical electronics and imaging industries in the period 1995-97.
They find that, except in the case of medical electronics, management
workers employed in workplaces in industries that have more high-
performance practices do earn more than those in traditional workplaces,
after controlling for gender, race, education, experience and tenure. The
lack of an effect in the medical industries probably reflects the importance
of formal qualifications and education for pay in that industry.
Eriksson (2003) makes use of the same data source as the current paper
and examines the effects of introduction of new work practices in Danish
firms on firms’ average wages and productivity. He distinguishes between
practices adopted for salaried employees and those paid by the hour and
investigates how their impact differs between early and late adopters as
well as between the short- and the medium-term. The study shows that it
is crucial to control for the skill structure of firms’ workforces. Otherwise
the returns to practice adoption are substantially overestimated. Late
adopters benefit less while for early adopters the short-run (2-3 years)
gains seem to be quite persistent.
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We are aware of only one micro study that examines the question of
whether workplace practices can explain a significant part of the gender
wage gap.35 Drolet (2002) uses matched employer-employee data on
24,302 workers from the 1999 Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey
to find that – not controlling for industry and occupation – workplace
characteristics account for 27.9 per cent and worker characteristics for 
10.8 per cent of the pay gap. However, the largest contributor among
workplace characteristics is the workplace part-time rate, which alone
accounts for 17.7 per cent of the pay gap. In terms of measures of high-
performance workplace practices, Drolet (2002) has access to two
measures, which are (a) whether or not the worker participates in self-
directed workgroups and (b) whether or not the worker receives
performance-based pay. These two variables account for 2.5 per cent and
2.3 per cent of the pay gap when occupation and industry are not included,
and 2.1 per cent and 2.2 per cent when they are included. When
occupation and industry are included, respectively, in worker and
workplace characteristics the part of the pay gap explained by these
components increases to 18.6 per cent and 42.6 per cent. Thus, while
overall 61.2 per cent of the gender wage gap is explained in this study, the
contribution of the two new workplace practice measures is minor and the
largest single contributing factor explaining gender differences in pay  in
Canada appears to be industry.
Two recent papers by Garcia et al. (2002) and Lausten (2001) investigate
the impact of the degree of worker autonomy and level of authority in
explaining gender wage differences among Spanish employees and
Danish executives, respectively. None of these previous studies has,
however, been able to examine the effect of a wide array of high
performance work practices on men’s and women’s wages for an
adequately large sample of establishments spanning a relatively long
period. By having access to an unique survey of the extent of adoption of
new work practices among firms in Denmark, matched to a large
employer-employee data base, ours is the first study to be able to quantify
the impact of a number of practices on the wages of male and female
employees within firms in the manufacturing sector, controlling for other
firm-level characteristics.
5.3 Methodological issues
A few methodological issues present themselves in the estimation of
wage models accounting for new workplace practices. First, more
productive workers may self-select into jobs characterised by high-
performance work practices or where pay is tied to performance (see for
example Parent, 1999; Lazear, 2000). The question is, how to disentangle
this “sorting” effect from real productivity effects of work and pay 
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not one of the studies is concerned with the impact of differences and changes in work organisations. The
same is also true for new pay practices; for an exception, see Heywood and Jirjahn (2002).
practices? This issue cannot be resolved easily in our data set-up. This is
because it is difficult to find unique instruments that can explain workers’
choices of firms but do not also affect their wages.
The other selection issue is that firms that face the threat of closure may
be the ones most likely to adopt such practices. Thus, there is a need to
measure performance before these practices are introduced (see for
example Cappelli and Neumark, 2001). As the sample period in the current
analysis spans the period 1992 to 2000, and as only a fifth of the firms had
adopted a practice already in the 1980s, a relatively large number of firms
in the sample are observed before the adoption of such practices, allowing
us to control for this type of heterogeneity.
As the model we will estimate is in essence a difference-in-differences
(DID) estimation, another potentially serious concern is that of serial
correlation. This is because, firstly, the panel is fairly long, secondly,
wages, the dependent variable, may be serially correlated and thirdly, the
treatment variable (introduction of new work practices) may not change
much over time. Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) suggest a
technique that can eliminate this problem which works well as long as
there is an adequate count of the unit of observation (firms, in our case) in
the data. We apply this method to our data in Section 5.6.
5.4 Data description
The analysis uses a data set on Danish private sector firms with more than
20 employees, which has been constructed by merging information from
two sources. The first source is a questionnaire directed at firms, that
contains information about their work and compensation practices. The
other is a longitudinal employer-employee data set36 that provides
information about firm characteristics and performance as well as about
the firms’ employees.
The survey was administered by Statistics Denmark as a mail
questionnaire survey in May and June 1999, which was sent out to 3,200
private sector firms with more than 20 employees. The firms were chosen
from a random sample, stratified according to size (as measured by the
number of full time employees) and industry. The survey over-sampled
large and medium-sized firms: all firms with 50 employees or more were
included, and 35 per cent of firms in the 20-49 employees range. The
response rate was 51 per cent, which is relatively high for the rather long
and detailed questionnaire of the type that was used.37
The survey represents a unique source of information on Danish firms’
internal labour markets and changes therein. In addition to some
background information about the firm, each firm was asked about its 
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36 See the Om Centre for Corporate Performance, Aarhus School of Business (http://www.ccp.asb.dk) for a
more detailed description.
37 The response rates for the size and one-digit industry cells vary only little: between 47 and 53 per cent.
Thus, the representativeness of the sample is of no major concern.
work organisation, compensation systems, recruitment, internal training
practices and how it evaluated its employees. For the questions
concerning work design and practices, the firms were asked to
differentiate between salaried employees and those paid by the hour. A
brief description of the questionnaire and the main results are available (in
Danish) in Eriksson (2001).
For the analysis in the present paper we use data from the manufacturing
sector only. This is motivated by the fact that the practices may have been
implemented quite differently in the services and the manufacturing
sectors. The sample we study thus consists of 691 firms and on average
194,838 employees per year. It should be noted that two thirds of male
workers are in blue collar jobs compared to about 60 per cent of female
workers, but the difference is not large. Thus, as we distinguish between
salaried employees and those paid by the hour, we are not simultaneously
distinguishing between the genders.
Using unique firm identification numbers from Statistics Denmark, the
survey data were supplemented with information about the firms as well
as about their workforces. This information is taken from a large employer-
employee linked database, which covers all private sector firms and all the
employees who worked in them (in Denmark) in any year during the
period 1980 to 2000.38 The panel contains detailed information about
employee characteristics39 (and hence, firms’ workforces in any year) and
about their labour earnings and other income. In addition, the panel has
economic information about firms with 20 or more full-time equivalent
employees, for the years 1992 to 2000.
Firms’ use of work (and pay) practices can be measured along several
dimensions. The measure adopted in the survey questionnaire is whether
a firm has implemented one of six work designs:
(i) Self-managed teams. An organisation with self-managed teams gives
its members authority over how to perform tasks, or even which tasks to
perform. Important aspects of team working are pooling of skills and skills
development of individual workers.
(ii) Job rotation. Job rotation is a system where the workers are explicitly
required to rotate between different jobs. This increases the variety of
tasks to be performed by the employee and is also likely to enhance the
employee’s understanding of the operation.
(iii) Quality circles. Groups of workers who meet regularly to solve
problems concerning productivity and people and to discuss aspects of
performance and quality.
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38 The important feature of the panel is the link between firms and employees, which is consistent over time.
The data originate from two separate registers maintained by Statistics Denmark: the integrated database
for labour market research (IDA) and the business statistics database (BSD).
39 Worker characteristics at the person-year level include gender, age, ongoing tenure, and level and years 
of education.
(iv) Total quality management (TQM). An important element of TQM
programmes, of which ISO9000 probably is the best known, is that they
include employee involvement.
(v) Benchmarking. Benchmarking is a formal system of learning about
practices in other firms and organisations.
(vi) Project organisation. Groups of workers are organised in projects with
defined targets, timetables, budgets and frequently considerable authority
with respect to how to perform tasks.
It is important to note that the firms were also asked when each work
practice (if any) was adopted. However, one important piece of
information we do not have regarding the implementation of the practices
is the proportion of employees affected by the particular work designs.40
Nor were the respondents asked to rank the practices according to some
notion of their importance.
The firms were also asked a corresponding question regarding the
implementation of performance related pay (PRP) practices. More
precisely the firms were asked whether they had adopted one of four PRP
methods – team bonus, individual bonus, stock and stock options and
profit sharing – for four different categories of employees: top managers,
middle-management, other white collar workers and blue collar workers;
see Eriksson (2001), for details. In contrast to the work practices, the firms
were unfortunately not asked about when they had implemented the
different pay practices. The questionnaire only asked the firms whether
they had made considerable changes in their payment systems in recent
years, without being more specific as to when or to which payment system.
Table 5.1 gives some information on manufacturing firms’ adoption of
each work practice as of 1998. Table 5.2 provides corresponding
information regarding new pay practices. From Table 5.1 we may note that
the most widely implemented new work practices are self-managed
teams, project organisation and job rotation schemes. Corresponding
shares of employees working in firms that have or have not introduced the
practices are found in Table 5.3. As larger firms are substantially more
likely to have adopted new work or pay practices (see Eriksson, 2001), the
proportion of workers in firms with them is larger than the share of firms
that have them.
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40 If seems plausible to assume that the higher the number of practices used, the larger is the proportion of
workers in the firm involved in some of the new work practices. Thus, the number of practices
implemented can serve as a proxy for coverage.
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Table 5.1: Some characteristics of adopters and non-adopters 
of new work practices.
Work practice:  Teams Job rotation Quality circles
Has adopted: NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Prop. of firms 82.2 17.8 84.95 15.05 97.5 2.5 
Prop. of women in firm 31.6 31.8 30.7 36.7 31.6 34.4 
Av. Wage women 117.32 116.46 117.34 116.21 117.12 119.27 
Av. Wage men 149.93 149.07 150.36 146.49 149.70 152.76 
Raw gender gap 32.60 32.62 33.02 30.28 32.58 33.49 
Work practice: TQM Proj. org. Benchmark
Has adopted: NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Prop. of firms 95.8 4.2 86.5 13.5 97.8 2.2 
Prop. of women in firm 31.5 34.7 31.9 30.1 31.6 34.5 
Av. Wage women 117.21 116.23 117.05 117.96 117.05 112.30 
Av. Wage men 149.94 145.98 148.95 155.03 149.65 155.29 
Raw gender gap 32.73 29.75 31.91 32.61 32.60 32.99 
Table 5.2: Some characteristics of adopters and non-adopters 
of new pay practices.
Pay practice: Team bonus Indiv bonus Stock option
Has adopted: NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Prop. of firms 65.1 34.9 59.0 41.0 90.8 9.2 
Prop. of women in firm 31.6 31.7 32.0 31.1 31.3 34.6 
Av. Wage women 116.92 117.63 116.15 118.63 116.37 125.05 
Av. Wage men 149.95 149.68 147.80 152.61 148.16 162.75 
Raw gender gap 32.76 32.32 31.65 33.98 31.79 40.70 
Pay practice:  Profit sharing Qualific Pay
Has adopted:   NO YES NO YES 
Prop. of firms   83.0 17.0 47.0 53.0 
Prop. of women in firm   31.6 31.8 31.8 31.5 
Av. Wage women   117.68 114.69 117.70 116.69 
Av. Wage men   150.29 147.27 150.91 148.77 
Raw gender gap   32.61 32.59 33.20 32.08 
Since the questionnaire was only sent out to private sector firms with 20
or more full-time employees, the (unweighted) average proportion of
women in the firms – 31.2 per cent – is considerably lower than in the
whole Danish labour force, in which women make up about fifty per cent.
It can, moreover, be seen that firms that have adopted new working
practices have on average a larger proportion of female employees than
other firms.
So, female employees are more likely to work in a firm with one or more
of the new work practices. The average firm wage for women is, however,
higher in firms which have not adopted the new practices, save firms with
quality circles and project organisations where hourly wages are
respectively higher and roughly the same as in those without them. For
male workers there is a similar pattern, except for firms with and without
project organisation and benchmarking, where men are on average paid
more in the former. The “raw” firm level gender gap is clearly smaller in
firms that have introduced job rotation and TQM schemes than in those
that have not.
Turning to Table 5.2, every second firm has the so called qualification pay
system – a formalised wage setting system, where extra pay is given to an
employee based on her qualifications such as education, experience of a
certain job or tasks, skills acquired through on-the-job training, etc. – and
35-40 per cent have team or individual bonuses. We notice that the
proportion of women is the same in firms with and without the
performance related pay systems, save stock and stock options where
there are somewhat more women working in firms that have them. For
both genders we observe the following pattern: with the exception of
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Table 5.3: The share of male and female employees working 
in firms with new work and pay practices, by practice.
Percentage of employees in firms with:     Female Male 
NWPs:
Teams     21.8 19.5
Job rotation     29.5 24.1
Quality circles     9.6 7.8
TQM     10.4 9.4
Benchmarking     7.8 6.6
Project organisation     16.6 17.0
NPPs:
Team bonus     47.9 41.9
Individual bonus     53.8 51.9
Profit sharing     16.6 15.9
Stock, stock options     22.8 15.2
Qualification pay     60.6 58.9
qualification pay and profit sharing, the average wage is higher in firms
with the new pay practices than in those which have not introduced them,
and the differences are typically quite large. As for the firm gender gaps,
they are larger in firms with individualised pay, like individual bonus
systems and stock and stock option schemes.
Of course, all the wage differences in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 may be due to
differences in the composition and skills structures of the workforces in
firms with and without the new work and pay schemes. In particular, the
differentials between adopters and non-adopters of new pay practices
may reflect the sorting effect mentioned earlier (see Lazear, 2000) that pay
systems rewarding good performance attract the best workers. The
similarity of patterns for both genders also suggests that there are a
number of factors we have not yet considered that give rise to differences
in pay between adopters and non-adopters of different work and pay
practices. In the following section we will, therefore, carry out analyses
that aim at controlling for these differences as well as accounting for when
and which of the different work practices were implemented in the firms.
5.5 Empirical model
The dependent variable in the analysis is the log of hourly wages, where
wages are deflated by the consumer price index. More specifically, we
compute for each firm and year, (i) the average hourly wage separately for
women and men, and (ii) the gender wage differential. Differences in the
average firm wages reflect of course differences in the composition of the
firms’ workforces with respect to age, education and other human capital
variables. As the firms’ workforce structures typically change only slowly,
we do not enter these as explanatory variables in the estimations but
capture them by using firm fixed effects and a time trend.
Thus, log hourly wages for sex group i in firm j at time t is given by:
LogWijt = 1Si+2jFj+ 1j(SixFj)+2(SixTt)+iNWPjt+ijt (1)
where Si indicates sex group i, Fj is an indicator for the firm, T indicates the
time period and NWPjt is an indicator for new workplace practices. Note
that the NWP indicator which we will operationalise in alternative ways is
a time-varying variable. Thus, the indicator captures the effect of
introducing a specific or one additional new work practice in the firm. An
advantage of observing firms before they introduce NWP is that we can
purge the estimates for some firm-level heterogeneity that arises because
of the “best practices” effect.
The gender gap in wages can be written as
LogWmjt–LogWfjt = 1(Sm–Sf )+1j(Sm–Sf )Fj+2(Sm–Sf )Tt+(m–f )NWPjt+mjt–fjt (2)
or,
LogWjt = a+b1jFj+b2Tt+dNWPjt+jt (3)
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The NWP indicator is entered in three different ways. First, we use a simple
dummy for whether or not the firm has adopted at least one of the new
work practices. This is of course a very crude measure. Our second
measure is the number of new work practices, which informs us about the
marginal effect of additional work practices. This measure allows for
synergies arising from bundling practices together, without either
arbitrarily grouping practices ex ante or selecting those groupings that
best fit the data ex post. The third operationalisation is entering the work
practices individually. We run the equations separately for women’s
wages, men’s wages and the gender differential. A small number of the
firms have either very few (less than 5) male or female employees, and for
these observations the firm gender wage gap measure is rather
meaningless. We have therefore, omitted the firms with less than five male
or female employees from the estimation sample.
In the estimations we implement when possible the correction for serial
correlation mentioned in Section 5.3. Following Bertrand, Duflo and
Mullainathan (2001), we first regress wages on firm fixed effects and a
time trend. Second, the residuals for only the treated firms (those that
implemented the practices) are divided into pre and post-treatment
periods, reducing the data set to a two-period panel. Then, a simple fixed
effects regression of work practices on wages is run on the transformed
data, yielding the serial-correlation corrected estimate and standard error.41
5.6 Estimation results
We bagin by considering the simplest version of the NWP indicator: at
least one practice, the estimates of which are collected in Table 5.4. We can
see that there are positive (1.5-2 per cent) and significant estimates for
men, especially those in salaried employment. For women, the estimates
are negative. As the wage gains are of opposite signs, the gender
differential is affected, and to the disadvantage of female employees, by
the introduction of new work practices, measured in this admittedly very
crude manner.
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Table 5.4: The impact of the number of new workplace practices
on men’s and women’s wages, with correction for serial correlationa
Dependent variable: log hourly wage (in gender gap regressions: difference in log hourly wage)
 Men Women Gender Men Women Gender Men Women Gender
   gap hourly hourly gap salaried salaried gap
    paid paid hourly   salaried
      paid
At least one NWP 0.011** -0.011** 0.022*** 0.007 -0.006 0.014* 0.012 0.008 0.004
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
a Firm fixed effects and a time trend were included as additional controls
41 We also estimated the models without corrections for serial correlation. The estimates did not differ much
from those reported in the text.
Turning next to Table 5.5, where the number of practices is used as the
NWP indicator, we may observe that the firm average wage for all (hourly
paid) men is positively affected by the first two (three) practices, after
which most of the estimates do not differ significantly from zero. It should
be noted that the estimates for five practices, some of which carry large
coefficients, are based on very few observations. The wage of female
workers is significantly lower in firms that have implemented one to four
new work practices. However, when separating between salaried female
employees and those paid by the hour, almost all coefficients lose their
statistical significance. The firm-level gender gap estimates are positive for
the first 3-4 practices adopted, and this seems to be due chiefly to the
increase in the gender gap among the hourly workers.
Table 5.6 gathers the results from regressions with all the individual
practices included. For women the estimates are either insignificant (for
the salaried, all practices) or with one exception – a large positive
coefficient attached to quality circles for employees paid by the hour –
negative. For men, there are more coefficients that differ from zero. These
are positive, save job rotation for men paid by the hour and project
organisation for salaried men. Hence in many cases the “net effect” on the
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Table 5.5: The impact of the number of new work practices on 
firm average wage by gender and the gender gapa
Number of Men Women Gender Men Women Gender Men Women Gender
practices   gap hourly hourly gap salaried salaried gap
    paid paid hourly   salaried
      paid
One 0.015** -0.015** 0.031*** 0.012* -0.011 0.023** 0.021** 0.009 0.013
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
Two 0.015* -0.019** 0.034*** -0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.006 0.013 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) 
Three 0.015 -0.012 0.027** 0.044*** -0.007 0.051*** 0.013 0.033* -0.020 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) 
Four 0.019 -0.041** 0.060*** 0.022 0.017 0.005 0.034 0.003 0.031 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.039) 
Five -0.081* -0.181*** 0.101* 0.132** 0.035 0.097 -0.238*** -0.218*** -0.020 
 (0.048) (0.055) (0.059) (0.057) (0.083) (0.086) (0.085) (0.084) (0.110) 
Six 0.017 -0.095 0.113 0.042 -0.030 0.072 -0.003 -0.014 0.010 
  (0.057) (0.066) (0.070) (0.068) (0.099) (0.104) (0.102) (0.101) (0.132) 
a Firm fixed effects and a time trend were included as additional controls    
 Note, however, that in addition to the rent sharing interpretation, it is also possible to interpret the 
results in Table 5.4 (and subsequent tables) as a market outcome. If female employees have a 
stronger preference for the new, less hierarchical, work organisations allowing for more collaboration 
than men, then the gender gap observed could be due to compensating wage differentials: women 
pay for the flatter more cooperative workplaces (whilst men are compensated for it).
firm level gender wage gap is positive, that is, the work practice is
associated with a large gender wage differential. For the salaried
employees the impact of the practices on the gender gap is small and
differs from zero only for project organisation. In all cases where the
gender gap is significantly larger in firms that have adopted a work
practice, the coefficient for the practice in question in the wage equations
for women is always significantly (or not so far from significantly) negative.
Thus, we find very little, and mixed, evidence that new work practices
improve women’s access to skill acquisition. For women paid by the hour,
quality circles are associated with a large wage premium and a small
gender gap, but on the other hand job rotation schemes leave their wage
unchanged both in absolute terms and relative to men. Nor is there much
to suggest that the new practices improve female employees’ bargaining
power. TQM and project organisations (for salaried workers) are
associated with a smaller gender gap, but this is due to men obtaining
lower pay in firms which have these practices.
In Tables A5.1 to A5.3 in the appendix, we present the results from
regressions in which individual practices are entered one by one. Because
the results for the number of practices indicate that bundles matter, we
might expect the results to differ from those in Table 5.6. But they do not.
In fact they are very similar regarding significance and do not differ
markedly when it comes to magnitudes, either. Thus, the estimates from
including the practices separately one at a time into equation (1) yield
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Table 5.6: The impact of work practices considered jointly on 
firm average wage by gender and the gender gapa
 Men Women Gender Men Women Gender Men Women Gender
   gap hourly hourly gap salaried salaried gap
    paid paid hourly   salaried
      paid
Teams 0.017*** -0.013* 0.030*** 0.021*** -0.009 0.030** 0.022* -0.001 0.023 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) 
Job rotation -0.001 -0.020** 0.019** -0.027*** -0.025* -0.002 0.031** 0.021 0.011 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) 
Quality circles 0.001 0.017 -0.016 0.037* 0.167*** -0.130*** -0.007 -0.023 0.015 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.042) 
TQM -0.035*** -0.007 -0.028* 0.014 0.021 -0.007 -0.014 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) 
Benchmarking 0.000 -0.011 0.011 0.010 -0.030 0.039* 0.007 0.012 -0.006 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.029) 
Project Org. 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.021** 0.011 0.010 -0.052*** 0.000 -0.053***
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) 
a Firm fixed effects and a time trend were included as additional controls
some additional support to our earlier findings, insofar as the introduction
of new work practices in firms widens the gender wage gap for workers
paid by the hour, but leaves it largely unchanged for salaried workers.
Assuming the gender pay differential associated with the new work
practices is not merely due to compensating wage differentials, where
does it come from? One possibility is that it could be due to differential
sorting. Because of the lack of a counterfactual, we can unfortunately not
apply the DID analysis to newcomers and incumbents, respectively, which
otherwise would be the obvious way to investigate the role of sorting.
Instead we have estimated wage growth equations for the employees in
firms that implemented a new work practice during years 1990-95
distinguishing between newcomers and incumbents.42 The observations of
the individuals’ wage growth are from two and more years after the
practice was adopted. Controlling for the employees’ age, education and
job level and the size and industry of the firm, we find that neither male
nor female newcomers receive significantly higher wages. This we
interpret as implying that the quality of the new workers joining firms after
they introduced the new work practice did not increase.
Another possibility is that the increased gap reflects real differences in
productivity due to women having fewer possibilities to exploit the
advantages of the new work organisations because of family
responsibilities. In order to shed some light on this we computed average
firm wages for the genders by presence of children under the age of 7 and
18, respectively. We found only small differences; the gender gap for all
employees was 32.61 Danish Kroner (about 4.40 Euros), and 33.49 (4.50
Euros) and 33.09 (4.45 Euros) for those with children under the age of 7
and 18, respectively. Thus, family responsibilities do not seem to be a
prime candidate for explaining the larger gender gap associated with the
new work practices. Still another explanation could be the facilitator
hypothesis mentioned by Black and Lynch (2004): male supervisors are
rewarded for supporting and implementing the new practices in their
workplaces. The data do not speak in the favour of this hypothesis, either.
First, the proportion of men in the middle management positions is roughly
the same in firm with and without new work practices: 14.1 and 16.2 per
cent, respectively. Second, as we have seen above, the gender gap for
salaried workers is not larger in firms that have adopted the new practices.
5.7 Conclusions
This paper investigates the effect of new workplace practices on the
gender wage gap by combining information on the adoption of an array of
workplace practices obtained from a unique survey on firms matched to
panel data on the population of workers within these firms. Thus, this is
one of few studies to explore whether such practices impact groups of
workers within firms differently, in contrast to the previous literature that
is largely focused on establishment-wide earnings outcomes. Our question
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42 To save space these are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request.
is whether or not new work practices can be the great equaliser when it
comes to the persistent pay gap that exists between men and women who
have the same characteristics and who work in the same firms.
The descriptive evidence shows that the most widely implemented work
practices among manufacturing firms in the private sector in Denmark are
self-managed teams, project organisation and job rotation schemes.
Estimation of a DID model of wages and work practices controlling for all
observed firm-specific factors shows that wage gains from the introduction
of new workplace practices seem to accrue mainly to salaried men, and in
fact, wage losses accrue to women so that so that the gender gap in pay
widens at the level of the firm.
When considering individual work practices, essentially the same findings
obtain despite the ‘unbundling’ of practices that presumably belong
together: the pay gap widens significantly for workers paid by the hour,
particularly in firms which introduce teamwork and benchmarking. It is
only reduced in the case of quality circles. For salaried employees the pay
gap remains unchanged in most cases, although it is reduced significantly
through project organisation. These findings may indicate that female
salaried employees benefit particularly from the greater control over task
definition and planning implied by project organisation and female
workers paid by the hour are able to learn across tasks by participating in
quality control circles, and these factors raise their relative wages. But
these represent the exception rather than the rule. All in all, in most
instances men’s wages increase and women’s wages are reduced in firms
that offer these practices. When both groups get increases, then men
obtain a relatively larger increase. Bias due to serial correlation does not
move the results as nearly identical estimates are obtained after correcting
for this problem.
Some additional analyses of the data indicate that the positive effects on
men’s wages are not a result of worker sorting. Nor do they seem to be
due to women having fewer possibilities to exploit potential gains from
the practices because of family responsibilities. Whatever the interpretation
however, we find that the new economy is not the great equaliser – new
workplace practices in most cases benefit men and not women.
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Appendix A5.1: The impact of individual practices on firm 
average wage, corrected for serial correlation
Dep. var.: log male wagea
 log female wagea
 gender wage gapa
Teams 0.012**
 (0.006)
 -0.012*
 (0.006)
 0.024***
 (0.006)
Job rotation   0.002
  (0.005)
  -0.018***
  (0.006)
  0.020***
  (0.006)
Quality circles   -0.001
   (0.012)
   0.008
   (0.021)
   -0.009
   (0.019)
Total quality management       -0.023***
    (0.009)
    -0.010
    (0.012)
    -0.013
    (0.010)
Benchmarking     0.004
     (0.008)
     -0.015
     (0.009)
     0.019**
     (0.008)
Project organisation            0.010
      (0.008)
      -0.001
      (0.009)
      0.012
            (0.008)
a Firm fixed effects and a time trend were included as additional controls.
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average wage, corrected for serial correlation
Dep. var.: log male wagea
 log female wagea
 gender wage gapa
Teams 0.016**
 (0.006)
 -0.007
 (0.009)
 0.022***
 (0.008)
Job rotation   -0.013**
  (0.006)
  -0.016
  (0.010)
  0.003
  (0.010)
Quality circles   0.031**
   (0.013)
   0.134***
   (0.039)
   -0.103***
   (0.039)
Total quality management       0.020
    (0.015)
    0.024
    (0.018)
    -0.004
    (0.019)
Benchmarking     0.011
     (0.008)
     -0.023
     (0.015)
     0.033**
     (0.013)
Project organisation            0.018*
      (0.010) 
      0.005 
      (0.012) 
      0.013 
            (0.012) 
a Firm fixed effects and a time trend were included as additional controls.
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Appendix A5.3: The impact of individual practices on firm 
average wage, corrected for serial correlation
Dep. var.: log male wagea
 log female wagea
 gender wage gapa
Teams 0.014
 (0.010)
 0.002
 (0.009)
 0.012
 (0.011)
Job rotation   0.021**
  (0.009)
  0.016*
  (0.009)
  0.006
  (0.011)
Quality circles   -0.003
   (0.029)
   -0.014
   (0.030)
   0.012
   (0.032)
Total quality management       -0.011
    (0.016)
    -0.004
    (0.014)
    -0.008
    (0.017)
Benchmarking     0.009
     (0.012)
     0.014
     (0.012)
     -0.005
     (0.016)
Project organisation            -0.032***
      (0.011)
      0.003
      (0.012)
      -0.036***
      (0.012)
a Firm fixed effects and a time trend were included as additional controls.
6 The Determinants of the
Employment Structure:
Wages, Trade, Technology,
and Organisational Change
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ABSTRACT
This paper uses matched employee-employer LIAB data to provide panel
estimates of the structure of labour demand in Germany, 1993-2002,
distinguishing between highly skilled, skilled, and unskilled labour and
between the manufacturing and service sectors. Reflecting current
preoccupations, our demand analysis seeks also to accommodate the
impact of technology and trade in addition to wages. The bottom-line
interests are to provide elasticities of the demand for unskilled (and other)
labour that should assist in short-run policy design and to identify the
extent of skill biases or otherwise in trade and technology.
6.1 Introduction
For several decades now, the demand for unskilled labour in Germany as
elsewhere has been declining. There is no shortage of explanations for
this phenomenon: skill-biased technological change (Falk and Seim, 1999),
increased international trade (Fitzenberger, 1999a) and, latterly,
organisational change (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000; Fitzenberger, 1999b).
(A related preoccupation is of course the extent to which declining
demand for the unskilled has been exacerbated by a rigid wage structure.)
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In the present treatment, using information on 1,171 manufacturing plants
employing on average 360,000 employees, and on 174 service sector
establishments covering some 49,000 employees, we seek to address
these various influences using a flexible cost function framework to derive
the demand for heterogeneous labour. It is precisely this latter
complication that involves the use of linked employee-employer data
because only the latter contain detailed wage information. We estimate.
the own-wage elasticity of unskilled and skilled (and highly skilled) labour
as well as the elasticities of the various labour categories with respect to
trade, technology, and organisational change measures. We disaggregate
by manufacturing and services both because of sectoral differences in the
role of trade and by reason of occupational composition.
To anticipate our findings, which are somewhat at odds with the literature,
we report that the own-wage elasticity of unskilled labour in manufacturing,
although well determined, is smaller in absolute value than that of skilled
workers (if not the most highly skilled). We also find that trade and
technology are not unfavourable to unskilled worker employment, while
organisational change often presumed to be destructive of unskilled jobs
also appears to have a positive effect. To explain why unskilled worker
employment has shrunk, we would therefore rely on (excessive) unskilled
worker wage levels in a rigid wage system, even if the actual decline in
employment over the decade long sample period is muted.
6.2 Data
Our data are taken from ten waves of the LIAB, 1993-2002. The LIAB
combines Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit)
employment statistics with plant-level data from the Institute for
Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung) or
IAB Establishment Panel. The distinctive feature of the LIAB is the
combination of information on individuals and details concerning the
firms – strictly establishments – that employ them. The employment
statistics are drawn from the German employment register, which
contains information on all employees and trainees subject to social
security taxes (see Bender, Haas, and Klose, 2000). In 1995, for example,
the employment statistics covered 79.4 (86.2) per cent of all employed
persons in Western (Eastern) Germany. Those excluded, in addition to the
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self employed, include civil servants, family workers, students enrolled in
higher education, and workers in marginal employment. The employment
register was established in 1973 to integrate the notification procedures
for social security (pensions, health insurance, and unemployment
insurance). Information is recorded at the start and end of the individual’s
employment within a firm and in annual end-year reports. The
employment statistics contain data on the individual’s three-digit
occupation, daily gross wage up to the earnings ceiling for social security
contributions,47 gender, year of birth, nationality, marital status, number of
children, and schooling/training. Each individual record also contains the
establishment identifier, as well as the size and industry affiliation of that
establishment, although unfortunately one cannot match establishments
belonging to a single enterprise.
The plant-level component of the LIAB, the IAB Establishment Panel,48 was
initiated in 1993 (Kölling, 2000). It is based on a stratified random sample
– strata for 16 industries and 10 employment size classes – from the
population of all establishments. (Although larger plants are over-
sampled, within each cell the sampling is random). In 1993 the sample
comprised 4,265 plants, accounting for 0.27 per cent of all plants in West
Germany and 11 per cent of total employment (29 million employees).
Subsequently in 1996 the former GDR was administered the Panel survey,
with 4,313 establishments (or 1.1 per cent of all plants) and 11 per cent of
total employment (6 million). Since then the number of plants sampled
has steadily increased to facilitate analysis at Länder level; for example, in
2003 the unified sample contained some 15,857 plants.
For its part, the IAB Establishment Panel was created to meet the need of
the Federal Employment Agency to provide further and detailed
information on the demand side of the labour market. Accordingly,
information on the workforce, its decomposition, and development
through time are central elements of the Panel questionnaire. Further
questions concern establishment sales, exports, and investment,
technological status, age, corporate form and legal status, as well as the
size of the overall wage bill, training provision, working time,
reorganisation measures, and aspects of collective bargaining. Most such
questions are asked annually. One exception is organisational change. The
question pertaining to those organisational changes introduced in the last
two years was included in four surveys only, namely, 1995, 1998, 2000, and
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47 We shall impute wages above the ceiling (see below).
48 The Panel survey is based on the employment statistics via the establishment identifier; as a result, the
panel only includes establishments with at least one employee covered by social security.
2001.49 Other examples cover topics such as innovations, profit
sharing/share ownership, further training, and labour flexibility.
In summary, the LIAB is created by linking the employment statistics of the
Federal Labour Agency with the IAB Establishment panel via the plant
identifier available in both data sets. This matched data set currently
comprises the years 1993 to 2002. For the purposes of the present inquiry
and in the interests of panel estimation we use information on all ten years
and thus exclude Eastern Germany. The basis of the initial sample is all
establishments in the manufacturing sector, while for services we exclude
banking and insurance where output is not measured by sales (being
reported in balance-sheet terms for the former and in premiums for the
latter) plus three clearly not-for-profit service subsectors (e.g. public
administration). We then proceeded to weed out further nonprofit
organisations in services by exploiting (two) other questions in the
Establishment Panel so as to obtain our preferred services (sub)sample.50
6.3 The model
Workers were notionally classified into six skill categories: three blue-
collar and three white-collar groups. So as to avoid having too few
workers in the individual skill categories for our two sectors, we formally
classified workers into four categories per sector – as well as imposing a
minimum requirement of two workers per skill group. For manufacturing
this meant three blue-collar skill categories (unskilled, skilled, and highly
skilled [i.e. master craftsmen]) and one composite white-collar group, based
on employer definitions. For services this meant three white-collar skill
categories (unskilled, skilled, and highly skilled, now defined on the basis
of education level and qualifications) and a composite blue-collar entity.51
Given this representation of the structure of the workforce, we wanted the
substitution possibilities between the various types of labour to be as
unrestricted as possible. To this end, we used a flexible cost function –
specifically, the Generalised Leontief Function – in which the elasticity of
substitution between any pair of factors can assume any (positive) value.
Further, we treat capital as a quasi-fixed factor, meaning that we are only
concerned with the optimal choice of the set of variable labour inputs
(using the capital stock as a regressor in our heterogenous labour demand
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49 In a subset of estimates using this variable (see Table 6.5 below), since the Establishment Panel measures
organisational change over a two-year interval we chose to use data from 1995 to impute values for the
years 1993 and 1994 (thus dropping 1995), data from 1998 to impute values for 1996 and 1997, data from
2000 to impute values for 1998 and 1999, and finally data from 2001 to impute a value for 2000 (dropping
2001). In other words, for specifications using the organisational change argument we lose three years of
data, including 2002 for which there was no organisational change question in the Establishment Panel.
50 The questions concern the legal form of the firm and the definition of business volume. We excluded two such
legal forms {‘Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts’ and ‘Sonstige Rechtsform (z.B. Verein, Genossenschaft)’}
as well as those units that defined their business volume in terms of budget rather than sales.
51 Following Bauer and Bender (2004), we also experimented with an occupational-based representation of
the blue-collar and white-collar skill structure, in which workers were classified into just three categories –
unskilled, skilled, and highly skilled – notwithstanding their white- or blue-collar status. The results of this
exercise are briefly reported on in section VI below.
functions rather than its user cost). We supplement our measure of capital
with a number of technological variables available in the Panel (see below)
and, in one specification, a measure of organisational change.
From the cost function, we are able to estimate the conditional demand
functions for the four types of labour.52 These four demand functions –
each giving the quantity of labour employed at establishment level as a
function of wage and non-wage variables – are estimated jointly.
(Technically, they are estimated in a system of seemingly unrelated
regressions to allow for the possibility that the error terms in each are
contemporaneously correlated, as when unexpected shocks affect them in
a systematic way). We can then obtain the own-wage and cross-wage
elasticities, as well as the labour demand elasticities with respect to the all
other explanatory variables. The own wage elasticity for a particular
category of labour is defined as the percentage change in its employment
caused by a one per cent increase in its wage (and since the cost function
is concave, the own wage has a non-positive impact on the demand for
each category of labour). The cross-wage elasticity of labour category i with
respect to the price of category j is measured as the percentage change in
the demand for i brought about by a one per cent change in the price of
input j; the two groups being substitutes (complements) if the cross-wage
elasticity is positive (negative). Similarly, the labour demand elasticity with
respect to output (capital) is defined as the percentage change in
employment of a given labour category resulting from a one per cent
change in output (the capital stock). For the dichotomous technology
variables, note that we report the respective labour demand semi-
elasticities, giving the percentage change in labour demand caused by a
unit change in the corresponding technological indicator. (The reader is
referred to the Appendix A6.1 for technical details).
We anticipate that the own-wage elasticities should not only be negative
but also decrease (in absolute value) with the skill content of the labour
input, because high-skill workers are more difficult to replace in
production than those with lesser skills. The capital stock is expected to
evince greater complementarity with highly skilled workers as well. We
also anticipate that technological and organisational change might impact
labour, and in particular unskilled labour, unfavourably and (for
manufacturing) that any adverse trade effects would likely be confined to
unskilled workers.
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labour demand.
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6.4 Empirical specification
As was noted in section III, we estimate the four factor demand functions
(per sector) by the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method. We do
not present the eight regressions here – they are available from the
authors on request – instead electing to summarise them in the form of the
wage and other elasticities.
We have already described the basis of construction of the four labour
inputs in each of our two sectors, manufacturing and services. Also taken
from the employment statistics are input prices since the establishment
panel only contains information on the overall wage bill. It will be recalled
that the earnings variable in the administrative data is censored at the
maximum earnings taxable under social security. In manufacturing
(services), 7.75 (8.56) per cent of the wage observations were censored.
We therefore used a Tobit-type estimator to impute daily earnings values
for those with right-censored earnings for each skill group separately,
estimating eight wage equations using pooled data and time dummies.53
Predicted wages together with the corresponding actual (below-ceiling)
wages were used in the calculation of mean wages per skill group per
plant per year. For manufacturing, the total number of observations were
as follows (with the censored values in parentheses): blue-collar unskilled,
2,626,147 (6,848); blue-collar skilled, 2,296,841 (18,763); blue-collar, highly
skilled 185,083 (31,856); white-collar composite, 2,330,451 (519,904). For
services, the corresponding totals were: white-collar unskilled, 99,296
(2,642); white-collar skilled, 1,729,792 (117,505); white-collar highly skilled,
454,763 (140,556); blue-collar composite, 796,786 (2,964). The variables
included in our conventional earnings function are detailed in Appendix
A6.2 and the fitted equations are available from the authors upon request.
Not mentioned in the table is our imposition of a monthly wage cutoff of
DM 1,000, although as a practical matter this restriction resulted in the loss
of few observations because of the ‘prior’ exclusion of part-time workers.
These plant specific wage measures, together with the corresponding
number of employees,54 are added to the establishment panel, which
contains the other information needed to estimate the system of input-
output ratios from which our elasticities are derived. Our measure of
output is sales volume. It would have been preferable to use a value-added
measure of output, obtained by subtracting the cost of materials from
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53 We selected the cluster option of the intreg-estimator provided in Stata. Our imputation procedure, based
on the predicted wage plus an error term, also guarantees that the imputed wage is never below the
ceiling. Results are available from the authors on request. Alternative imputation methods did not
fundamentally alter the results reported below.
54 We should note that there are disparities between the sum of employees obtained from the employment
statistics and the total given in the establishment panel. Where these amounted to 20 per cent or more we
chose to exclude the plant from the sample, treating the establishment identifier as flawed.
sales. Although the establishment panel allows us to construct a value-
added measure55 – and a number of recent studies have deployed this
measure (see, for example Wolf and Zwick, 2002) – inspection of the raw
data reveals that the materials cost estimates are little more than informed
guesstimates. No less important, panel survey respondents often fail to
answer the materials cost question, so that use of a value-added measure
involves a large reduction in the number of observations: around one-third
of all plants have missing values for these intermediate inputs.
The next variable taken from the establishment panel is our measure of
the capital stock. This argument is approximated by the sum of investment
expenditures in the last two years and, like the output measure, is also
calculated in DM million. In other work, two of the present authors have
used replacement investment since this variable is more clearly expected
to be proportional to the capital stock (see Addison, Schank, Schnabel, and
Wagner, 2003). In the present paper, however, our sample period begins in
1993 and data on replacement investment is only available after 1996.
The penultimate four arguments are dummy variables and provide more
information on the nature of the capital stock. Three investment dummies
signify whether a plant has, in the previous year, invested in property and
buildings, in production units, and in information and communication
technology. Supplementing the last measure as a proxy for the use of new
technologies in the plant is a separate dummy variable set equal to one if
the plant uses either state-of-the art or at least up-to-date equipment to
produce goods and services.56 For manufacturing alone, we also include an
indicator of organisational change over the previous two years. This variable,
which is not available for all years in the sample, is defined in Appendix
A6.2 and footnote 49.
Our final argument is a continuous variable proxying the importance of
international trade and globalisation. It is the proportion of sales
consisting of exports. Like the organisational change variable is only
entered for the manufacturing sector. Descriptive statistics on all variables
are provided in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
107
The Determinants of the Employment Structure: Wages, Trade, Technology, and Organisational Change 
55 Specifically, panel survey respondents are asked to estimate the percentage share of total sales represented
by materials cost, so that multiplying sales volume by 1 minus this share yields value added.
56 Respondents in the Establishment Panel survey are asked to rate the technical condition of the plant’s
equipment compared with that of other firms in the industry/sector along a Likert scale where 1 indicates
“state-of-the-art” (auf dem neuesten stand) equipment and 5 indicates “obsolete” equipment (völlig
veraltet). In forming a modern technology dummy, we grouped categories 1 and 2.
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Regression Sample, 
Manufacturing
  Full sample Reduced sample
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Number of employees: 
Blue-collar workers
 – unskilled 264 523 288 506
 – skilled 218 470 232 471
 – highly skilled 20 57 22 53
White-collar workers 234 461 252 463
Daily wage (in DM):  
Blue-collar workers  
 – unskilled 148 24 145 23
 – skilled 170 23 167 22
 – highly skilled 236 28 232 27
White-collar workers 215 29 211 28
Output (mill. DM) 314 709 322 644
Capital (mill. DM) 33.6 97.7 34.6 85.3
Export share 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.26
Index of technology 0.74 0.44 0.75 0.44
Investment in IT 0.80 0.40 0.80 0.40
Investment in other units 0.90 0.31 0.91 0.28
Investment in buildings 0.36 0.48 0.37 0.48
Organisational change   0.85 0.36
n  4982  2649
Establishments 1171  688
Notes: A description of the variables is provided in Appendix A6.2. The ‘reduced sample’ is obtained 
when dropping all establishments in which the organisational change variable is missing.
6.5 Findings
Estimated elasticities for the manufacturing and service sectors are
provided in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, respectively. Beginning with manufacturing,
we see that with the exception of the white-collar composite group, the
own-wage elasticities are all of the expected sign, and those of unskilled
workers and skilled workers are both well determined and the differences
between them (and between them and the white-collar composite) are
also statistically significant at the .05 level or better. Note, however, that
our expectation that the absolute value of the unskilled elasticity would be
larger than those of the other skill groups is not borne out. Unskilled blue-
collar workers emerge as substitutes in production for skilled and highly
skilled workers but not with white-collar workers as a collectivity. On the
other hand, skilled and highly skilled workers are weakly complementary.
As far as white-collar workers are concerned the only significant cross
elasticity is, as noted earlier, the negative association with unskilled blue-
collar workers.
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Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Regression Sample, Services
  Full sample Sub-sample
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Number of employees:
White-collar workers
 – unskilled 19 36 24 47
 – skilled 330 432 305 509
 – highly skilled 105 210 67 178
Blue-collar workers 225 597 345 837
Daily wage (in DM):
White-collar workers
 – unskilled 156 32 161 36
 – skilled 176 26 182 30
 – highly skilled 257 47 250 48
Blue-collar workers 142 25 148 28
Output (mill. DM) 224 518 285 635
Capital (mill. DM) 39.1 118 51.9 158
Index of technology 0.69 0.46 0.76 0.43
Investment in IT 0.83 0.38 0.81 0.39
Investment in other units 0.78 0.42 0.78 0.42
Investment in buildings 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.50
Organisational change   0.82 0.38
n  1427  654
Establishments 368  174
Notes: See Table 6.1. The ‘sub-sample’ is based on a further cut of the services data designed to remove 
remaining not-for-profit units; see the text and footnote 50.
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With the exception of white-collar workers, the output elasticities are
positive and statistically significant. They are well determined only for the
skilled blue-collar worker category and the white-collar aggregate
(although the latter association is perverse). The labour demand
elasticities with respect to capital are uniformly well determined and of
very similar magnitude for each of the blue-collar groups. And trade
seems benign in the sense that a rising share of exports in total sales
seemingly boosts labour demand throughout. But the effect is small for
blue-collar workers: a 10 per cent increase in export share is associated
with a less than one per cent increase in employment. For white-collar
workers the growth in employment is anomalous – on this occasion,
anomalously high.
The generally benign effect of exports has a counterpart in the influence of
technology. For both measures – state-of-the-art/up-to-date technical
equipment and investments in information technology – the semi-
elasticites are all positive and well determined. For each labour category,
upgrading to state-of-the-art equipment and going from no investment to
some investment in IT has a positive, albeit still small effect on
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Table 6.3: Employment Elasticities for Different Skills Groups, 
Manufacturing (within-plant estimation)
   Blue-collar White-collar
   workers workers
  Unskilled Skilled Highly skilled
Elasticities
Wages:
Blue-collar workers
 – Unskilled -0.472*** 0.735*** 1.220*** -0.293**
 – Skilled 0.700*** -0.849*** -0.155 0.099
 – Highly skilled 0.151*** -0.020 -0.430 -0.061
White-collar workers -0.378** 0.134 -0.635 0.254
Output 0.238 0.854** 0.611 -4.814***
Capital 0.403*** 0.411*** 0.561*** 1.773***
Export share 0.056*** 0.091*** 0.020*** 0.512***
Semi-elasticities
Index of technology. 0.029*** 0.021*** 0.050*** 0.040**
Investment in IT 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.031*** 0.059***
Investment in other units 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.067***
Investment in buildings -0.006** -0.009*** -0.021*** -0.024
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively. 
The elasticities are obtained from the parameter estimates of a (constrained) SUR regression after a 
within-plant transformation of the data. The corresponding heterogeneous labour demand equations 
have been derived from a Generalised Leontief cost function (see Appendix A6.1). The number of 
observations (establishments) is 4,982 (1,171).
employment. We have no explanation for the consistent but opposing
directional effects of investment in other production units (positive) on
property and buildings (negative) on labour demand.
Turning to services, perhaps the main difference from manufacturing is
the emergence of a hierarchy in the pattern of own-wage elasticities. In
particular, the own-wage elasticity of unskilled white-collar workers is
strongly negative – a 10 per cent increase in the wage of unskilled white
collar employees lowers their employment by 21 per cent – and is clearly
differentiated from the experience of the two more skilled white-collar
groups, the estimates for both of which groups are poorly determined. The
own-wage elasticity of the blue-collar aggregate is also strongly negative
and not significantly different from that of unskilled white-collar workers.
There are few indications of either complementarity or substitutability
between unskilled white-collar workers and their more skilled
counterparts, although the skilled and the very highly skilled are clearly
complementary inputs. Increases in the wages of blue-collar workers as a
group lead to increases in both unskilled and skilled (although not highly
skilled) white-collar employment.
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Table 6.4: Employment Elasticities for Different Skills Groups, 
Services (within-plant estimation; sub-sample)
   Blue-collar White-collar
   workers workers
  Unskilled Skilled Highly skilled
Elasticities
Wages:
White-collar workers
 – Unskilled -2.086*** -0.012 0.089 0.141**
 – Skilled -0.180 -0.508 -1.086** 0.926**
 – Highly skilled 0.392 -0.328** 0.326 0.221
 Blue-collar workers 1.874** 0.849** 0.671 -1.288**
Output 4.159*** 0.976 -0.706 2.530**
Capital 0.262*** 0.260*** 0.367*** 0.362***
Semi-elasticities
Index of technology 0.122*** 0.214*** 0.231*** 0.147***
Investment in IT 0.086*** 0.065*** 0.146*** -0.028
Investment in other units 0.008 -0.057*** -0.037** 0.011
Investment in buildings 0.156*** 0.148*** 0.228*** 0.137***
Notes: See Table 6.3. The number of observations (establishments) is 654 (174).
Labour demand elasticities with respect to output for unskilled white-collar
employees and blue-collar workers exceed unity and are well determined.
Those for the two other white-collar categories are statistically
insignificant. But, as was the case for manufacturing, there is strong
evidence of complementarity between capital and labour. Similarly,
technology is associated with increased employment. In fact, the semi-
elasticities are somewhat stronger than observed for manufacturing in
seven out of eight cases. Again, then, investing in IT and upgrading
technology leads to increases rather than decreases in labour inputs. As
far as labour demand elasticities with respect to investments in other
production units and in property and buildings are concerned there is
some reversal of findings: now the latter investments increase
employment across the board while the former investments tend to
reduce employment albeit very modestly.
Finally, we investigated the effects of organisational change on labour
demand. We already noted the loss in observations that this caused
(because of the irregularity with which this question is asked in the panel
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Table 6.5: Employment Elasticities for Different Skills Groups, 
Manufacturing (within-plant estimation; reduced sample with 
the additional regressor ‘organisational change’)
   Blue-collar White-collar
   workers workers
  Unskilled Skilled Highly skilled
Elasticities
Wages:
Blue-collar workers
 – Unskilled -0.492** 1.184*** 1.945** -0.658***
 – Skilled 1.096*** -1.330*** 0.015 0.105
 – Highly skilled 0.235** 0.002 0.116 -0.197**
White-collar workers -0.839*** 0.144 -2.077** 0.750**
Output 0.139 1.754*** -0.832 -5.794***
Capital 0.599*** 0.711*** 0.354*** 4.125***
Export share 0.040*** 0.073*** 0.030*** 0.366***
Semi-elasticities
Index of technology 0.040*** 0.030*** 0.054*** 0.118***
Investment in IT 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.035*** 0.043**
Investment in other units 0.003 0.013*** 0.014* 0.024
Investment in buildings -0.018*** -0.016*** 0.002 -0.136*** 
Organisational change 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.018** 0.087***
Notes: See Table 6.3. The number of observations (establishments) is 2,649 (688).
survey) and so we only present results for the considerably larger
manufacturing sample. We simply add the new regressor to an otherwise
unchanged specification for manufacturing. As before the respective
elasticities are provided. As can be seen from Table 6.5, the main result is
of course that the introduction of organisational change is associated with
increases in employment. The magnitudes of the semi-elasticities are
small: initiating organisational change as opposed to not doing so
increases the employment of blue-collar workers by between 1.3 and 1.8
per cent, although the effect is greater for the white-collar aggregate at just
under 9 per cent. As far as the other variables are concerned there are
scarcely any qualitative differences between the results for the restricted
and full manufacturing samples. As expected, these and other differences
(in magnitude) are explained by the reduction in sample size. (Results for
the restricted manufacturing sample net of the organisational change
variable are available on request.)
Stated baldly, the bottom lines from this empirical inquiry are fourfold.
First, for manufacturing if not services, the own-wage elasticity of
unskilled workers does not appear to be larger in absolute magnitude than
that of skilled and yet more highly skilled groups. Second, capital and all
the various skill categories seem to be complements in production. Third,
(manufacturing) employment is increasing in export share. Finally,
investing in technology and introducing organisational change are again
productive for employment across the board.
6.6 Interpretation
Our analysis has used information on 1,171 manufacturing plants covering
on average 360,000 employees (and 174 service sector establishments
covering some 49,000 employees), and has used one of the longest panels
of which we are aware. Our findings differ somewhat from those reported
in the literature in a number of respects. Chief among these is the absence
of the familiar hierarchy in the own-wage elasticities by skill group (e.g.
FitzRoy and Funke, 1998), at least for manufacturing. It may be objected
that our findings for manufacturing could reflect inaccuracy in the
identification of skill. Although our subsequent experimentation using
education levels and qualifications to define blue-collar skill groups in
manufacturing proved abortive (because of limited numbers of workers in
the highest category), we were able to obtain a common measure of skill
across sectors using the occupational breakdown, suggested by Bauer and
Bender (2004). Estimates based on these definitions – not reported here,
but available from the authors on request – closely matched those
reported in Table 6.3, based on employer definitions of skill.
Issues of hierachy in these elasticities notwithstanding, our estimates of
the unskilled worker own-wage elasticity are always well determined, and
are particularly strong in the case of services. Within manufacturing,
unskilled workers emerge as substitutes in production for more skilled
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workers, among the ranks of which there is however only very weak
evidence of complementarity. For services, on the other hand, there is little
evidence that unskilled and skilled (and yet more skilled) workers are
affected by each other’s wage. In both sectors, some strong substitute
relationships between the composite skill groups and the more narrowly
defined categories again suggest that further disaggregation is in order.
Complementarity between capital and the various skill categories is
stronger than in previous research using the LIAB (e.g. Bellmann and
Schank, 2000; Kölling and Schank, 2002). However, such studies use either
a cross section of data or at best a short panel. Note also that, with the
exception of the composite groups, our estimates of the labour elasticities
with respect to capital fall within a narrow range.
Increased trade does not appear to have adverse consequences for any
skill group. That is to say, the labour elasticities with respect to export
share are not only uniformly positive but also well determined throughout.
The estimated elasticities for unskilled blue-collar workers are smaller than
for their skilled counterparts but the magnitudes are small for all blue-
collar groups. But we would caution that the establishment panel does not
contain information on the other side of the trade coin – imports – and so
one cannot conclude in particular that trade is benign for low-skilled groups.
Perhaps most at odds with previous research, however, are our findings
for technology. We find no evidence suggestive of skill-biased technical
change insofar as this is captured by our two indicators. That is to say,
neither upgrading to state-of-the-art equipment nor investing in
information technology has negative consequences for any of our
narrowly-defined skill categories. Interestingly, the technology findings
carry over to organisational change, which innovations are seemingly
associated with modest increases in employment across the skill groups
in manufacturing industry. In sum, the semi-elasticities are positive and
statistically significant throughout. These results are also consistent with
the results for the capital stock.
Our principal finding nevertheless resides in the estimated own-wage
elasticities for unskilled workers. We have found that a 10 per cent fall in
the wages of unskilled workers would translate into a 5 per cent increase
in the demand for blue-collar workers in manufacturing and, more
controversially, into a 21 per cent increase in that of unskilled white-collar
employees in services. If, as it is conventional to argue, rigid wages lie at
the heart of the German employment problem, our estimates may suggest
that one first-pass policy solution may lie in subsidising unskilled work. To
establish the effect of wage subsidies on unskilled worker unemployment,
some additional assumption regarding the elasticity of wages with respect
to unemployment is of course required (see Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004,
pp. 663-664).
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Appendix A6.1: Technical Aspects
To represent the production (cost) possibilities, we select a flexible
function that can be viewed as a second-order local approximation to an
arbitrary cost function. Specifically, we deploy a Generalised Leontief Cost
Function in which the elasticity of substitution between any pair of inputs
can take any (positive) value; indeed, the greater is the corresponding
coefficient in the cost function, the greater is the elasticity of substitution
(Diewert, 1971).57
Capital is treated as a quasi-fixed factor. This assumption is our preferred
way of tackling the optimal choice of the set of variable (labour) inputs.58
We consider this approach appropriate in the data circumstances. Thus,
although the maximum panel length is ten years, in many cases
establishments are only observed for a few years. Furthermore, there is no
direct measure of the capital stock: it can only be proxied using
information on annual investment. The limitations of our measure of the
capital stock are in part offset by a number of technological variables in the
establishment panel; for example, dummy variables indicating the use of
either state-of-the-art or up-to-date equipment, recent investments in
information and communication technology, inter alia, and the
introduction of organisational changes.
Formally, omitting establishment and time subscripts, the chosen function
can be denoted as C(W,y,Z;,,), where W=(w1, w2, w3, w4) is the vector of
variable input prices, y is output, Z=(z1, z2, z3) is a column vector of non-
wage variables comprising the capital stock (z1), the export share (z2), and
a technology indicator (z3), and (,,) are the parameters to be estimated.
As a practical matter, we disaggregate z3 into z31, z32, z33, and z34, denoting
the presence of state-of-the-art/up-to-date equipment, investments in
information and communication technology, investments in buildings,
and investments in production units, respectively. Further, for a subsample
of manufacturing, we will enter an additional regressor capturing
organisational change.
The corresponding vector of conditional factor demands, obtained by
applying Shephard’s Lemma, is then given by X=(x1, x2, x3, x4), where x1 is the
conditional factor demand of skill group i. A useful property of this flexible
cost function is that the corresponding conditional demand functions are
also linear in the parameters. A typical labour demand x1 will be
x1=x1(W,y,Z;,,), i=1,2,3,4. (1)
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57 An alternative representation of the technology is given by the Translog cost function (Christenson,
Jorgenson, and Lau, 1973), which also can be viewed as a local second-order approximation of an arbitrary
cost function. For this specification, factor shares rather than the conditional factor demands are linear in
the relevant parameters of the cost function. The resulting system of cost share equations can also be
estimated by the SUR method.
58 Rationalisation of this approach in the context of labour demand estimation can be found in Bond and
Reenen (2006).
Although these four demand functions can be estimated by OLS, there are
well known gains in efficiency if they are estimated jointly in a system of
seemingly unrelated regressions. We implement a SUR model with fixed
effects, which amounts to applying a standard within transformation of
the data (meaning that for each variable we take the difference from the
mean of the production unit). The usual symmetry conditions are imposed
on the system. Further, to avoid any bias in the estimated standard errors,
the labour demand input is divided by output so that the system is
specified in terms of input/output coefficients.
Finally, the relevant own- and cross-wage elasticities, as well as the
elasticities of labour demand with respect to capital and the other
indicators of technology, can be derived as follows. Formally, the elasticity of
the labour demand for skill group i with respect to input price j is given by
(xi,wj) = (xi/wj)(wj/xi), i, j = 1,2,3,4. (2)
In turn, the output elasticity is
(xi,y) = (xi/y)(y/xi) (3)
while the elasticity with respect to any of the variables (i.e. capital, export
share, and technology) is
(xi,zi) = k zi/xi (4)
For the dichotomous z3 technology variables, the semi-elasticity is
obtained by dividing the corresponding elasticity in (4) by z31, z32, z33, and
z34, respectively. Given that the elasticities will differ at every data point, we
adopt the usual procedure of computing them at the sample means.
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Appendix A6.2: Description of variables
Variable Description 
Employee skill groups Employees in the raw administrative records were first classified into 
four groups: three blue-collar worker categories (comprising the 
unskilled, skilled, and highly skilled) and one aggregate white-collar 
category made up of all white-collar grades. (The residual categories of 
home-workers, part-time workers, and apprentices were dropped from 
the sample.) White-collar workers were then disaggregated into three 
skill categories according to their education level: unskilled (individuals 
without a completed apprenticeship and without an Abitur), skilled 
(individuals with a completed apprenticeship and/or an Abitur), and 
highly skilled (individuals possessing a college, polytechnic, or 
university degree). As noted in the text, for the manufacturing sector 
analysis we used all three blue-collar skill categories and the single 
white-collar aggregate; whereas in the service sector we deployed all 
three white-collar categories and aggregated the blue-collar categories 
into a single grouping. 
Wages Daily wage in DM. Information on individual wages in the administra-
tive data is right censored at the upper earnings limit for social security 
contributions. For such individuals, the predicted wage was obtained 
using separate Tobit regressions of the daily wage on age, gender, 
nationality, 3-digit occupational dummies, plant size, and industry and 
year dummies. 
Output Total sales in DM.
Capital Sum of the current and the previous year’s investment. 
Export share The percentage share of exports in the establishment’s annual turnover.
Index of technology Modern technology dummy, assuming the value of 1 if the plant’s 
equipment is either state-of-the art or up-to-date compared with other 
firms in the same industry, 0 otherwise. 
Investment in  IT dummy, assuming the value of 1 if the establishment has invested
information and  during the survey year in information and communication technology,
communication technology 0 otherwise.
Investment in other units Dummy variable assuming the value of 1 if the establishment has 
invested during the survey year in other plant and equipment, 
0 otherwise. 
Investment in buildings Dummy variable if the establishment has invested during the survey 
year in buildings and real estate, 0 otherwise. 
Organisational change Dummy variable assuming the value of 1 if the establishment had (in 
the last two years) reorganised by shifting responsibilities and decision 
making to lower levels in the hierarchy, by setting up units with their 
own costs and results accounting, and by introducing team work and 
self-governing work groups, etc. The organisational change question 
was not asked in all waves of the establishment panel. The method of 
interpolation used in the present treatment is documented in the text 
(footnote 49).
Notes: In the employee-employer matching procedure, all establishments employing less than 20 
employees were dropped from the sample. Further, inclusion required that each establishment had at 
least 2 workers in each skill category. Finally, establishments in which the employer-employee match 
yielded a difference in employment levels of 20 per cent or more were excised from the sample.
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7 Analysing Working Time:
Why Use Linked Employer-
Employee Data?
Mark L Bryan59
ABSTRACT
Linked employer-employee data are essential to account fully for the
differences across people in their working time. As well as capturing the
effects of workers’ personal attributes on hours worked, these data allow
for specific workplace-level influences on hours. This analysis shows that
workplace-level hours ‘policies’ or norms are strong drivers of working
hours, accounting for nearly a third of the variation in ‘explained’ hours.
They have an especially large effect in the expanding private services
sector. Hours also vary widely within workplaces, depending on skill,
occupation and family characteristics. The results point to a dual-pronged
strategy to improve work-life balance: promotion of job mobility to enable
workers to find jobs with suitable hours, and enhancement of already
existing within-firm hours variation.
7.1 Introduction
The UK has a high and (until recently) increasing employment rate. Some
75 per cent of the working age population are now in employment and in
its five-year strategy, the Department for Work and Pensions has
announced its ‘aspiration’ to go even further and achieve an employment
rate of 80 per cent.60 By integrating groups with historically low
participation rates (mainly mothers of young children, older workers,
disabled people and ethnic minorities), the Government hopes the
economy will benefit from previously untapped skills which can help
sustain the growing retired population. But the flipside of an economy in
which everyone who can work does work is a squeeze on the amount of
time left for personal and family activities – perhaps especially for those
labour market entrants, like mothers and some older people, who are also
carers. So as well as introducing measures to stimulate labour supply, the
Government has been engaged in a consultation and awareness-raising
process that has culminated in the introduction of various new workplace
entitlements. The new legislation includes the right to parental leave and 
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paid paternity leave, the extension of paid maternity leave, the right to
emergency time off for employees with dependents, and the right for
parents of young children to request flexible working patterns.61
To design effective working time polices we need to understand the factors
which explain working hours and different working patterns, and so
identify areas where intervention may be most beneficial (and least
harmful to efficiency). Working time is one area where both workers and
employers are likely to have quite strong preferences, but traditional
analysis has been restricted to one side of the market only, usually the
supply side. If there were perfect mobility in the labour market, so that
workers could always find a job matching their hours preferences, this
might not matter analytically. A supply-side analysis (based on individual-
level data) could, in principle, fully explain differences in working hours
between individuals. But as long as there is something ‘specific’ about the
worker-firm match – a skill linked to that particular job, or the fact that the
firm is conveniently located for the employee – there will be some ‘cost’ to
breaking up the relationship. In that case, the hours of identical workers
will typically differ across firms, and both worker and firm factors will be
needed to explain working time. Unlike ‘traditional’ data sources, linked
data show the influence both of individual workers’ characteristics and
also those of their employers.
This article focuses on the cross-sectional component of the 1998
Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS 98). This was a nationally
representative cross-sectional survey of over 2000 workplaces with ten or
more employees. As well as conducting interviews with a manager, and a
worker representative where possible, it included survey responses from
up to 25 individuals in each workplace. The WERS data have already been
used in several studies to analyse family-friendly working practices. A
positive relationship has been found between family-friendly policies and
establishment performance.62 Other studies have exploited one potential
advantage of linked data, which is that both management and workers can
be asked similar questions about the same topics.63 For example, Budd and
Mumford compared the availability of family-friendly practices as stated
by the manager, with the availability perceived by workers. They
concluded that workplace-level statistics on family-friendly policies
probably overstate the true accessibility of these practices to employees.
I use the WERS data here in a different way, to assess the importance of
workplace factors versus individual worker factors in determining hours of
work. In other words, to what extent are working hours driven by a
common workplace-level hours ‘policy’, and to what extent do they vary
within workplaces? If they do vary within workplaces, how is this linked to
different job and family characteristics? The matched data allow analysis
of two specific aspects which are necessarily neglected in traditional 
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Employment Relations website, in particular http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/fw_wlb.htm
62 Gray (2002).
63 See, for example, Dex and Smith (2002), Heywood et al (2005) and Budd and Mumford (2005).
studies restricted to employee-level data: differences in the working hours
of observably identical workers across workplaces, and the extent to
which workers are non-randomly ‘sorted’ into workplaces with different
working hours. The approach is to split the variation of working hours into 
two components – differences in working hours between workplaces and
differences within workplaces – and then link each type of variation to the
observed characteristics of workers.64 The next section introduces the
sample from the WERS 98 data. Then in Section 7.3, I show how the
variation in working time, as well as other personal and job characteristics,
can be broken into the within- and between-workplace components.
Looking across the workforce, these figures show whether or not people
with particular characteristics (working hours, but also occupation, family
structure etc) tend to be clustered into particular workplaces. Section 7.4
decomposes the total variation of hours into the parts due to personal
characteristics, workplace effects and the two sets of factors acting
together. The workplace effects are then examined in more detail in
Section 7.5. In Section 7.6, I explore the links between family
characteristics and working hours. I assess whether family circumstances
affect hours primarily within workplaces, or because people with certain
characteristics tend to be sorted into particular workplaces. Section 7.7
summarises the evidence and concludes.
7.2 Data
The basic sample consists of 1740 workplaces with, on average, 13
workers observed in each workplace, as shown in Table 7.1. The sample is
smaller than the 2191 workplaces surveyed because in the remaining
workplaces, either no employees returned the questionnaire or they did
not provide the full information needed for the analysis.
The survey unit of the workplace (or establishment) is of course not the
same as the idea of the ‘firm’. Indeed, nearly three-quarters of the
workplaces in WERS belong to larger organisations. But the factors that
affect firm-level working hours, such as the possible need to coordinate
staff work schedules, should also apply at the workplace level, and so I
122
Making Linked Employer-Employee Data Relevant to Policy
64 For more a more technical treatment see Bryan (2005).
Table 7.1: Numbers of workplace and individual observations
Sample Number of Number of Mean individuals Median individuals
  workplaces (N
1
) individuals (N
2
) per workplace (N
2
/N
1
)  per workplace
Full 2191 – – –
With individual info 1782 28215 15.8 17
With valid data 1740 21833 12.5 13
treat the two concepts interchangeably. Also, to the extent that there is not
free movement between different workplaces in the same firm, the
workplace is perhaps the more relevant unit.
The measure of working time studied is the response to the following
question in the employee survey:
‘How many hours do you usually work each week, including any overtime
or extra hours?’
As in other individual-level surveys, no reference period is given for ‘usual’
hours; the intention behind the question is that respondents average over
any temporary fluctuations or seasonal variations. This response is the
‘cleanest’ measure of working time in the employee questionnaire.
Respondents were also asked for the amount of overtime or extra hours
worked (again, ‘usually’). Therefore one could construct a measure of
standard hours as the difference between the two; in practice, though, the
standard hours measure would be considerably ‘noisier’ than the straight
measure of total usual hours. In any case, total hours are a better reflection
of the ‘real’ amount of time worked. Because it includes overtime working,
the total hours measure covers a wide range. Thus 13 per cent of workers
usually worked more than 48 hours per week, while 18 per cent worked 20
hours or less. Total usual hours averaged 36. The next section shows how
much of this variation can be accounted for by the workplace a person
belonged to, as well as introducing the other personal characteristics which
also affect hours.
7.3 The (un)importance of workplace affiliation. 
A first look at the evidence
There are two types of worker characteristics which are relevant to hours
determination: first, those variables affecting a person’s particular job, and
therefore hours, within a firm. Examples are education, occupation, age,
job tenure, and even gender to the extent that women tend to be
‘segregated’ into certain jobs. The second type of characteristics are those
which, having controlled for skill and occupation, are usually thought to
affect the number of hours an employee wishes to work. These
characteristics are usually termed labour supply or preference variables,
and typical examples are marital status and the presence of dependent
children in the household. Some of their effects may of course result from
domestic obligations rather than true preferences, but they are classified
here as labour supply characteristics in order to focus on worker-firm
interactions (rather than the domestic division of labour). Preferences may
operate as well through the first set of characteristics, for instance if
someone chooses their occupation based on the hours it requires. The
purpose of defining the more limited set of labour supply characteristics 
is to identify variables that affect hours through preferences only and 
not occupation.
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One variable which may affect both the number of hours chosen by the
firm and the number desired by the worker is the (average hourly) wage.
The wage is omitted from the analysis because it itself can be affected by
the number of hours actually worked, and so cannot be considered as a
genuine ‘independent’ variable. Rather, the role of the wage will be
reflected in the effects due to skill and occupation, in addition to their own
independent effects.
It is useful first to ask how these basic characteristics are related to where
somebody works. Do people with certain characteristics tend to be ‘sorted’
into particular workplaces, or are they randomly distributed across
workplaces? For several of the variables, Table 7.2 reports the mean,
variance and the proportion of the variance which can be accounted for by
an employee’s workplace. Technically, the variance share figures are
produced using a regression equation in which the only explanatory
variables are a set of categorical variables which identify the different
workplaces. The share of the variance explained by the workplace is the
adjusted R2 from the regression.
The top row of Table 7.2 reports that mean total hours across the whole
sample of individuals are 36.0, with a variance of 171.2, and that 41 per
cent of this variation can be attributed to workplace affiliation. The second
and third rows show the results for the hours variable expressed in two
different forms – first as the logarithm of hours and then transformed into
an indicator of part-time work – to check that the variance shares do not
depend overly on the precise measure used. All three figures are similar
and show that the weekly hours worked by an individual are strongly
associated with the workplace to which they belong. Of course, these
estimates do not account for any of the other hours determinants. If these
other variables are also non-randomly distributed across workplaces, then
we can expect the shares due to workplace affiliation to decline when they
are added to the analysis.
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To see how other characteristics are related to workplace affiliation, the
next panel of Table 7.2 reports the variance shares for some measures of
skill and occupation: degree level education, three broad occupational
groups, age and tenure, as well as gender. All the estimates imply that
these characteristics are not randomly distributed across workplaces.
Instead, their incidence is relatively well explained by workplace affiliation.
For example, the occupation proportions vary from 28 per cent to 43 per
cent. The variable with the lowest share is age (15 per cent).
The final panel of the table shows the shares for labour supply
characteristics: marital status and the presence of children in three age
bands. In contrast with the other characteristics, little of the variation can
be attributed to workplace affiliation. The highest estimate is 8 per cent for
marital status and the highest estimate for the children dummies is 5 per
cent for children aged 12–18 years. Overall, then, Table 7.2 shows that a
person’s workplace seems to have a strong association with both their
hours of work and the type of job they do, but not with the sort of factors
that influence their desired hours of work.
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Table 7.2: Share of variation in individual characteristics 
due to workplace variation
Dependent variable   Proportion of variation due to
(worker-level outcome) Mean Variance  workplace affiliation (adjusted R2)
Total hours 36.03 171.16 0.41
Log total hours 3.48 0.27 0.41
Part time incidence 0.25 – 0.38
Degree level qualification 0.21 – 0.25
High-skilled non-manual 0.31 – 0.28
Less-skilled non-manual 0.26 – 0.34
Manual 0.44 – 0.43
Age 39.70 146.38 0.15
Tenure (months) 88.1 6102.7 0.22
Female 0.48 – 0.32
Married or cohabiting 0.70 – 0.08
Children under 5 0.14 – 0.03
Children 5-11 0.20 – 0.04
Children 12-18 0.20 – 0.05
Notes: (a) The number of individuals is 21833 and the number of workplaces is 1740 (mean number of 
individuals per workplace is 12.5).
(b) The proportion of variation is the adjusted R2 from a regression of the individual variable on the 
set of workplace dummies. Individual probability weights are used.
7.4 Decomposition of total weekly work hours
To get a complete picture of the way that the workplace influences work
hours, we need to include the full set of personal characteristics in the
analysis, and apportion the variance to the workplace effect, the effect of
skill and occupation, the influence of labour supply preferences and the
various effects of these factors acting together. These results are shown in
Table 7.3, and note (1) under the table lists all the included characteristics.
I first discuss results estimated from the full sample, which provide an
economy-wide picture of work hours and are reported in the top panel of
Table 7.3, before commenting on differences between industrial sectors.
The figure in column (3), the adjusted R2, is the total proportion of the
variance in hours which can be explained by the combined effects of
workplace and personal characteristics. This figure is 57 per cent, which is
somewhat higher than the 41 per cent explained by workplace affiliation
alone (Table 7.2) and is a first indication that personal characteristics also
matter for hours. The remaining unexplained proportion of 43 per cent will
be a combination of random measurement error, ‘random’ variation in
hours and unobserved personal characteristics. Depending on the size of
this last component, the calculated variance contributions may
underestimate the importance of personal characteristics to some degree.
It is worth noting in this connection that standard labour supply equations
typically only explain around 10 per cent of the variation in hours. The
augmented framework presented therefore does rather well in accounting
for hours variation.
After controlling for personal characteristics, do workplace factors still
affect hours worked? As shown in column (6), workplace effects account
for 18 per cent of total variation or 18/57 = 32 per cent of the explained
variation (reported in italics under the shares of total variation). This points
to a substantial role for workplace-level factors in the determination of
total working hours. Notice that the variance share of 18 per cent is less
than half the 41 per cent share when only workplace dummies were
included (Table 7.2), showing that workers are indeed not randomly
allocated across workplaces – this sorting is examined below. The
workplace share is slightly bigger than any of the other components of the
decomposition to be discussed, although slightly smaller than for all
personal characteristics combined. To give an idea of the size of workplace
effects in practice, there is a gap of just over six hours between the quarter
of workplaces working the shortest hours and the quarter working the
longest hours. So observably identical workers can be doing very different
hours according to where they work. Workplace-level hours ‘policies’ or
norms have a strong effects on the hours that workers end up doing.
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Columns (4) and (5) show the amount of variation which can be assigned
to skill and occupation, and to labour supply preferences. Thus 16 per cent
of total variation (and 28 per cent of explained variation) is due to
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Table 7.3: Decomposition of total weekly hours into 
contributions due to individual and workplace characteristics
observed differences in skill and occupation, and 4 per cent (7 per cent)
can be attributed to labour supply preferences. Since the calculations net
out the workplace effect, they show that personal characteristics have an
effect on hours within workplaces. The share due to preferences is quite
small, but the choice of preference variables was deliberately restrictive,
and some preferences will be operating through the other set of
characteristics (by choice of occupation for instance).
The decomposition also shows that there is some sorting of workers into
workplaces based on their personal attributes. Workers with skills that
raise working hours tend to work in workplaces where, on average,
everyone works longer hours – this effect can account for 11 per cent of
the variance as shown in column (7) – and workers who prefer long-hours
also tend to be sorted into long-hours workplaces, accounting for 4 per
cent of variance (column (8). The preference sorting effect is perhaps
surprising given the evidence in the raw data (Table 7.2) that workers with
different family characteristics are not strongly sorted into different
workplaces. However, those figures did not control for other relevant
characteristics. It also turns out that the preference sorting effects are not
estimated very precisely, as will be shown below.
The figures in the top panel of Table 7.3 reflect working hours variation in
the economy as a whole. Not surprisingly, this aggregate analysis hides
some important differences between industrial sectors, which are likely to
stem from differences in capital usage and market structure. The remainder
of Table 7.3 presents decompositions according to sector: ‘manufacturing
and physical infrastructure’ (manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, and
private-sector construction), private services and public services. Since the
overall variance of hours differs greatly across sectors (in private services it
is nearly three times as large as in manufacturing/infrastructure), the table
also reports absolute variance shares. Consistent with the idea that in
capital-intensive industries, hours schedules need to be coordinated (for
example, on a production line), the manufacturing and physical
infrastructure sector is characterised by relatively tightly bunched hours
and, within the sector, an important role for workplace affiliation (50 per
cent of explained variance). In the private service sector, there is wide
variation in hours – possibly reflecting the need to fit in with customers’
time schedules – which in part is due to widely differing workplaces: the
absolute variance of workplace effects is 3-4 times bigger than in the other
sectors. But skills and occupation also have a large effect on hours and,
especially, workers with skills that raise hours tend to be clustered into long-
hours workplaces (24 per cent of explained variance). We do not see sorting
on skills to this degree in either of the other sectors. Finally, in the public
sector, workplace effects are relatively unimportant (19 per cent of
explained variance), despite quite wide variation of total hours (more than
twice the variance of hours in the manufacturing and physical infrastructure
sector). Instead, skills and preference characteristics account for large
variance shares (46 per cent and 13 per cent of explained variance).
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Figure 7.1: Workplace hours effects
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7.5 Workplace effects
The charts in Figure 7.1 illustrate the dispersion of workplace effects – that
is, the differences in the average hours of workplaces after netting out the
influence of personal characteristics – in the three sectors, and especially
the large differences in working hours between workplaces in private services.
The gap between the quarter of workplaces with the shortest hours and
the quarter with the longest hours in private services is over 8 hours.
How are the workplace effects related to various observable workplace,
industry and regional factors? Based on regression equations of the
workplace effects as a function of these characteristics, Table 7.4 shows
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Table 7.4: The industry correlations of workplace effects
  Manufacturing & infrastructure Private services Public services
Electricity, gas, water (SIC 2) -0.938
  (1.48)
Construction (SIC 3) 1.891***
  (2.96)
Hotels and restaurants (SIC 5)  1.101
   (1.38)
Transport, storage and comms (SIC 6)  5.639***
   (6.56)
Financial intermediation (SIC 7)  2.161**
   (2.49)
Real estate, renting, business (SIC 8)  3.535***
   (4.87)
Public administration and defence (SIC 9)  2.545 -1.177**
   (0.39) (2.04)
Education (SIC 10)  0.060 -3.268***
   (0.05) (5.41)
Health and social work (SIC 11)  -2.212** -3.313***
   (2.55) (5.35)
Other social and pers services (SIC 12)  -0.152 -6.307***
   (0.15) (7.40)
Observations 356 818 565 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.15 0.17 
Notes: (1) Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
(2) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(3) The dependent variable is the workplace effect estimated previously in each sector.
(4) Dummy variables are also included to indicate: trade union recognition, workplace size, whether 
part of a larger organisation and its size, few competitors in product market, main product market is 
domestic, and unemployment to vacancy rate ratio in travel-to-work-area <_ 3.
(5) The reference industries are respectively manufacturing, retail and the publicly-owned parts of 
construction, transport/communications and real estate.
(6) Estimates are unweighted.
that a workplace’s industry strongly affects its hours level, compared to a
representative ‘reference industry’. For instance, the private services
column shows how much workplace-level hours depart from those in the
retail sector. So a worker in property could expect to work 3.5 hours per
week more than a comparable worker in retail, while a similar worker in
transport would do 5.6 hours more than in retail. Other variables (not
reported, but listed under the table) like workplace size also influence
hours, but to a lesser extent than industry. However, the low R2 figures in
Table 7.4 also suggest that the major factors influencing hours at the
workplace level are not observed in the data.
7.6 Effect of labour supply characteristics
The decompositions showed that personal characteristics affected hours
both within workplaces and through the non-random allocation of workers
to workplaces. Table 7.5 gives more detail of the effects associated with
the labour supply characteristics, marital status and the presence of
children, with separate estimates for men and women. The ‘individual
level’ figures show the effect of each variable within the workplace, while
the adjacent ‘workplace mean’ coefficients give the additional association
(due to sorting) between the workplace effect and the proportion of
workers with that particular characteristic. As an example, we would
expect a woman in private services and with a child under 12 years old to
be working 6.4 hours less than a similar woman in the same workplace but
without any children. Comparing her to similar childless woman in
another workplace, there would be an additional effect because of the
change of workplace. If there is sorting, then knowing something about
workforce composition, we can predict this additional gap. In this case, the
workplace mean coefficient of –3.3 shows that in a workplace with 10
percentage points fewer women, the hours of the comparison woman
would be higher by 3.3 x 0.1 = 0.3 hours. Thus the total difference would
be 6.7 hours.
The main message of the table is that, within workplaces, women with
young children work substantially shorter hours, and that in workplaces
with a high proportion of women with children, all employees work
shorter hours (in other words the workplace effect is smaller in these
workplaces). This sorting effect seems to vary across sectors, however. In
fact, it is only highly significant (statistically) in the public sector, where
there is also evidence that married men tend to be sorted into workplaces
with longer hours. This contrasts with statistical tests for sorting on skills
and occupation, shown at the bottom of the table, which indicate strong
sorting in all sectors.
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7.7 Conclusions
Using the WERS 98 data, the analysis has shown that workplace-level
hours ‘policies’ or norms are strong drivers of the hours that employees
end up working. Overall, they account for nearly a third of the variation in
hours explained by the analysis, and they have an especially large effect
in the expanding private services sector. These differences across
workplaces would not be identified in unlinked employee-level data, since
one could not separate differences between workers from differences
between firms. This demonstrates that linked employer-employee data are
essential to account fully for the differences across people in working time.
But as well as differing between workplaces, hours also vary within them
(accounting for over a third of the explained variance). Skill and
occupation as well as family characteristics all affect hours within
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Table 7.5: Family characteristics and total weekly hours
 Manufacturing & Private Public
 infrastructure services services
 Coefficient: Coefficient: Coefficient: 
Variable Individual W/place Individual W/place Individual W/place
 level mean level mean level mean
Male * married 1.220*** 1.025 0.590 3.978* -0.387 5.352**
 (4.00) (0.55) (1.63) (1.70) (0.87) (2.41)
Male * children <19 0.213 -1.876 0.141 0.433 0.196 -2.337
 (0.81) (0.98) (0.41) (0.20) (0.49) (1.15)
Female * married -0.585 2.462 -0.305 -2.298 -2.078*** 0.828
 (1.33) (0.80) (0.99) (1.33) (5.92) (0.49)
Female * child <12 -4.651*** -3.272 -6.403*** -3.273* -6.167*** -3.530**
 (8.59) (0.88) (18.93) (1.73) (17.38) (2.06)
Female *child 12-18 -1.151* -1.767 -1.856*** -3.932* -0.934** -4.422***
 (1.82) (0.46) (4.96) (1.80) (2.56) (2.63)
Number of individuals  5021  9462  7278
Number of workplaces  356  818  565
Tests of joint significance of workplace mean coefficients: 
All 2(31) = 93.47*** 2(35) = 366.03*** 2(30) = 157.84***
Skill / occup characs 2(26) = 89.38*** 2(30) = 156.15*** 2(25) = 69.56***
Preference characs 2(5) = 2.37 2(5) = 13.16** 2(5) = 17.65*** 
Men’s pref characs 2(2) = 1.03 2(2) = 3.50 2(2) = 5.84* 
Women’s pref characs 2(3) = 1.25 2(3) = 9.83** 2(3) = 11.64*** 
Notes: (1) Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
(2) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(3) Estimates are unweighted.
(4) Controls are also included for age and age squared (and interactions with female gender), job 
tenure, highest educational qualification, possession of a vocational qualification, whether received 
training in the last year, fixed term contract, temporary contract, existence of health problems 
limiting daily activities, occupation (and interactions with female gender), female gender.
workplaces. In particular, I have highlighted the large differences in the
hours of women in the same workplace, and in comparable jobs,
according to whether or not they have young children. Finally, just over a
quarter of the variation in hours explained by the analysis is due to a
sorting process of workers to firms. Workers in occupations that entail
long hours also tend to be in workplaces where, on average, everyone
works longer hours. There is somewhat weaker evidence that workers
who prefer longer (or shorter) hours also sort into long-hours (or short-
hours) workplaces.
What are the lessons for policy? Working hours are likely to become
increasingly diverse with the expansion of the private service sector, which
contains the largest spread of hours across workplaces. With restricted job
mobility, it could be difficult to achieve the policy goal of fitting workers to
jobs which enable them to reconcile work and home life. One strategy
would to encourage job mobility. But the coexistence of between-
workplace differences together with substantial variation of hours within
workplaces suggests a dual-pronged approach: promotion of job mobility,
but also the encouragement of within-firm flexibility, which already exists
to some extent.
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8 Using Linked Employer-
Employee Data to Estimate
the Earnings Costs of
Business Closure in the UK
Alex Hijzen, Richard Upward and Peter Wright65
ABSTRACT
We estimate the earnings loss for workers whose employer goes out of
business, using a random one per cent sample of all employees in the UK
linked to a large panel of UK enterprises. We use difference-in-difference
regression techniques to control for observable differences between
displaced and non-displaced workers. We find that earnings losses are
initially large but generally last less than four or five years. Earnings losses
are mainly driven by periods of non-employment rather than wage losses
for those who are successful in finding work again. This is important,
partly because business closure is a very common occurrence: 10 per cent
of the businesses in our sample are not in the sample in the following year.
Business closure can also be politically significant. Governments in many
countries intervene to prevent it, partly in the belief that the costs of
closure are large and long-lasting.
8.1 Introduction
“…whilst we all feel immense empathy for those who lost their jobs there
are a range of new job opportunities coming to the West Midlands.”
Margaret Hodge, Work and Pensions Minister.66
“The jobs we had were highly skilled. Working at Tesco’s would obviously
be nothing like the same kind of work and the pay would be nowhere
near what we used to earn.” Former MG Rover worker.67
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What happens to workers’ earnings when their employer goes out of
business? Accurate estimates of the earnings losses due to firm closure
are clearly of direct policy interest. Research on job creation and
destruction has shown that the entry and exit of firms is an important part
of the way in which economies adjust to changing patterns of demand
(Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh 1996). The costs of firm exit are therefore
likely to be a significant part of the overall ‘adjustment cost’ of changing
patterns of production.
There is a large literature which estimates the effects of displacement on
workers’ earnings. This literature is dominated by estimates from the US.
Kuhn (2002) suggests that this has partly been because of data availability,
and partly because jobs were traditionally perceived to be less secure in
the US than in other OECD economies. Surprisingly little is known about
these costs for workers in the UK: Borland, Gregg, Knight & Wadsworth
(2002) is the only study we are aware of.
We provide the first analysis that explicitly estimates the earnings losses
due to enterprise closure in the UK. We further make the following
contributions. First, we use a new, much larger, dataset to provide
estimates of the earnings loss resulting from firm closure. Our data come
from linking a one per cent sample of workers to a large panel (effectively
a census from 1997 onwards) of enterprises in the UK from 1994-2003.
Second, our definition of displacement is based on the disappearance of
enterprises, rather than self-reported job loss. Because we observe firm
exit over a long period we are able to track workers’ earnings for several
years after the displacement event.
Our main findings suggest the following. First, earnings losses are
primarily associated with periods of non-employment (as defined by
absence from the New Earnings Survey) rather than with falls in wages for
those who are re-employed. This is in sharp contrast to findings from the
US (e.g. Jacobson, Lalonde & Sullivan 1993). However, the only other UK
study on worker displacement (Borland et al. 2002) find that wage losses
for workers who move directly from job to job are negligible, and that
losses are limited to those who experience some time out of work.
Second, earnings losses do not appear to be particularly long-lived. After
controlling for observable characteristics, displaced workers’ earnings are
not lower than non-displaced workers’ five years after displacement.
In Section 8.2 we provide a detailed description of the data construction
process. The methodological issues are explained and discussed in
Section 8.3. Section 8.4 presents the results. Finally, Section 8.5 concludes.
8.2 Data
In order to evaluate the impact of business closure on workers we need
longitudinal information on workers, linked to the businesses they work
for, and we need to know when those businesses cease to exist. Survey
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data on individuals or households (such as the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS) in the UK or the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in
the US) typically do not record the identity of workers’ employers, nor are
they able to identify business closure. We therefore use various datasets
made available at the Business Data Lab of the Office for National
Statistics.
The New Earnings Survey (NES) is a random sample of one  per cent of
employees who are part of the PAYE tax scheme. The last two digits of an
individual’s National Insurance number are used to select the sample, and
so it can straightforwardly be linked across time to form the New Earnings
Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD). Businesses can be identified by a PAYE
reference number, although it should be noted that in some years this
information is not available for all workers. PAYE reference numbers are
available in 1994-1996 and every year from 1998 onwards. It is important
to appreciate that the NES is a sample only of employees, and in addition
probably undersamples low-paid employees and those who have recently
changed employers (Elias & Gregory 1994).
Individuals in the NES may hold more than one job, and to simplify the
subsequent analysis we keep only the highest-paid job for each individual
in each year. We also remove the (very small) number of individuals with
inconsistent measures of age and sex. The resulting sample has slightly
over 150,000 observations per year.
The Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) is a list of UK businesses
maintained by the ONS. It is used for selecting the sample for various
surveys of firms and employees conducted by ONS. A comprehensive
description of the IDBR can be found in the Review of the Inter-
Departmental Business Register (Office for National Statistics 2001). The
IDBR is actually a ‘live’ register which changes frequently. The Business
Data Lab does not (yet) have systematic snapshots of the IDBR going back
through time.
The IDBR linking file is a subset of the IDBR which contains the link
between an enterprise reference number and the PAYE reference number
used in the NES. As far as we are aware, this file is only available for the
years 1997 and 2004. Table 8.1 shows the number of enterprises and PAYE
reference numbers covered by the linking files. Enterprises may have
more than one PAYE reference number.
The Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) is an annual survey of businesses
which, since 1994, has been sampled from the IDBR. The ‘selected sample’
of the ABI is a census of all large businesses employing 250 or more and
a sample of smaller businesses. The ‘non-selected sample’ are those
businesses in the sampling frame which were not selected for the survey.
See Jones (2000) for a more detailed description. The Annual
Respondents’ Database (ARD) contains the information from the ABI for
each year. The ARD comprises three aggregation categories. The lowest
level of aggregation is the local unit: a single plant at a single address. An
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‘enterprise’ may contain one or more local units, and is essentially a firm
or business with a relative degree of autonomy. Finally, an enterprise
group is the group of all enterprises under common control. In addition,
an enterprise may record information via several reporting units. The vast
majority of enterprises have a single reporting unit. However, those
enterprises with multiple reporting units are on average very large, and
will therefore be important in worker-level data.
It is most straightforward to link the data at the level of the enterprise,
because both PAYE reference numbers and enterprise reference numbers
are available in the linking file. The closure of an enterprise is also possibly
a more easily identifiable economic event as far as workers are concerned.
In contrast, the closure of a local unit may in fact be a case of business
restructuring, and may lead to worker relocation within enterprises.68
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68 This is in itself an interesting issue, but not the focus of this paper.
Table 8.1: IDBR linking file
    1997 2004 
Number of unique PAYE references  2,543,158 1,742,894 
Number of unique enterprise references  2,069,297 1,149,834 
8.2.1 MEASURES OF ENTERPRISE CLOSURE
Our measure of enterprise closure is based on the enterprise reference
number in the ARD, and therefore relies on this reference number being
recorded consistently over time. Our basic sample of enterprises is listed
in Table 8.2, together with the number that exit. Obviously we cannot
identify exiting enterprises in the final year of the data.
Comparing Table 8.2 with Table 8.1, we can see that in 1997 the ARD
sample comprised 1,481,789 enterprises, while the linking file contains
2,069,297 unique enterprise references. In 2004, however, there appear to
be far fewer unique enterprise reference numbers in the linking file. This
fall in the number of enterprises seems unlikely to be genuine, though we
cannot identify the cause. However, the number of successful links does
not seem to be affected by this fall in the number of enterprises in the
linking file.
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Table 8.2: ARD sample 1994-2003
Year Continue Exit % Exiting Total 
     
1994 301,993 40,026 11.70% 342,019 
1995 310,342 37,050 10.67% 347,392 
1996 301,708 33,016 9.86% 334,724 
1997 1,320,365 161,424 10.89% 1,481,789 
1998 1,386,354 167,525 10.78% 1,553,879 
1999 1,459,824 179,902 10.97% 1,639,726 
2000 1,483,215 184,363 11.06% 1,667,578 
2001 1,491,961 189,041 11.25% 1,681,003 
2002 1,490,486 217,405 12.84% 1,692,949 
2003    1,743,642 
Total 9,546,248 1,209,752 11.26% 10,741,059 
8.2.2 THE LINKING PROCEDURE
We first link each year of the NES to the IDBR linking file. This is relatively
straightforward because the link is at the level of the enterprise. Figure 8.1
illustrates the connection between the relevant files for one particular year.
The left-hand panel shows the NES for the year 2000. Each of these
individuals has a PAYE reference number, which can in theory be linked to
an enterprise reference number using the linking files shown in the middle
panel. These enterprise reference numbers can then be used to link to the
ARD shown in the right hand panel. Note that some enterprises have
multiple reporting units or multiple local units. Without additional
information on, for example, location or industry, we cannot associate
individuals with individual reporting units or local units.69
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69 In related work, Haskel and Pereira (2002) link two years of the NES to the ARD at the level of the reporting
unit by using additional local unit information on postcode and industrial classification. This approach is
problematic because industrial classification and postcode is not consistently recorded in the NES at the
same level of aggregation, and because many postcodes in the NES appear to be miscoded.
Figure 8.1: The data-linking procedure
New Earnings Survey
 2000   1997 linking file  ARD 2000
 Year N.I. PAYE Year N.I. PAYE Year Enterprise Reporting Local unit
  no. ref. no.  no. ref. no.  ref. no. unit ref. no. ref. no.
 2000 1 A 1997 A a 2000 a a1 a11 
 2000 2 D 1997 B b 2000 b b1 b11 
 2000 3 E 1997 C c 2000 b b1 b12 
 2000 4 B 1997   2000 c c1 c11 
 2000 5 C 1997 X x 2000 c c2 c21 
    1997 Y y 2000 c c2 c22 
    1997 Z z 2000 d d1 d11 
       2000 d d2 d21 
       2000 d d3 d31 
     2004 linking file  2000    
    2004 B b 2000 x x1 z11 
    2004 C f 2000 y y1 y11 
    2004 E e 2000 z z1 z11 
    2004
    2004 X x
    2004 Y y
    2004 Z z
Because the linking file contains a correspondence between PAYE
reference numbers and enterprise reference numbers only for 1997 and
2004, there will be individuals in the NES for whom we cannot find an
enterprise in the linking file, and individuals for whom we can only find a
match in one particular year.
An enterprise which existed in the year of the linking file may not exist in
the year of the NES. For example, an enterprise which existed in 1997 may
not exist in 2000 (exit). Or an enterprise which did not exist in 2000 may
exist in 2001 (entry). In Figure 8.1, enterprise a exits at some point between
2000 and 2004, and so does not appear in the 2004 linking file. We must
therefore rely on the 1997 link in this case. Similarly, enterprise e enters at
some point between 1997 and 2000, and therefore does not appear in the
1997 linking file.
The enterprise reference number may change over time. In Figure 8.1,
PAYE reference number C is associated with two enterprise numbers: c in
1997 and f in 2004. This leads to individual number 5 being linked to
possibly two apparently different enterprises. This problem may also be
caused by PAYE reference numbers changing over time.
Table 8.3 shows the results of the link between the NES and the IDBR
linking file.
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We can now link those individuals whose PAYE reference number matches
an enterprise reference number to the ARD. Before we do this, however,
we can increase the number of cases where an enterprise reference is
available by utilising the longitudinal nature of the NES. Individuals who
work for enterprise A at t-1 and at t+1, but who have no enterprise
reference number at t are assumed to have worked in enterprise A at t.
Individuals whose local unit postcode and whose five-digit SIC code
remain the same at t+1 are assumed to be working for the same enterprise
as at t. Following these rules allows us to link more individuals,
particularly in 1997. Table 7.4 shows the number of links made between
the NES and the ARD.
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Table 8.3: Linking NES to IDBR
Year No link to either Link to 1997 Link to Link to both Link to both Total
 linking file linking file 2004 only linking files different ent.
  only  same ent. ref. number
    ref. number
1994 82,982 15,858 0 59,884 3,912 162,636 
1995 43,500 16,943 0 92,712 6,801 159,956 
1996 24,880 16,199 0 111,645 8,185 160,909 
1997 151,885 0 0 0 0 151,885 
1998 20,687 11,999 0 117,961 8,169 158,816 
1999 21,819 9,902 0 119,154 8,163 159,038 
2000 49,682 3,623 0 96,518 5,348 155,171 
2001 140 5,907 N/A 140,688 8,686 155,421 
2002 406 3,395 6,251 138,576 8,220 156,848 
2003 878 1,534 30,052 116,377 5,345 154,186 
Total 396,859 85,360 36,303 993,515 62,829 1,574,866 
Note that in 1997 there are no PAYE reference numbers available in the NES and so we cannot link 
any individuals to the linking files. Before 1997 the number of links is rather low. It seems unlikely that 
this is due to enterprise entry and exit; it seems more likely to be due to changing enterprise reference 
numbers or changing PAYE reference numbers. The quality of the link appears to increase after 2000.
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Table 8.4: Linking NES to ARD
Year No link to either Link to 1997 Link to Link to both Link to both Total
 linking file linking file 2004 only linking files different ent.
  only  same ent. ref. number
    ref. number
1994 132,246 6,698 391 22,688 613 162,636 
1995 115,363 8,134 573 34,955 931 159,956 
1996 111,013 7,814 611 40,527 944 160,909 
1997 87,819 6,232 445 55,419 1,970 151,885 
1998 45,502 11,561 491 97,016 4,246 158,816 
1999 40,180 9,468 620 104,960 3,810 159,038 
2000 52,673 5,470 518 93,428 3,082 155,171 
2001 28,454 5,427 881 116,385 4,276 155,423 
2002 29,847 3,774 3,996 115,926 3,305 156,848 
2003 30,839 474 19,516 102,358 999 154,186 
Total 673,936 65,052 28,042 783,662 24,176 1,574,868 
Table 8.5: Number of workers with linked enterprise 
reference numbers
Year Unlinked Linked % Linked Total 
1994 132,859 29,777 18.31% 162,636 
1995 116,294 43,662 27.30% 159,956 
1996 111,957 48,952 30.42% 160,909 
1997 89,789 62,096 40.88% 151,885 
1998 49,748 109,068 68.68% 158,816 
1999 43,990 115,048 72.34% 159,038 
2000 55,755 99,416 64.07% 155,171 
2001 32,730 122,693 78.94% 155,423 
2002 33,152 123,696 78.86% 156,848 
2003 31,838 122,348 79.35% 154,186 
Total 698,112 876,756 55.67% 1,574,868 
Note that the number of individuals with no link is much greater than in Table 8.3. This is largely due to 
the incomplete coverage of the ARD. Before 1997 the ARD only covered manufacturing sectors, for 
example. The final number of individuals with a linked enterprise reference number is shown in Table 8.5. 
The proportion of workers in the NES who can be associated with an enterprise ranges from less than 
20% in 1994 (largely due to non-coverage of services in the ARD) to around 80% in more recent years.
8.2.3 ENTERPRISE CLOSURE IN THE LINKED DATA
Table 8.6 reports the proportion of workers experiencing enterprise
closure in a given year, which is far lower than the proportion of
enterprises which exit (Table 8.2). This is because the linked worker
sample is effectively weighted by firm size, and large firms are less likely
to exit.
We are able to use the longitudinal nature of the NES data to check the
accuracy of the measure of enterprise closure. As noted earlier, if
enterprise reference numbers are not coded consistently across time, this
might cause inaccurate measures of business closure. We compare those
cases where enterprise reference numbers disappear with the data with
changes in the individual’s PAYE reference number. Table 8.6 shows that
in about 20 per cent of cases an enterprise reference number disappearance
is not associated with a change in the PAYE reference number, which
suggests that these enterprises did not in fact exit. We therefore code
these as non-exits. This leaves 11,663 enterprise exits observed at the
individual level.
8.2.4 STRUCTURE OF THE RESULTING LINKED DATA
In each year t = 1994, …, 2003 we observe Nt workers drawn from the New
Earnings Survey, indexed I – 1, …, N. This information refers to April of
each year. Each worker has a set of observable characteristics xit, including
variables such as the individual’s age, sex, industry and occupation. For
each worker we also observe yit, a measure of their pay. The pay measure
we use is gross weekly pay, including overtime payments.
143
Using linked employer-employee data to estimate 
the earnings costs of business closure in the UK
Table 8.6: Number of workers in enterprises which exit
 Linked Enterprise exit % Exiting Enterprise exit % Exiting
  at t+1  at t+1 and
    PAYE ref change
1994 29,777 435 1.46% 310 1.04% 
1995 43,662 909 2.08% 654 1.50% 
1996 48,952 1755 3.59% 1754 3.58% 
1997 62,096 767 1.24% 767 1.24% 
1998 109,068 2138 1.96% 1461 1.34% 
1999 115,048 1565 1.36% 1376 1.20% 
2000 99,416 1008 1.01% 661 0.66% 
2001 122,693 3749 3.06% 2403 1.96% 
2002 123,696 3859 3.12% 2277 1.84% 
2003 122,348
Total 876,756 16,185 1.85% 11,663 1.33% 
In each period workers may be linked to the selected and non-selected
data from the ARD. As noted, the number of linked workers varies from
about 20 per cent in 1994 to over 80 per cent in 2003.
The most significant decision we make regards the treatment of
individuals who are not observed in the NES in certain years. We cannot
ignore them because to do so would remove any unemployment effects
from the resulting estimates. Following Jacobson (1993), we assume that
years in which an individual is not observed in the NES are years in which
the individual is not employed. Jacobsen et al. assume earnings of zero for
these periods. Rather than do this, we allocate these individuals standard
rates of the job-seekers allowance.70 This decision will undoubtedly give us
an underestimate of the earnings of individuals who are not in the sample
because some of those missed by the NES will not in fact be unemployed.
We should note that there are different methods that can be used to
generate periods of unemployment. The first method assumes that any
missing row between existing rows is a period of unemployment, but
ignores missing rows at the beginning or the end of the sample. This
ignores workers who leave the sample permanently. The second method
adds in any missing rows from the sample period, giving a balanced
panel. When using the second method we only consider workers aged
25-55 so that entry to and exit from the labour force is not confused with
periods of unemployment. In Section 8.4 we look at the impact of these
different assumptions.
Define J(i,t) to be the function that maps worker i at time t to enterprise j
(see Abowd, Kramarz & Margolis (1999)). For those workers who are linked
to the ARD we observe a limited set of information on the enterprise,
denoted zJ(i,t),t. This could be more simply written as zjt.
A worker is defined as experiencing a business exit if the enterprise they
were in at t no longer exists at t+1. Define a dummy
dit = {1   if firm J(i,t) does not exist at t+1
0   otherwise
(1)
8.3 Methods
In common with the recent literature on policy evaluation,71 we treat a
worker displacement (or an enterprise closure) as if it were some kind of
‘treatment’ which may impact upon a worker’s future labour market
outcomes, in the same way as a training or welfare programme. The key
problem is that we cannot observe outcomes for an individual who both
experiences and does not experience displacement.
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70 Taken from www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D3989.xls
71 See Blundell and Costa Dias (2002) for a recent summary.
Let t* be time relative to the year in which dit = 1, so t* = 0 in the year
immediately before firm closure. Define w 1it to be the sequence of earnings
for a worker which experiences displacement at t*. Define w 0it to be the
(hypothetical) sequence of earnings for the same worker in the absence of
displacement. The total cost of displacement for worker i is
ci = w
1
it* – w0it* t1 	 0, t2 
 0
Note that this cost includes any difference in the sequence of earnings
before as well as after the event.
In this paper we follow the methodology employed in Jacobson et al. to
estimate ci. The basic estimating equation for earnings is:
yit = i + t* + di0 + dit + xit  + it (2)
Equation (2) includes a dummy indicating whether or not the individual is
in the treatment group (di), a set of parameters for relative time t*, plus the
relative time dummies interacted with di. Equation (2) also includes an
individual-specific fixed effect i which is likely to be correlated with dit,
and therefore it is important to allow for this in the regressions. Finally, the
vector xit includes a set of covariates which vary across individual i and
time t up to the point of displacement.
This method thus estimates ci from the difference in mean earnings
between a group of workers who are displaced at t* = 0 (the treatment
group) and a group who are not (the control group). Because the control
group may have different observable characteristics to the treatment
group, the difference in mean earnings is estimated conditional on a set of
characteristics xit. Differences between the treatment and control group
which are not observed but which are fixed through time can be
eliminated by comparing the within-individual change in earnings over
time between the two groups, thus implementing a difference-in-
difference estimator.
8.4 Results
8.4.1 AVERAGE EARNINGS COMPARISONS
The simplest aggregate comparison uses average earnings for the
treatment and control group for each year before and after displacement.
The treatment group are defined as those displaced in year t* = 0 while the
control group are those not displaced in year t* = 0. A separate treatment
and control group is therefore defined for each possible year of
displacement (1994-2002). We then stack each of the treatment and control
groups together to estimate an average effect for all years combined.
Individuals may therefore appear in the control group several times, since
t2

t = t1
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an individual who is not displaced in year t may also not be displaced in
year t+1 and so on. The only restriction we place on the sample is that
individuals must be employed (i.e. in the NES sample) in all five years
before displacement –4 	 t* 	 0. This restricts the sample to displacement
events in the period 1998-2002, which in turn means that at most we have
five years of post-displacement earnings information.
Figure 8.2 shows that workers whose enterprise exits suffer falls in
earnings of about 30 per cent in the first year after the displacement, and
that earnings take between four and five years to return to the pre-
displacement level. If we take the non-displaced as a counterfactual, we
can see that the earnings of those who are displaced are also lower in
most years before the displacement, and that the gap in earnings between
the groups is greater at t* = 5 than it was at t* = 0.
One striking difference between this pattern of earnings and those
presented by Jacobson et al. (Figure 8.1) is the earnings of the control
group. In our sample the control group experience a small earnings loss at
t* = 1. This is due to the fact that we do not restrict the control group to
include only those in employment in all years. Therefore although at t* = 0
the whole sample is employed, a proportion of that sample (including
some in the control group) will be unemployed at t* = 1. Jacobsen et al.
restrict the control group to include workers who are never unemployed.
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Figure 8.2: Average Earnings by Displacement Status
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The average earnings shown in Figure 8.2 are strongly affected by the
proportion of the sample observed in the NES in each year, because those
not observed are assumed to be unemployed and receiving job-seekers
allowance. Figure 8.3 plots the proportion of the sample who are in
employment (i.e. observed in the NES) in each year relative to t* = 0. By
definition the whole sample is employed from –4 	 t* 	 0. More than 30
per cent of the displaced sample are non-employed at t* = 1. The displaced
also have lower employment rates at t*  –4. Note that the method we use
to impute spells of unemployment (filling in gaps) means that
employment rates at t* = -8 and t* = 5 are 1 by definition.
Figures 8.2 and 8.3 illustrate that the post-displacement difference in
earnings between the treatment and control groups is largely due to
different employment rates. There is some evidence at t* = 5, however, that
the treatment group have lower earnings despite all being in the sample.
To check the robustness of these results we plot the difference in earnings
between the treatment and control groups under a number of different
assumptions, shown in Figure 8.4. The solid line plots the proportional gap
in earnings between the two lines shown in Figure 8.2. We then compare
this with a sample which has no pre-displacement restriction on
employment. This has the effect of slightly increasing the gap in earnings
before displacement because the displaced have lower employment
147
Using linked employer-employee data to estimate 
the earnings costs of business closure in the UK
Figure 8.3: Proportion of sample observed in employment
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probabilities at t* 	 0, but has very little effect on the gap after displacement.
One advantage of this sample is that we can follow earnings for up to nine
years after displacement. It is interesting to note that the earnings gap has
completely disappeared by t* = 9.
We then consider the impact of our method of creating unemployment
spells. The third line in Figure 8.4 shows the effect of assuming that
permanent exits from the NES sample are unemployed for the remaining
sample period. Unsurprisingly, this increases the earnings loss substantially
at t* = 1 because a large proportion of displaced workers disappear from
the NES and do not reappear. Estimated earnings losses still reduce and
after five or six years are only slightly larger than under the alternative
assumption.
8.4.2 COMPARISONS OF PURE WAGE EFFECTS
As noted, earnings losses are driven mainly by the increased rates of non-
employment in the displacement sample. This is in contrast to the results
of Jacobsen et al., who claim large earnings losses even among those who
are re-employed after displacement. To examine this issue more closely,
we restrict the sample to those individuals who have a wage recorded in
the NES and are therefore definitely in employment. We split the sample
according to the length of the ‘gap’ between the displacement event and
the subsequent observation in the NES. Thus an individual who was
displaced in 1998 and first observed subsequently in 2000 would have a
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Figure 8.4: Average Earnings Loss: Alternative Sample Definitions
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gap of one year. In Figure 8.5 we plot average wage losses relative to a
control group who do not experience displacement and who do not have
a gap.
It is striking that displaced workers who are observed in the NES in the
year after displacement (those with no gap) experience no additional wage
loss in the year after displacement, although their wages are about 5 per
cent lower before displacement. Individuals who are not observed in the
NES in the years after displacement do tend to have lower post-
displacement wages, but they also tend to have lower pre-displacement
wages as well, so there is no clear evidence of wage losses if we look only
at workers who are in employment (and hence observed in the NES). 
In fact, Figure 8.5 is more consistent with models of selection rather than
models of wage loss due to the loss of firm-specific human capital. When
a firm closes, the workers with the highest earnings ability are employed
more quickly, while those with lower earnings ability experience periods
of unemployment.
8.4.3 REGRESSION RESULTS
In this section we use regression methods to estimate the earnings loss
experienced by displaced workers. The data used are identical to those
used to draw the graphical comparisons. As before, treatment and control
groups are defined for each year and then stacked.
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Figure 8.5: Average wage loss by length of gap
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Table 8.7 reports some baseline estimates of the impact of displacement
which are directly comparable to the graphical comparisons shown in the
previous sections, with the addition of estimated standard errors. OLS
estimates on the unmatched sample (column 1) show that although mean
wages are lower in the periods preceding displacement, none of these
estimates are significantly different from zero. There is, however, a
constant effect of being in the displacement group of -0.0365 which is just
insignificant at 5 per cent. Wage losses in the periods following
displacement are initially large (0.513 log points equates to a fall of 40 per
cent), but decrease in size and are insignificantly different from zero after
five years.
OLS estimates of Equation 2 are potentially biased because they treat the
individual fixed effect i as part of the error term. We therefore then
estimate Equation 2 using within-i mean deviations, which sweeps out any
term which is fixed for an individual over time, including any
unobservable. The results are shown in the second column of Table 8.7.
Post-displacement wage effects now diminish more quickly and also tend
to be smaller, suggesting that some of the raw difference in post-
displacement wages is due to a negative correlation between i and dit. It is
interesting to see that some estimated differentials are actually positive,
including that at t* = 5. This is partly a result of sample selection at the
beginning and end of the sample period. Due to the way in which
unemployment spells are created, at t* = 5 only those in employment are
included in the sample (see Figure 8.3). If displacement serves to remove
workers with low earning potential from the NES sample, we might
observe wages of those who remain in the sample actually increasing.
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In Table 8.8 we repeat the fixed-effects estimates of Equation 2 separately
for each year of separation. Wage loss at t* = 1 (the year after
displacement) varies from -0.76 log points for those displaced in 2000 to 
-0.53 for those displaced in 2001. Note that the estimates for 2002 rely on
a sample who are all employed in 2003, and this estimate is actually
positive, albeit insignificantly different from zero. Again, this shows that a
sample comprising only those who find work after displacement is
probably not representative of all those who are displaced.
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Table 8.7: Baseline regression results
  Unmatched, conditional on covariates
 OLS  FE
displaced -0.0365 (0.054)
d(-7) 0.0094 (0.667)
d(-6) 0.0037 (0.868) 0.0062 (0.684) 
d(-5) -0.0192 (0.397) -0.0003 (0.983) 
d(-4) 0.0035 (0.853) 0.0393 (0.005) 
d(-3) -0.0048 (0.798) 0.0293 (0.035) 
d(-2) 0.0006 (0.975) 0.0329 (0.018) 
d(-1) -0.0078 (0.683) 0.0252 (0.070) 
d -0.0148 (0.447) 0.0199 (0.151) 
d(+1) -0.5132 (0.000) -0.4867 (0.000) 
d(+2) -0.2069 (0.000) -0.1643 (0.000) 
d(+3) -0.1401 (0.000) -0.0400 (0.048) 
d(+4) -0.0914 (0.025) 0.0200 (0.401) 
d(+5) 0.0161 (0.711) 0.1001 (0.002) 
N* 1,692,802  1,692,802
N 63,984  63,984
R-squared 0.5092  0.412 
Notes
(1) Estimates of Equation (2). Dependent variable is log gross weekly pay. 
(2) Regression includes full set of controls including sex, age, region, occupation, industry, public 
sector, union agreement and firm size. 
(3) The notation d() indicates the displacement dummy interacted with relative time. All regressions 
also include dummies for relative time t*.
(4) P-values in brackets. OLS standard errors are robust to within-i clustering.
8.5 Conclusions
We provide the first estimates of the earnings losses associated with
enterprise closure in the UK. Our estimates are robust to different
definitions of the sample used and to different estimation methods. Our
key finding is that earnings losses are primarily associated with periods of
non-employment (as defined by absence from the NES) rather than with
falls in wages for those who are re-employed. This is at odds with the
findings from the US, but possibly consistent with the only other UK study
on worker displacement (Borland et al. 2002).
Our second key finding is that earnings losses do not appear to be
particularly long-lived. After controlling for observable characteristics,
displaced workers’ earnings are not lower than non-displaced workers five
years after displacement. A caveat to this finding is that it partly reflects
the methods we have used to construct the sample, because permanent
exits from the NES are not included.
These findings are preliminary. A key difficulty with the NES is that it is a
sample of employees. This means that periods when individuals are not
employed are not included in the data, and we do not know whether or not
these periods are actually periods of unemployment. In addition, workers
who change employer may be missing from the sample for a short period.
Both of these facts suggest that non-appearance in the NES does not
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Table 8.8: Fixed-effect estimates by year of displacement
 Displaced in 1998 Displaced in 1999 Displaced in 2000 Displaced in 2001 Displaced in 2002 
 Coeff. P-value Coeff. P_value Coeff. P_value Coeff. P_value Coeff. P_value 
d(-6)         0.0087 (0.678) 
d(-5)       -0.0406 (0.020) -0.0338 (0.102)
d(-4)     -0.0051 (0.843) -0.0013 (0.939) 0.0310 (0.126) 
d(-3)   0.0083 (0.740) -0.0332 (0.193) 0.0116 (0.501) 0.0165 (0.416) 
d(-2) 0.0018 (0.948) -0.0146 (0.560) -0.0127 (0.617) 0.0119 (0.489) 0.0201 (0.321) 
d(-1) 0.0032 (0.909) -0.0456 (0.068) -0.0097 (0.704) 0.0063 (0.713) 0.0106 (0.599) 
d -0.0240 (0.393) -0.0277 (0.267) -0.0360 (0.158) 0.0010 (0.952) 0.0269 (0.185) 
d(+1) -0.6564 (0.000) -0.5883 (0.000) -0.7643 (0.000) -0.5336 (0.000) 0.0193 (0.515) 
d(+2) -0.2884 (0.000) -0.3837 (0.000) -0.2633 (0.000) -0.0084 (0.695)
d(+3) -0.0879 (0.011) -0.1445 (0.000) -0.0850 (0.012)
d(+4) -0.0783 (0.032) -0.0138 (0.684)
d(+5) 0.0327 (0.396)
N* 331,849  341,405  329,687  342,158  347,703 
N 36,745  37,295  35,484  37,011  37,875  
R-sq’d 0.3016  0.3856  0.4456  0.4743  0.4657
Notes:
1. All regressions are within-i fixed-effects
2. All regressions include full set of controls in baseline regressions
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72 See Gregory and Jukes (2001).
necessarily imply periods of non-employment with associated large
earnings losses. In this sense our estimates of earnings losses may in fact
be overstated. We are currently working on identifying spells of
unemployment more precisely using data on unemployment claimant
recipients which can also be linked to the NES.72
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